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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRACY STRAUSS,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner,
Case No. 044500158
vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
DAVID TUSCHMAN,
Respondent.
DATE: October 29, 2007

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
October 18 and 19, 2007. Petitioner was. present with Amy Hayes
Kennedy and Respondent was present with Maria L. Booth.

BACKGROUND
This case was filed August 10, 2004.

The petition for

divorce alleged a marriage of July 20, 1996, and a separation of
May 14, 2004.

It alleged one child, Ruzele, was born to

petitioner on January 17, 1994 before the marriage, but there are
no children of this marriage. It sought a distribution of assets
and debts and a reservation of issues relating to the child.
Respondent filed an answer and counterclaim on September 4,
2004.

It sought a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable

differences and sought parent time with the child, alleging
respondent was for all practical purposes the father's child.
Respondent moved for temporary orders on May 12, 2005. After
hearing on May 13, 2005, the court, the Honorable

Deno

Himonas,

granted, pursuant to stipulation, a bifurcated divorce. In the
written order of July 6, 2005, petitioner was to vacate the home
in Jeremy Ranch, respondent was given possession of the home, and
the home was to be listed for sale.

Respondent was given parent

time with the child on Tuesday evenings and every other weekend
Friday afternoon until Saturday evening.
The Decree was entered June 10, 2005, effective May 13,
2005. Then-counsel for petitioner withdrew.
Respondent moved for temporary orders on June 13, 2005,
relative to the child. The court held a hearing July 1, 2007, and
ordered a visitation evaluator be appointed and a GAL be
appointed.

The written order of July 19, 2005, made the

appointments, found respondent was entitled to visitation, and
issued other orders relating to personal property and personal
files.

Parent time was set as partially supervised and

unsupervised.

New counsel for petitioner then withdrew.

On October 5, 2005, the court appointed Dr. Anna Trupp as a
parent time evaluator.
The GAL filed an appearance on October 5, 2005.
On October 13, 2005, respondent moved for an order to show
cause why petitioner should not be held in contempt over parent
time issues. On January 4, 2006, the court scheduled an
evidentiary hearing on the contempt issues. A hearing was held
before the Honorable

Robert

K. Hilder
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on January 27, 2006.

A

stipulation was reached and contempt was reserved.

Reunification

counseling was to commence and the counselor was to determine the
frequency of visitation between the child and respondent.

An

order was signed February 27, 2006.
Petitioner then moved on March 28, 2006, for temporary
orders relating to alimony and the release of funds from the sale
of the marital home.

An evidentiary hearing was set for August

23, 2006, but it was continued and the hearing was held before
Commissioner

Michelle

Tack on September 27, 2006. The

commissioner recommended on November 8, 2006, that the request
for release of funds be denied.

Respondent was ordered to pay

$1300 per month alimony beginning October, 2006. Respondent filed
an objection to the recommendation. The objection was overruled
on December 27, 2006.
After a certificate of readiness was filed December 15,
2006, by petitioner, the commissioner on January 24, 2007,
certified all issues for trial. The issues in the pre-trial order
were established as allocation of home equity, step-parent
visitation time and attorney fees.
On April 4, 2007, petitioner moved to have respondent held
in contempt relative to the payment of temporary alimony. The
matter was not resolved.
On April 23, 2007, this trial date was fixed.
On August 1, 2007, the GAL withdrew and no new GAL was
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appointed. Neither the court nor either party took steps to have
another GAL appointed.
On October 15, 2007, the court ruled on petitioner's motion
in limine concerning respondent's standing to seek visitation.

The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised. The court took the matter under
advisement.

The court finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were married July 20, 1996.

No children

were born to the parties but petitioner had a child, Ruzele, born
January 7, 1994, prior to this marriage, from the biological
father Robert Hayden.

Petitioner and Hayden were never married.

After the marriage petitioner moved to Texas to be with
respondent, but left Texas and came to Utah in July 1997, and
brought the child to Utah. The parties separated due to
disagreements. Respondent remained in Texas working at his own
property/apartment management business until approximately July
2002 when he moved to Utah and the parties reconciled. During the
five year separation the parties remained in contact. During that
separation respondent came to Utah approximately monthly and
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petitioner and the child went to Texas a few times to visit
respondent. Minimal financial support was provided to petitioner
during that time and petitioner worked with her family on and
off. Petitioner and the child lived with petitioner's mother and
sister during this time of separation until 2002.
2.

The parties moved into the marital home, the Jeremy

Ranch home, in July 2002 and remained together until July 2003
when petitioner again moved out with the child and rejoined her
family, her mother and sister.

The parties reconciled again in

February 2004 until May 2004 when petitioner again left and
rejoined her mother and sister.

Petitioner remained out of the

marital home except for a one week period when she returned, when
respondent was gone, in early 2005. This case was filed in August
2004.
3. During the separations respondent saw Ruzele (the child)
and did things with and for her on occasion.

When the parties

did live 'together respondent did things with and for the child,
including providing financial support. He went with her to
activities and participated in her school activities.
4. The home was purchased in 2002 for the price of $391,000.
The contract papers were in the name of respondent but the
property upon sale was titled in the names of the parties as
joint tenants. Shortly thereafter, in October 2002, another
warranty deed was prepared by the parties conveying the property
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to them as tenants in common, each with an undivided one half
interest.
5. Respondent had a family trust and inheritance before the
marriage. The Texas business he ran was taken over from his
father in approximately 1991 and the trust had as its corpus
various apartment buildings in Texas.

Respondent earned

approximately $35,000 per year in 2000, 2001, and 2002, from that
business but received substantial sums regularly from the trust.
He used some of that trust money for purchase of the Jeremy home
which was paid for and thus there was no mortgage. The entirety
of the purchase price came from respondent's inherited trust
funds. Petitioner was never made a beneficiary of the trust. All
of the insurance and taxes were paid by respondent from those
trust funds.

Shortly after purchase the home was remodeled with

trust fund money. The amount of that remodel expense was not
demonstrated convincingly to the court but he testified, through
an exhibit, that approximately $50,000 of trust funds was put
into the remodel. There was no supporting documentation as to
that amount however. Those trust funds became depleted in 2004
with the sale of the final asset and there are no more trust
funds.
6. Respondent testified he only put the name of the parties
on the title because petitioner promised him she would allow
respondent to adopt the child if he did so.
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Petitioner denied

that.

The court makes no finding in that regard but does find,

as detailed below, that respondent wanted to adopt the child.
7. Respondent did not work productively in the sense that he
earned an income upon his return to Utah in 2002 but tried "day
trading" and other evidently entrepeneurial ventures.

He later

obtained his realtor license in 2004 and became a licensed agent
in 2004 but earned no income until 2005.
8. Petitioner worked early in the marriage as an airline
reservationist paid by the hour, earing approximately $7.50 per
hour.

She did not contribute any funds to the marital home and

improved it only in terms of living in it and taking care of the
home.
9. Respondent received monthly distributions from his
family trust in varying amounts and those were put into a
checking account.

No records from that account were furnished to

the court from that time period of 2002-2003.

The court was

furnished checking account records in the name of respondent for
the periods July 2006 through September 2007, two separate
accounts in the name of respondent, one evidently that he used
for business purposes and one for personal purposes.

Exhibits

showed in summary fashion amounts that went through respondent's
account, the first date being June 2005. The court, based
thereon, from the exhibits and records, must find that the
account into which the trust funds were placed was in the name of
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respondent but that the funds were used and spent on joint living
expenses of the parties.

Petitioner has evidently not, during

the marriage or after, had a checking account in her name.
During the time from respondent's return to the family in 2002
until the separation in 2004 neither party had any direct or
earned income but lived completely off the trust funds of
respondent.

Only when respondent got his realtor license later

in 2004 did he have any earned income and those records are
before the court.
10. Petitioner in her divorce petition did not seek alimony.
In March 2006 she sought a temporary order asking for alimony and
listed her monthly expenses at approximately $6800 per month.
Respondent was ordered to pay $1300 in temporary alimony on a
temporary basis. Petitioner's current financial declaration at
the time of trial lists petitioner's expenses at $3876 and some
of those clearly include expenses that involve the child.
11. The court finds the financial declarations of petitioner
to be less than credible and trustworthy.

Similarly with

respondent in some respects.
For example, petitioner lists substantial medical expenses
for various providers.

Included in the March 2006 declaration

was a debt to University of Utah Hospitals.

Various components

of that showed she claimed to owe at that time approximately
$41,000.

As noted, petitioner is not employed and claims no
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income whatever from any source except the temporary alimony.
Somehow, that debt at the time of trial was reduced to her
claimed amount of $23,777.

There have been withdrawals from the

home equity and perhaps that was the source of payment to the
medical providers, but that was not revealed by the testimony nor
any records. Her claimed expenses show only $300 per month
payments toward those medical obligations, however. That cannot
rationally amount to a reduction of $18,000 in a medical bill
with no income and with other expenses of approximately $3500 per
month on $1300 per month alimony.

Petitioner claims utility

bills in the sum of $333 per month for electrical and $250 for
natural gas.

Petitioner admitted a mistake as to the natural gas

but explained that these amounts were her one-third share of the
condo expenses she now lives in with her mother and sister and
her sister's two children.

That would mean, of course, that the

electric bill is $1000 per month.

She explained there are past

due amounts in that figure from a former home of her mother.
Further, petitioner claims expenses that clearly include the
child as part of the expense, for example food and clothing.
Yet, her position is that respondent has no standing whatever to
even see the child, yet she evidently believes he should pay for
some of her expenses, even though petitioner has refused child
support from respondent.

Those factors give the court little

confidence in the truthfulness of the claimed expenses by
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petitioner.
In short, the court has no basis to find the claimed
expenses of petitioner credible or accurate.

The court reduces

the amounts claimed by petitioner in the areas of utilities,
telephone, laundry, clothing, dental, entertainment, gifts and
donations, grooming, auto expense and finds the reasonable
expenses of petitioner are $2566.
petitioner's family involvement.

The court remains uncertain of
There was testimony that before

living in the condo currently occupied, petitioner lived with her
mother and sister in the "Solamere" home or "big" house it was
called, described as being over 10,000 square feet and having a
housekeeper.

That area is known to be in Deer Valley. The court

is familiar with that area of Summit County and it is a luxurious
area.

Thus, whether petitioner actually pays any rent at all or

other housing expenses further clouds the court's ability to find
meaningful the expenses claimed by petitioner. She has no income
yet drives a car valued at $17,000, a 2002 Toyota Sequoia 4WD
SR5. That was evidently purchased by respondent with trust funds
during the marriage. It is paid for and there are no car
payments. Petitioner lists no other consumer debt other than
household living expenses.

She claims a total owed for medical

bills to be $66,661 and has no health insurance. While most of
her claimed expenses are reasonable in amount and not in any
sense outrageous, the court simply attaches very little
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credibility to the claims given the evident ability of petitioner
to survive on seemingly nothing.
Respondent's claims also reasonable and are not in any sense
outrageous except for the notion of having mortgage payments on
two residences, each with a first and second mortgage.
claims seem reasonable largely as discussed below.

The other

However, the

court also attaches little credibility to respondent in most
financial matters because of one simple fact.

He recently in

2005 purchased a condo for just under $200,000 and a home in 2007
for over $500,000.

No lender the court is aware of would

possibly lend such money to a person who claims income as
respondent lists in.his current filings.

Obviously he has either

inflated to the lender his income or has decreased it for court
purposes.

In either event, it shows a lack of complete candor.

It is just totally inconceivable that a lender would provide a
loan with payments over $3000 per month on a stated income of
just over $4000.

Everyone with rational thought or experience

knows that is not what respondent told his lender and if he can
engage in such activity (possibly conduct that could amount to a
felony if proven) his credibility before this court in matters
financial is very low.
12. Petitioner is obviously intelligent and well spoken and
testified with convincing force.
were not revealed.

Her background and education

Her age was not revealed but she appears from
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her life description and from appearances to be approximately 40
years of age. From her description of her life, however, it
appears she has not had meaningful and long lasting employment
other than as an airline reservationist for approximately 2 years
early in the marriage, earning approximately at that time in the
mid- to late 1990s approximately $7.50 per hour.

She describes

herself as being in good mental health but poor physical health,
having had gastric bypass surgery in 1991 and being hypo-glycemic
and having been on various medications for many years. She has
taken iron infusions but it was not clear exactly when that began
or if it has ended nor what effects that has on her ability to
work. She had back surgery at a young age, age 14, fusing several
vertebrae, and has had back problems through her life.

She did

some work for her sister's construction company fairly recently
involving light office work and telephone calling.

Based on all

that was revealed, the court finds that petitioner could work and
earn could earn $1500 per month in Summit County.
13. Since earning his realtor's license respondent has
earned strictly commission and that is currently his only source
of income.

The trust fund is depleted. He works full time and

more as a realtor.
such work.

There are ongoing expenses associated with

His education level was not revealed but obviously he

has been the recipient of his family trust funds which are now
depleted and liquidated. In 2005 he earned gross commissions of
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$2121 per month, in 2006 gross commissions of $7025 per month,
and through August 2007 he has earned gross commissions of $5961
per month. Of course in real estate the work precedes the
commission payment and there are ongoing expenses that often are
"advanced'' by the realtor and not recovered until commission is
received.

He claims business expenses from those gross

commissions of $400 per month average. Both parties agree his
gross commissions have been, give or take a few dollars, $157,452
in the past 37 months, or an average gross income of $4255 per
month, which the court finds to be his gross income per month.
14. Respondent claims monthly expenses of $10,363.

Those

include mortgage payments on a home he recently purchased in
Wasatch County in approximately March 2007 for the sum of
$524,510.

The first mortgage payment is $3065 and there is a

second mortgage payment of $971, which was recently increased as
respondent borrowed $50,000 against the home to pay off other
things.

The current balance on that second mortgage is

approximately $104,000. The balance of the first mortgage was not
revealed but with a purchase in March 2007 the court would expect
the balance owed to still be well over $500,000. These claimed
expenses also reflect mortgage payments on a small condo
respondent purchased in 2005 just after the bifurcated divorce.
Respondent is trying to sell that unit currently at approximately
$187,000.

There is a mortgage on it, as well as a second
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mortgage which he recently increased to borrow $25,000 to pay off
other things.
$233.

The first mortgage is $1033 and the second is

The balances owing were not fully revealed but evidently

are in the vicinity for both of $147,000. Those four mortgage
payments alone amount to $5302 per month, more than respondent
earns on average. Both the condo and the residence were purchased
after the bifurcated decree and up until early 2006 petitioner
did not seek alimony in her petition nor was it ordered in the
first temporary order.

Thus, the purchase of the condo was at

least made by petitioner with an understanding there would not be
alimony payments he would be making. The purchase of the big new
house with over $4000 in payments was made after he was ordered
to pay temporary alimony, however. His claimed monthly expenses
include some business expenses as well as the court-ordered
temporary alimony.

The court reduces those amounts in the areas

of food, his claimed business expenses, dry cleaning and
miscellaneous. Respondent also has borrowed from his family in
the amount of approximately $25,000 which remains unpaid. Because
respondent anticipates selling the condo soon, where he hopes to
realize approximately $40,000 plus eliminate the mortgage
payments ($1033 + 233 =$1266) the court finds his monthly
expenses to be $7906.

Of course, again, that amount is very

largely a function of the first and second mortgages on a new
half million dollar home.

The two mortgages on this primary
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residence alone amount to $4036. If the $40,000 profit from the
sale of the condo is applied to the second mortgage on the home
rather than repaying the money borrowed from family that second
mortgage would be reduced but it is currently approximately
$104,000, so it would be reduced but not eliminated and seemingly
the payment could go down to some extent. Thus, the court finds
respondent's monthly expenses are or should soon be $7000 per
month, which again still includes a mortgage on a new home of
over $3000 per month and a second mortgage as well.

The wisdom

and ethics of such a payment, given that petitioner is living in
a condo with her mother and sister (again her family assistance
is unknown but appears perhaps to be substantial), and given that
petitioner can work but is clearly and admittedly not in the best
of health nor does she have great qualifications for employment
nor does she have much work experience, makes it difficult for
the court to countenance such monthly expenses. Obviously if
respondent is allowed to continue in his big new home he cannot
afford any alimony, there is no ability to pay at all as his
expenses, even reducing most everything he claims and eliminating
two current mortgage payments on the condo and reducing the
second mortgage on the home, far exceeds his average income.

He

testified the real estate market in Summit County is not
improving but going soft and he does not anticipate higher income
in the near future.

That is, of course, open to a good deal of
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speculation and the court is certainly not able, based on the
testimony nor its general knowledge of this area, to adequately
predict what respondent's income may be.

When respondent

obtained his realtor license real estate was certainly a
lucrative field in this area of the State. Thus, the court can
only find his income is what it has historically been, a gross of
just over $4200 per month.

However, even if a "normal" or mor

acceptable reduced mortgage or rent payment were included and
calculated rather than two mortgages on a big new home, for
example assuming he spent $1500 per month rent or for a mortgage,
his expenses would still be $4500 ($7000-2500, reducing the
mortgages from approximately $4000 to 1500).

Having reduced

petitioner's claimed expenses to the very bare bones, and
assuming her family has been helping her greatly and imputing
just above minimum income to her, her reasonable needs still
exceed her ability to provide for herself.

Still, the

calculations do now show respondent can make up the difference in
what petitioner can provide for herself and what her needs are.
An additional complicating factor, of course, is the child.
Petitioner indicates she has never asked for and has not accepted
and would not accept child support from respondent.

However,

with the recent re-introduction of the child"s biological father
Hayden into the equation, petitioner has the ability to seek
child support from him. She testified she has not done so and may
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not do so as he is not "warm" to the idea and petitioner believes
it is more important for him to have a good relationship with the
child than it is for the child to receive his financial support.
If that is petitioner's decision then part of her financial
difficulty is attributable to that decision and she and the child
to some extent bear the consequences of that decision.
Considering all of the factors mentioned the court finds
petitioner should receive from respondent some alimony and she is
in need of it.

However, he is not able to pay alimony and none

is ordered.
The court finds respondent is current in his court ordered
temporary alimony. The "bounced check" for an alimony payment
shortly after the temporary order has been remedied and is found
not to have been wilful.

The request of petitioner for contempt

on behalf of respondent is denied and no contempt is found on
behalf of respondent.
15. The marital home in Jeremy Ranch was sold in July 2005
for $575,000.

The net proceeds were $534,781 after commissions

and closing costs.

The increase in equity was $133,602 from the

time of purchase in 2002.

By stipulation of the parties, as

noted, $60,000 of the proceeds was given to petitioner and she
was to pay her previous attorney, medical bills, and the
remainder was for her use.

Respondent has previously borrowed

$100,000 for his use and has withdrawn another $167,390, meaning
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he has so far realized $267,390, one half of the proceeds from
the sale of the home.

The sum of $167,390 remaining was

deposited with petitioner's counsel and it remains available for
distribution.

Previous orders have allocated the above funds.

16. While the parties were separated from 1997 to 2002
respondent had limited contact with the child, at least weekly by
phone and in person over the weekend perhaps monthly for those
five years.

When the parties were then together in Utah from

July 2002 to July 2003 living in the marital Jeremy home
respondent was involved with and had a valuable relationship with
the child, engaging in what the court will call normal fatherdaughter activities.
17. The court finds, based on all the testimony of the
parties and the experts, that respondent had indeed formed a
strong bond of love and affection with the child prior to the
final separation in May 2004 when the child was age 10.
Respondent supported petitioner and the child in Utah through the
trust funds available to him.

Respondent has sought, through

petitioner, to adopt the child but she rebuffed those requests
and would not consent to it. Initially even in this case
petitioner did not seek to halt visitation by respondent and
agreed in an earlier hearing he could have visitation.
18. As time passed visitation became increasingly rare and
difficult to attain for respondent because of petitioner"s
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conduct. Respondent sought relief from the court and petitioner
responded by alleging there was no relationship between
respondent and the child.

Thus, a visitation evaluation was

ordered and performed at the request of respondent.

The order

granting the appointment of Anna Trupp, LCSW, was made in October
2005 but petitioner did not fully cooperate and did not make her
payment to the evaluator until the end of March 2006.

Visitation

still remained a problem and respondent sought a contempt
finding, and that issue was reserved for this trial. At that same
time reunification counseling was ordered by the court.

That

occurred but was terminated in March 2007 ostensibly by the
child.
19. The court finds that the child as of this date states
and verbalizes that she does not want to see respondent, does not
want him part of her life, and that she wants to be involved with
Hayden, her biological father. The court finds that there has
been alienation on behalf of petitioner, however.

The testimony

revealed, at worst for respondent, that he had yelled in the past
at the child and at respondent in the presence of the child, in
earlier times and in early 2004.

The court finds rationally that

such is not enough for the average child to maintain that such a
person, the only "father figure"' the child had met up until early
2005, to retain such memories that she would never want to see
that person again and would want nothing to do with him.
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While

reasonable persons can disagree about the degree of harm that
results from yelling at or in the presence of a child, the court
finds such is not sufficient to result in the attitudes expressed
by the child currently.

She views respondent as all evil and

wrong and states she cannot recall any fun or good times she had
with him, despite clear evidence to the contrary in the form of
pictures and notes and such which the court has viewed as part of
the evidence.

The court has available to it to DVDs which have

not been viewed. The court attempted to view them both but even
with court staff help was unable to view the proffered pictures.
The court finds, nevertheless from the testimony and other
pictures and notes that have been viewed, that at some time in
the past the child enjoyed many activities with respondent and
they did in fact have fun and good times together. The court
finds that the attitude expressed by the child has to have come
from petitioner, directly or covertly based on petitioner's
attitude.

Petitioner during the trial called David Tuschman, the

man to whom she was married for 9 years, and who bought a home
for her and her child to live in and who paid all expenses while
they lived in a home, "respondent."
Mr. Tuschman, but "respondent."

She did not call him David,

Respondent during the trial

called petitioner "Tracy" and the child "Ruzele." The court
attaches little credibility to petitioner and her denials of this
alienation. For example, she testified that the visitation
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evaluator met with her only for 10 minutes when she, petitioner
and her mother, just happened to drop in. The evaluator testified
they exchanged numerous calls and emails and the in-person visit
was for two hours.

During the reunification counseling the child

indicated she did not want to be there, did not want to talk with
respondent, and could recall no good memories even when shown
photographs of herself and respondent obviously enjoying "good
times'' in her younger years.

Petitioner chose Father's Day to

tell the child that respondent was not her real father and that
she had a father named Hayden.

The child and Hayden did not meet

for several years after the child was told of her biological
father, but in May 2005 petitioner took the child to California
to meet with Hayden and his family, and the timing of that trip
was just when visitation became most difficult for respondent.
According to the evaluator, the child states that her real father
Hayden is all good and she loves him and respondent is all bad
and evil and she wants nothing to do with him.

There appears no

valid reason for this feeling other than petitioner's influence
on the child as the historical facts do not justify such a strong
anti-respondent belief or feeling, even though the feelings must
be considered.

Hayden had no role whatever in the child's life

until May 2005, though he could not as petitioner told him in the
pregnancy that she had miscarried and that she then wanted
nothing to do with him and did not want to see him.
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He did not

even know of Ruzele until May 2005 when petitioner told him of
her. Hayden has had 5 physical visits with the child and numerous
phone contacts but he has provided no support financially other
than the "vacations" they have had together.
Thus, the court finds and concludes there appears no reason
observable to the court based on the facts presented by
petitioner, taken at their best for her, that justify this
attitude of the child that is against respondent.

The court

could conclude or find that this attitude might just be "odd" or
in someway irrational, but rather the court finds and concludes
that the child's attitudes, expressed as they are to the
professionals, are based on something else-namely, what
petitioner and perhaps her family have inculcated in the child.
Certainly any child can be mad at a parent who yells, or worse,
but to the court normally a child who experiences such an event
will be mad or upset with such a person for a time but will not
retain that feeling for years and forevermore.

Further, after

some of the events in the life of this child that petitioner
claims are at the bottom of this alienation, this child did
indeed have visitation with respondent allowed by petitioner,
after the separation in May 2004.

Nothing has shown the court

that there have been any significant events in 2005 to the
present that would justify such an attitude and the court does
not believe the child is simply "wrong headed."
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The bond between

petitioner and the child is described as particularly close and
strong and petitioner's views about respondent have, directly or
covertly, been passed on to this child.
Petitioner testified that respondent tried to kill her when
she accidently overdosed on prescription medication because he
did not call emergency personnel quickly enough after he
discovered her in a largely comatose state.

Whether that event

and petitioner's belief concerning it has been conveyed to the
child is unknown, but the court finds it not to be factual in any
event-that is, the court has not been shown respondent attempted
to cause the death of petitioner.

Nevertheless, shortly after

that event, whatever it was, petitioner allowed respondent to
have visitation and then lack of visitation occurred later.

To

the extent such attitudes clearly residing within petitioner have
been conveyed to the child, that may answer why the child feels
she wants nothing whatever to do with respondent.
As further indications of the alienation the therapist and
visitation evaluator and respondent all combine to relate an
incident in March 2007 wherein the child ended the reunification
session abruptly upon entering the session.

The child said she

was not doing this anymore and called her mother and left the
room within moments of entering the room.

Less than 2 minutes

later, and by some accounts within a minute, the child was with
her mother outside the office of the therapist and the child was
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getting into the car driven by petitioner.

Petitioner explained

she was shopping and got a call and arrived in 10 minutes.

The

court discredits that in the face of three others and the court
finds that session ended as a result of a planned event with
petitioner awaiting outside and fully anticipating the child
would enter, announce she was not participating any further, end
the session, and leave.
Petitioner testified that the child has

xv

called the shots'"

and that is the reason there is no visitation because the child
does not want to see respondent and petitioner has merely
acquiesced and allowed the child to have the final say on this
issue.

While that may possibly be true in one sense, the court

finds petitioner has alienated the child from respondent and has
done so wrongly.
20. The child's therapist for the past two years plus, since
May 2005, testified the child has made clear to her throughout
that the child has no desire whatever to see respondent, to be
with him, or to talk to him.

The therapist, Roxi Nelson, was of

the opinion that the child who will be age 14 in January is
frustrated because she does not see her desires as being taken
seriously and she does not want to be forced to see someone she
does not want to see.

The court finds the therapists concerns

valid to a certain degree but failing ultimately in their
persuasiveness.

That is because as is obvious most 13 year olds
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(soon to be 14) often do not want to do many things that are
either good for them or that are simply necessary as part of
life-to get up on time to go to school, clean their room,
practice the piano, go to bed early, do their homework, eat their
vegetables, and on and on.

Most parents "force" compliance with

such actions not because the parents do not "honor" or respect
the child's wishes, but because most adult parents believe they,
unlike their children, know what is best for that child when the
child does not.

Parents and adults are not always right of

course but all throughout our lives we are somehow coerced or
"forced" to do things we do not want to do.

The wise parent does

not require homework be done at the point of a gun, but
techniques and tactics are employed to get the job done often.
The court views this situation as the same.

It would be most

unwise to physically lasso the child and drag her to see
respondent, just as it would unwise to beat a child until they
clean their room. It is generally good for children, and this
child in this case, the court finds, to realize that a
relationship cannot be broken and others' feelings and emotions
stepped on merely because of the way we feel at the moment or for
a time.

No one should try to force this child to love respondent

but he is factually entitled, and the court finds it would be in
the best interests of this child that this lesson be conveyed to
her in these proceedings, that she be in a position where she can
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on her own, without undue or unfair input from others, decide if
she wants respondent in her life.

She ought not to be able, for

whatever reason, to simply eliminate a relationship that did
exist at one time.

Much of humanity perhaps ends some

relationship in their lives, from failure to see old friends to
breaking up as teenage sweethearts, but those ought to be done
humanely and with consideration.

The court believes that is a

good lesson for this and any child, and a relationship ought not
to be ended cruelly and without reason.
Further, the child appears to be a "victim" at this point
and feels to be such, that respondent has been abusive and unfair
and it will be beneficial in the life of this child to work
through her feelings with the help of neutral persons rather than
perpetuate the feelings she now has that she cannot seem to
overcome. The fact remains, however, that the child feels this
way and those feelings are real and not to be overlooked,
whatever their source.
At least in this case the court does not now see a reason
for such attitudes and failure of this child to allow respondent
to be a part of her life.

Once a few more years pass this child,

as with all children of this age, will be in a better position as
far as maturity to fully make such a decision-I do or do not want
to see this person.

For now, the court finds and concludes that

the court appointed visitation evaluator was fair and unbiased in
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her investigation.

The court does not fully subscribe to her

recommendations, but those recommendations come pretty close to
the court's view.
However, and alas, given the decision in this case those
recommendations are not to be fulfilled and these views of the
court are legally irrelevant and occupy so much paper without
much purpose other than to express the court's view of this
situation.

Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The issue of the ability of respondent to have visitation
was raised in a motion in limine which was brought to the
attention of the court shortly before the trial, wherein
petitioner sought to disallow respondent's evidence as to the
best interests of the child. The court realized that was a
substantive and difficult issue and indicated it would hear the
evidence and argument at trial, which it did, and then rule.
issue is complex and difficult and the court has struggled.

The
The

above findings and discussion demonstrate that the court fully
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believes respondent SHOULD have visitation but the court does not
believe legally he is entitled to such visitation.
Respondent has petitioned the Court in his counterclaim for
visitation rights with the minor child of the petitioner
following the divorce. The child's biological mother wishes to
prevent respondent's visitation with the child and claims he has
no standing to seek or obtain visitation. Respondent has
nonetheless petitioned the Court arguing that under Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a), as an immediate family member of the child,
he has standing to petition for and obtain visitation. The court
has struggled with this issue, and has considered the relevant
statutes, case law, and the arguments of counsel.

The court determines that a stepparent does not have
standing to petition the court for visitation with a nonbiological child following a divorce, when the child's biological
parent who has not been declared unfit, seeks to deprive that
step-parent of visitation.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) (a) states,

NX

[i]n determining

parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court
shall consider the best interest of the child." The statute thus
requires the court to make a two-part determination: (1) whether
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a petitioner seeking parent time or visitation falls among those
people with parent time or visitation rights and if so, (2)
whether visitation with that person would be in the child's best
interests.

The first question before the court is purely a matter of
law as the facts surrounding it are not in dispute.

The court

has found, and neither party disputes, this child is the
biological daughter of petitioner, and she was never adopted by
respondent, though he desired to do so.

The question then

becomes whether, having married petitioner respondent/step-father
has standing as a parent or "other members of the immediate
family" under § 30-3-5(5) (a) to petition for visitation with the
child.

Only if respondent has such standing would the court

consider what is in the child's best interests.

Step-father's status as a legal parent
Obviously respondent is not a parent as he is not the
biological father of the child.
In Jones

v.

Barlow,

2001

UT 20,

the Utah Supreme Court

determined that the non-biological mother of a child who had
cohabited with the biological mother was not entitled to petition
for visitation under statutory or common law. (OT 40-41). The
Court reasoned that because the Legislature had defined a mother-
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child relationship in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201 and outlined
exceptions for visitation for grandparents and other immediate
family members, the cohabiting partner of the child's biological
mother, who had not (and in fact could not) adopt the child, was
not among those people the legislature intended to have the right
to petition for visitation.
This case is distinguishable from Jones
Unlike the two mothers in Jones,

in several respects.

the instant parties consummated

a legal marriage in the state of Utah. Respondent is a person who
could legally adopt the child. The step-father is asserting his
right to visitation under the statute, not common law. However,
similar to Jones,

the step-father never adopted the biological

daughter of his legal wife, though he expressed interest in doing
so and is a person who would be, unlike the Jones

case, legally

able to adopt. Although the court notes that he may have desired
to adopt, the mutual consent to adoption was never given and no
adoption was actually undertaken and certainly not finalized.
The Legislature has defined father-child relationships.
Relevant to the case at hand such a relationship may be
established through paternity or a man's legal adoption of the
child to whom he is not the biological father. Utah Code Ann. §
78-45g-201(2)(d).
In Gribble

v. Gribble,

583 P.2d

64 (Utah

1978),

the Utah

Supreme Court would have required a step-parent show he stood in
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loco parentis to a child before a court could consider whether
visitation was in the child's best interests. The Gribble

Court

noted that if Utah had a statutory provision obligating the stepparent to support the child, the stepparent would have the same
status as a parent or at least a relative and would be entitled
to a hearing on visitation. However, because no such statute
existed at the time, the court required the stepparent to stand
in loco parentis to the child. State
P.2d 710, 715 (Utah 1990) (citing
The Jones

Court modified Gribble

in

Interest

of

J.W.F.,

799

Gribble).
when it determined that

even if a parent stood in loco parentis to a child, that in loco
parentis relationship was temporary and could be terminated at
the will of the surrogate parent, the child and the biological or
legal parent. Jones,

at li 17-24. The step-father in the instant

case is not arguing that he stood in loco parentis to the child,
nor could he, as the biological mother of the child has
terminated any potential that he could stand in loco parentis to
this child.
The Jones

Court majority did not include a surrogate mother

in its definition of immediate family, because:

[G]ranting visitation rights to de facto parents
contradicts the legislature's narrow grant of standing
to certain immediate family members to petition for
visitation. . . . The grant of standing to immediate
family members under certain well-defined
circumstances, however, creates the negative
-31-

implication that all other categories of nonparents are
prohibited from seeking visitation rights. Otherwise,
the standing requirement would not serve its function
as a jurisdictional bar to litigation because every
unmentioned class of nonparent could attempt to
establish visitation rights under the common law. We
decline to expand the common law into an area occupied
by statute so as to contradict the apparent legislative
intent.

Jones,

f 41.

In her dissent, Chief Justice Durham would have

found the non-biological mother had standing as an immediate
family member because of how that term was defined in other
statutes, even though none explicitly dealt with custody or
visitation rights. Jones,

at % 48. The majority disagreed,

however, and found that common law principles:

[M]ilitate[d] against a common law right of visitation
for nonparents. . . .Other relatives of a child merely
have Asome dormant or inchoate right or interest in the
custody and welfare of children' that matures only upon
the death or termination of the rights of the parents.
. . .[C]ourts may not make a 'best interests' inquiry
into nonparent custody of a child absent a
determination that the legal parents are unfit. . . .
Although our precedent in this area involves custody
rather than visitation, the common law nevertheless
evidences a strong presumption that parental rights
shall not be disturbed absent a determination that the
legal parents are unfit.

Jones,

H39 (noting that Utah Code §§ 30-3-5(5) (a) and 30-5-2,

"stand as statutorily created exceptions to this general rule
because they grant standing to seek visitation rights even
against the objections of fit parents." Id. at n.ll.
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Thus, without adoption or actual paternity, a man who
marries a woman with her own biological children is never under
the statute their "legal" father. Further, under Jones,

without

the ability to stand in an in loco parentis relationship to the
child and when the child's biological parent has not been
determined legally unfit, a step-parent's rights are severely
curtailed and subject to the desires of the biological parent.

Step-parents as immediate family members
The question then becomes, if the step-father is not a legal
parent, is he among those "immediate family" members entitled to
petition for and receive visitation? The term 'immediate family'
is not defined in § 30-3-5, nor did the Jones

Court define the

term although a surrogate parent was found not to be immediate
family to a child. As noted, Chief Justice Durham addressed
several other explanations of who was M a member of the child's
immediate family" in other statutes, none of which, however dealt
with custody or visitation rights, nor did any of those deal with
the rights, of a step-parent.
While Chief Justice Durham would have given a surrogate
parent standing under the definition of immediate family found in
other statutes she did not discuss the standing of a step-parent.
Counsel for the step-father in the instant case argued that
did not address step-parent rights and in a footnote left the
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Jones

issue open. However in footnote six, which the court suspects
Court states: M We do not have

counsel was referring to, the Jones

before us, and we do not decide, whether a person who is or once
stood in loco parentis to a child has standing to seek visitation
or custody in the absence of a fit legal parent." Jones,

at 1 28

n.6. Although the step-father has suggested he wished to
challenge petitioner's fitness as a parent to her daughter, that
issue is not properly before the Court at this time.1
In a 2005 decision the Utah Court of Appeals addressed which
family members were entitled to use an easement under an
agreement. Gillmor

v. Macey,

2005

UT App 351.

The agreement in

that case entitled a man and "his immediate family to the first
degree of consanguinity and their spouses and children'' to have
access to the easement. The Court of appeals noted, "[njormally
one's ^immediate family' would reasonably be defined as including
one's spouse as well as one's children." Id. at I 22

1

The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over a
.petition to terminate a biological parent's parental rights.
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104(1)(g)). The only exception to this
exclusive jurisdiction is when a petitioner files for termination
of parental rights in conjunction with an adoption proceeding.
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-7.1) (see also J.CO.
v. Anderson,
734
P. 2d 458, 464 (1987),
and State
in Interest
of Summers
v.
Wulffenstein,
616 P.2d 608, 610 (1980) finding that district
courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate adoption petitions). While
there have been allegations that an adoption was to occur in this
case, neither an adoption petition nor a petition to terminate
parental rights have been filed. Thus, the court does not believe
it has jurisdiction to consider the biological mother's fitness
as a parent at this stage in the proceedings.
-34-

n.10) (surveying other provisions of the Utah Code as well as
cases from other jurisdictions). Nowhere in the Court of Appeals
discussion of immediately family in Gillmor
step-parent. The Gillmor

did it include a

Court specifically found that because

the grant of access was narrow, the step-children of the grantee
were not entitled to receive the benefit of use of the easements
"as they are not related to [the grantee] . . .
consanguinity." (Id.

by any degree of

at 1 23).

In a recent decision from the Colorado Court of Appeals,
released in August 2007, that Court explained at length the
history and development of non-parents' rights to visitation with
children. In

Ct.

App.

re

2001).

C.I.G.,

2001

Colo.

App.

LEXIS

1561,

*7-10

(Colo.

That Court noted that at common law third parties

had no rights to visitation, but

xx

by 2005, all fifty states had

enacted statutes conferring on grandparents the right to seek
visitation with their grandchildren in various situations." Id.
at *8. The Colorado Court, similar to the Jones

Court, agreed

that limitations on third party visitation were designed to
respect the biological parents' desires concerning how to raise
their family. Id. at *9. Citing an Iowa court's decision, the
Colorado Court noted that without these limitations courts:

A

[W]ould have no clear guidelines as to where such
[third-party] visitation should stop. For example, claims
for visitation could arise from siblings, aunts, uncles, and
other persons with special relationships. With so many
-35-

potential petitioners, a court would have to decide which
petitioners are more deserving of visitation than others,
and how much time each petitioner should receive with the
child. It could be chaotic, at best, assigning so many
diverse visitations to an already limited number of weekends
and holidays.'
(Id.

at *10)(citing In re Ash,

507 N.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Iowa

1993)(citations omitted). This underlying policy argument echoes
in the Jones

Court's refusal to abrogate any of the biological

mother's parental rights to someone not already sharing them.
Jones,

at 1 42. This policy underlies this court's resolution of

this matter.
The court takes from these decisions that unless a third
party's relationship has been specifically defined by statute, an
immediate family member, in the context of visitation and
custody, that relationship must be defined in relationship to the
child and not to the parent. Or, otherwise stated, the
relationship family members have to a child defines whether they
are immediate or not for purposes of being able to petition for
visitation. While this does not clearly limit who may petition,
it does require that to petition for or be entitled to
visitation, a third party must have some direct legal or
biological relationship to the child, and not just to the parent
of that child. To define immediate family otherwise, as
respondent suggests,'would permit the scenario of an endless
stream of competing visitation petitions, and unnecessarily
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subject children to disputes between family members all claiming
to act in the best interests of the child.
Consequently, a step-parent who has not adopted a child is
not among those members of the "immediate family" for whom a
court can determine visitation rights over the objections of a
biological parent, because none of the various definitions of
"immediate family" found in Utah statutes or case law consider a
step-parent as immediate family to a child. Further, the

Jones

Court made clear its preference for permitting only a biological
parent to determine how to raise their child.
Respondent's argument that he is a member of the immediate
family because he is the spouse (was the spouse at the time of
the petition in the counterclaim) of the parent is rejected based
on the above reasoning. The relationship that gives standing to
seek visitation "rights" in the child must stem from the
relationship to the child, not that child's parent.
Where a step-parent has not created a direct relationship to
a child through adoption the court does not believe that in the
absence of a determination that the biological parent is unfit,
that a court can permit a step-parent to petition for visitation
over the objections of a biological parent. Such a step-parent is
precluded from petitioning a court for visitation over a
biological mother's objections.
While this may result in what the step-father's counsel
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argued in court is an inequitable result and contrary to wise
public policy, where step-parents have no interest in investing
in a step-child's well being, the court believes the contrary.
Respondent's argument is not without merit that if a step parent
knows he or she may be without any claim t«© see the child in case
of a divorce that step parent will not much sacrifice for that
child.

However, there are other policies involved that compete

with and prevail against that sound policy. Such a rule as this
court adopts will encourage step-parents to take a far more
active role in their step-children's lives by adopting them
whenever possible. Most importantly, it upholds the ultimate
authority of biological parents to determine how they wish to
raise their children which policy was firmly declared in

Jones.

Here, as often noted, respondent did desire to adopt but if the
biological parent will not consent such may not occur.

As discussed in the findings, the court believes respondent
SHOULD have visitation with this child.

Had the court been

required to analyze the facts with the best interest of the child
in mind, as noted, the basic recommendations of the evaluator
would largely have been adopted.

However, as a legal

determination the court rules it cannot and does not examine the
best interest of the child as respondent has no legal right to
seek or obtain visitation with a step child that has not been
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adopted.

2. As to the division of the sale proceeds from the marital
home, the only issue deals with the $167,390 in the trust account
of petitioner's counsel.

As found, the home was certainly and

beyond dispute purchased with pre-marital and separate funds, all
funds coming from the trust of respondent, including the down
payment and purchase price, as well as remodel cost, insurances
and taxes.

The trust funds the parties lived on before

separation were put into a checking account that bore the name of
respondent, not petitioner, but the funds were spent on marital
expenses and living expenses.

The residence, however, was titled

in both names, as joint tenants then as tenants in common.
In considering this issue the court is to consider when the
property was acquired, its source, the standard of living of the
parties, their respective financial conditions, their need and
earning capacity, the duration of marriage, the health of the
parties, children, any relationship to alimony.and child support,
the contributions by one party, and any enhanced value of the
property. Normally interest or enhanced value on pre-marital
property remains pre-marital unless it has become commingled.
Petitioner contends that the home is marital property as it
has become commingled.
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Both the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court
have long held that "once a court has determined that something
is marital property, the court may distribute it equitably,
notwithstanding which party's name appears on the title."
Hoagland

v.

Hoagland,

852 P.2d

1025,

1028

(Utah

Ct.

App.

1993) (citations omitted). The Utah Code permits parties to
transfer premarital property into marital property:

"[a]

conveyance, transfer or lien executed by either husband or wife
to or in favor of the other shall be valid to the same extent as
between other persons." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-3 (1953).
Nonetheless,

NN

the state of title to marital property prior to a

divorce decree is not necessarily binding on the trial court in
its distribution of such property pursuant to such decree. The
trial court is empowered to make such distributions as are just
and equitable, and may compel such conveyances as are necessary
to that end." Jackson

v.

Jackson,

611 P.2d

338,

340-341

(Utah

1980) .
M

In appropriate circumstances, one spouse may be awarded

property which the other spouse brought into the marriage. The
rationale behind this exception to the general rule is that
^marital property ^encompasses all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever
source derived,'' . . . . and that the trial court may, in the
exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property equitably

-40-

regardless of its source or time of acquisition." Rogue
831

P.2d

120,

122

(Utah

Ct. App.

1992)

v.

Rogue,

(citations omitted).

Notwithstanding a trial court's broad power to divide
marital property equitably, x'[i]n some instances, equity will
require that each party to a divorce recover the separate
property he or she brought to the marriage. E.g., Preston
Preston,

646

P.2d

705

invariable." Workman
In Bradford

v.

Bradford,

(Utah

1982).

v. Workman,
993

v.

However, that rule is not
652

P.2d

881

P.2d
(Ut.

931,
App.

933

(Utah

1999),

1982).
relied on

by petitioner, the Utah Court of Appeals looked to the intent of
the parties when transferring premarital property to the marital
estate and whether there was an evident intent to change the
nature of that property to marital property. Where there is no
intention to create a one-half property interest in the other
spouse nor any expectation on the part of the other spouse that
he or she has received a one-half property interest, a court may
freely confer the property to the party who brought it into the
marriage. See generally
(Utah

Jesperson

v.

Jesperson,

610

P.2d

326,

328

1980) .

The original rule for what courts should do with such
property and when exceptions may apply was determined in
Mortensen

v.

Mortensen,

160 P.2d

304,

Court stated:
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309

(Utah

1988),

where the

[I]n Utah, trial courts making "equitable" property division
pursuant to section 30-3-5 should . . . generally award
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance
during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange
thereof) to that spouse, together with any appreciation or
enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by
his or her efforts or expense contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property,
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois v.
Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has been consumed or its
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to
the other spouse. Cf. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326
(Utah 1980). An exception to this rule would be where part
or all of the gift or inheritance is awarded to the nondonee
or nonheir spouse in lieu of alimony . . . The remaining
property should be divided equitably between the parties as
in other divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict
mathematical equality. . . . in making that division, the
donee or heir spouse should not lose the benefit of his or
her gift or inheritance by the trial court's automatically
or arbitrarily awarding the other spouse an equal amount of
the remaining property which was acquired by their joint
efforts to offset the gifts or inheritance. Any significant
disparity in the division of the remaining property should
be based on an equitable rationale other than on the sole
fact that one spouse is awarded his or her gifts or
inheritance. The fact that one spouse has inherited or
donated property, particularly if it is income-producing,
may properly be considered as eliminating or reducing the
need for alimony by that spouse or as a source of income for
the payment of child support or alimony (where awarded) by
that spouse. Such property might also be utilized to provide
housing for minor children or utilized in other
extraordinary situations where equity so demands. These
rules will preserve and give effect to the right that
married persons have always had in this state to separately
own and enjoy property. It also accords with the normal
intent of donors or deceased persons that their gifts and
inheritances should be kept within their family and
succession should not be diverted because of divorce.

The Bradford

Court noted that in Mortensen

the property was

inherited while the couple was married, however other courts have
-42-

also applied the Mortensen

rule to property inherited before

marriage. This trust fund was established before the marriage but
distributed before and during the marriage. Bradford
Finlayson

v. Finlayson,

814 P.2d

843,

841

(Utah

Ct.

quoted
App.

1994)

stating "Each party should, in general, receive the real and
personal property he or she brought to the marriage or inherited
during the marriage."
In Bradford

the husband "conveyed his interest in the home

to himself and his wife as xjoint tenants with full rights of
survivorship and not as tenants in common'" and intended at the
time of the conveyance to give a one-half interest in the home to
his wife.

The Court consequently concluded that the transfer of

the husband's separate property to his wife as a joint tenant
with himself effectively transformed the subject property from
Mr. Bradford's separate property into marital property.
In making its conclusion a court may consider many factors,
including whether other significant and compensating factors in
its division of marital property justify its decision.
Finlayson

at

See

849 stating, "[i]n determining whether a certain

division of property is equitable, neither the trial court nor
[the appellate court] considers the property division in a
vacuum. The amount of alimony awarded and the relative earning
capabilities of the spouses to support themselves after the
divorce are pertinent to an equitable division of the fixed
-43-

assets of the marriage/'. The court may also consider the intent
of the spouses during the conveyance, and whether the other
spouse has acquired an equitable interest in the property by
contributing to its upkeep, in dividing the property.
Here, the court concludes that the actions in titling this
property were not intended fully as gifting half the interest in
the home to petitioner.

Respondent testified that was not his

intent, though the re-titling of the property from joint tenants
to tenants in common appears to have been done to allow the child
to have half the home as the heir of petitioner.

ALL funds

expended on the home were from respondent and his inheritance and
trust fund.

All remodel expenses, all insurance and taxes, and

daily living during the basic one year the parties were together
from July 2002-2003 came from respondent.

Respondent bought a

vehicle from inherited funds, now valued at approximately $17,000
which petitioner drives and will retain.

The titling of the

property is not determinative, but re-titling the property as
tenants in common shows again the desire of respondent to provide
for the child as if petitioner died the child would be entitled,
as envisioned by the parties at that time, to petitioner's half
interest in the property.

That conforms with the intent to aid

the child and eventually adopt her, not with the intent of merely
giving petitioner half the home.
did occur.

The adoption, as noted, never

The court has not found factually whether there was

-44-

such an adoption-for-the-house discussion, but in any event there
was no adoption.

There would be very little reason for the

tenancy in common to occur without that reason and from that the
court concludes respondent did not intend to fully grant
petitioner a half interest in the house absent the adoption.

She

has already received in any event $100,000 from the home, plus
the vehicle from pre-marital funds.

Respondent has not sought a

return of those funds.
Based on all the circumstances the court believes that
respondent is entitled to retain the bulk of the remaining funds
from the sale of the home that remain in the trust fund of
counsel for petitioner.

The court awards respondent $135,000 of

the $167,390 and those amounts should be distributed immediately
to the parties, petitioner receiving the remaining amount.
court believes that provides equity to the parties.

The

The property

remained largely pre-marital but there is some indication of an
intent to commingle the property.

An equal distribution does not

seem equitable under all the circumstances.

Respondent moved

away from his family and life long home in Texas, provided for
petitioner and the child with pre-marital funds, and ought to
retain the bulk of what he brought into the marriage.

Again,

petitioner did not contribute to the home in any way other than
living in it and presumably doing normal cleaning and basic
maintenance on the home, though there was no testimony concerning
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anything she did. Petitioner probably has the greater need but
all factors discussed lead the court to this conclusion that
respondent is awarded $135,000 of the funds remaining and
petitioner is awarded the remainder.

3. As to alimony the court considers the statutory and case
law factors including the finances and needs of petitioner, the
earning capacity and ability to produce of petitioner, the
ability of respondent to provide support, the length of marriage,
any children, what work petitioner did to help respondent with
his income production, whether petitioner helped increase the
skill or education of respondent, the debts of parties, their
standard of living, what each party gave and gave up, what each
party brought into marriage, their ages, health, overall
abilities, any extraordinary sacrifice, and the court may
consider fault.

As discussed to some extent above the court concludes
respondent is simply not able to provide any support to
petitioner.

She has need, probably more than the court has

found, but respondent, even "taking away" his large house
payments cannot provide support based on his last three year
income.

Prior to that he had a trust fund which is now depleted.

He works full time in an occupation that ought to provide at some
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time but now that income is simply and altogether insufficient to
provide for two households.
The court finds it ironic that petitioner in fact is
including in her needs some expenses for the child, yet her
position is that respondent has no right or ability to have
visitation.

The court has agreed with that legal position but

does not agree that any need expressed by petitioner should
include any expenses of her child.
The parties spent a good deal of time on fault, petitioner
claiming respondent yelled, tried to kill her, and watched
pornography.

Respondent, as all courts have come to expect,

responded that petitioner yelled, she watched more pornography
than he did, and he did not attempt kill her and that she laid in
bed all day and overdosed intentionally on prescription drugs at
least twice.

That is precisely the reason fault is a minimal

factor, at least to this court, in awarding alimony.
party was all right or all wrong.

Neither

Fault is not a significant

factor at all in this case.
Weighing and considering all factors and as discussed above,
despite the need, respondent is not able to provide support to
petitioner and no alimony is awarded.

4. As to the contempt of petitioner the court finds
respondent has not proven contempt for the reasons discussed.
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The court has expressed its complete dissatisfaction with
petitioner's behavior and has basically found, though it is
really irrelevant given what the court has done, that petitioner
is the cause of the failure of visitation.

Still, the court

cannot find that the failure to follow the temporary orders was
done in such a way that contempt would have any meaning in this
case.

There would be no purpose in "punishing" petitioner at

this point.

Any theory of punishment, retribution or specific

deterrence, has no meaning in this context as this will not be
repeated.

The court could merely punish petitioner but again the

court sees

no value in doing so. Respondent's request to have

petitioner found in contempt for failure to provide visitation
according to the temporary orders is denied.

5. As to attorney fees given what has been discussed it is
apparent that neither party is financially able to pay the fees
of the other party.

Each party will receive some of the trust

fund money currently held by counsel that remains from the sale
of the home and each is able now to provide for their own
attorney fees.

Neither party has prevailed in such a way that

the court believes that party is entitled to attorney fees.

In

addition, neither is able to provide for the fees to the other.
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The visitation time issue has been difficult for the court.
The court comments that it wishes there could be some
reunification.

The only consolation to the court in making this

difficult decision that takes this child out of the life of
respondent and is not in her best interests is that as a
practical matter this probably is effective for only a couple of
years. Normally when children are approximately age 16 they
pretty much see who they want to see in any event after they
become "mobile" and able to drive, and that is absolutely true
legally at age 18. When this child is more mature perhaps she
will see things differently.

A child normally cannot have too

many people who love that child.

The parties are to work together to prepare an order in
compliance with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS
MEMORANDUM DECISION IS HEREBY INCORPORATED INTO THE FINAL DECREE
AND IS CONSIDERED PART OF THE COURT'S ORDER. The order the court
signs must fully incorporate this decision into the final order.
No additional findings of fact are needed and the supplemental
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decree is to conform to this order.

DATED this

L

1/

/

__ \ day of *-•

( f
' '

, 2007
H

BY THE COURT:

—.

-

>-

^

^

BRUCE C.
L U B E C K
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ReidTateoka(3193)

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Petitioner
170 South Main Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
6300 North Silver Creek Road, park City, Utah 84098

TRACY STRUASS,

TEMPORARY ORDERS

Petitioner,
vs.
Civil No. 044500158
DAVID TUSCHMAN,
Judge Bruce Lubeck
Respondent.

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on Petitioner's Motion for Temporary
Orders before the Honorable Bruce Lubeck at 1:30 p.m. on June 30, 2005. Petitioner, Tracy
Strauss, was present, represented by her counsel, Reid Tateoka of McKay, Burton & Thurman.
Respondent, David Tuschman was present, represented by his counsel, Maria L. Booth. Having
heard the argument of counsel and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The Court approves the appointment of a visitation evaluator to assist the Court in

determining appropriate visitation for this matter.
2.

The Court will approve an evaluator agreed upon by the parties. If the parties

cannot agree the Court requests that each party select three evalu^tors and submit them to the

Court and the Court will select one of the evaluators.
3.

The parties shall refrain from making derogatory comments about the other in the

presence of Ruzele Strauss.
4.

The parties shall instruct third parties not to make derogatory comments regarding

Tracy Strauss or David Tuschman in the presence of Ruzele and that Ruzele should be removed
from the presence of third parties who are making derogatory comments regarding Tracy Strauss
or David Tuschman.
5.

The Court orders that a Guardian ad Litem be appointed in this case.

6.

The Court finds that a relationship has been established between minor child,

Ruzele Strauss, and her stepfather, Respondent, David Tuschman.
7.

The Court finds that support has been paid.

8.

The Court finds that David Tuschman is entitled to visitation.

9.

The Court orders that pornography not be available in the home during visitation

with the minor child, Ruzele Struass.
10.

The Court orders that any and all personal property taken by Petitioner from

Respondent must be returned to him.
11.

The Court orders that any files, including financial and legal files of Respondent

which may have been taken by Petitioner, must be returned to him or immediately destroyed.
12.

Respondent is granted visitation with the minor child as follows:
a. Week 1; visitation will begin on Saturday, July 2 with visitation on Thursday,

July 7 and Friday, July 8. Each of these visits will be for a period of 1 hour and will be in the

home of Ruzele Strauss.
b. Week 2; visitation will be three supervised visits of 2 hours each..
c. Week 3; visitation will be three 1 hour unsupervised visits of 1 hour each,
conditioned upon Respondent's enrollment in an anger management class or an evaluation showing
that such class is not necessary.
d. Week 4; visitation shall be as stipulated pursuant to the November Stipulation
of the parties, ie, Tuesday afternoons 3:00 p.m. - 6:30 p.m. and Friday 3:00 p.m. overnight until
Saturday at 6:30 p.m.
e. Telephone calls should be allowed on a regular frequent basis. The parties have
agreed that Respondent should be entitled to a daily telephone call with Ruzele at 7:00 p.m.
DATED this \ H

day of July, 2005.

£/
Bruce Lubeck
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Maria t/. Booth
Attorney for Respondent

Approved as to form:

Reid Tateoka^
Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TRACY STRAUSS,
Petitioner,

PARENT TIME EVALUATION
SUMMARY

vs.
Civil No.044500158
DAVID TUSCHMAN
Respondent,

Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
Commissioner

MINOR CHILD AND DATE OF BIRTH:
Ruzele Carol Ann Strauss

DOB: January 17, 1994

APPOINTED EVALUATOR:

Anna Trupp, L.C.S.W.

DATE OF REPORT:

July 31, 2007

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER:

Amy E. Hayes Kennedy

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:
GUARDIAN AD LITEM:

Maria L. Booth
Marianne McGregor Guelker

Nature of Evaluation
Initially, with the assistance of a mediator, Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman were able to
reach an agreeable visitation schedule but experienced a great deal of conflict with
implementing the schedule. After several failed attempts to facilitate visitation and a
long lapse in contact between Mr. Tuschman and Ruzele, the Court ordered a parent-time
evaluation be completed. Although the evaluation was ordered in October 2005, the
process did not begin until March 2006 as Ms. Strauss had not returned the necessary
form to the evaluator nor had she paid her portion of the initial retainer until March 21,
2006.
Case History
Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman were married in June 1996. They separated numerous
times throughout the marriage and permanently separated in May 2004. Prior to
marrying, Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman engaged in a long distance relationship. Ms.
Strauss lived in California and Mr. Tuschman lived in Texas. Their courtship lasted
approximately two years prior to them marrying. During the courtship, the parties
frequently visited each other and had significant phone contact when not visiting. During

Parent-time bvaluation
Case Number 044500158
Page 2 of 14
this time Mr. Tuschman became acquainted with Ms. Strauss's 8 month old daughter,
Ruzele, who Ms. Strauss conceived in a prior relationship. Ms. Strauss did not maintain
contact with Ruzele's biological father and he had no contact with Ruzele. In June 1996
Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman married and she and Ruzele, who at the time was two and
a half years, moved to Texas where Mr. Tuschman lived.
Early in the marriage Mr. Tuschman and Ms. Strauss began experiencing marital
difficulties. Ms. Strauss indicated that Mr. Tuschman became increasingly controlling
and verbally abusive towards her. In 1997, during a visit from her mother, Ms. Strauss
decided to separate from Mr. Tuschman and move back to her mother's home in Park
City, Utah. Ms. Strauss indicated that her decision to move was a result of her
experiencing ongoing verbal abuse by Mr. Tuschman as well as an incident where Mr.
Tuschman became angry with her and "raged" at her in the presence of Ruzele. Ms.
Strauss indicated that witnessing this incident traumatized Ruzele to the point that Ruzele
was fearful of being around Mr. Tuschman.
Mr. Tuschman perceived Ms. Strauss's decision to separate as being strongly motivated
by Ms. Strauss's mother, Carol, as well as by her heightened reliance and dependence on
her mother. Furthermore, Mr. Tuschman did not perceive the move as a separation in the
marriage as he indicated that he and Ms. Strauss were still very much in love and were
not considering divorce. While living apart Mr. Tuschman indicated that he engaged in
counseling and worked with Ms. Strauss to improve their marital relationship. They
maintained daily phone contact with her and Ruzele and he visited them every 3-6 weeks.
After three years of living separately Mr. Tuschman and Ms. Strauss decided to purchase
a home in Jeremy Ranch. Mr. Tuschman moved into this home in November 2000. Ms.
Strauss followed in January 2001, after Mr. Tuschman completed some household
repairs. Over the next two years Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman continued to have
marital problems and engaged in frequent arguments which at times became verbally
heated. As a result Ms. Strauss moved out of the Jeremy Ranch home on several
occasions, each time returning to her mother's home. After the situation calmed down,
Ms. Strauss would return home.
During this time Mr. Tuschman indicated that he noticed a marked change in Ms.
Strauss's behaviors. He indicated that she displayed increased depressive symptoms and
found her to be sleeping a great deal of the time, isolating herself and refusing to get out
of bed for extended periods of time. She also displayed increased instability in mood and
was increasingly irritable. Mr. Tuschman also became progressively more concerned
about Ms. Strauss's use of prescription medication during this time. Mr. Tuschman
reported that Ms. Strauss struggled to maintain normal daily activities and became less
involved in Ruzele's care and activities. Although already very involved, Mr. Tuschman
assumed more responsibility for caring for Ruzele. He provided daily care and
participated in her academics, attending school functions and assisting Ruzele with the
majority of her home work. Mr. Tuschman also said that he spent a great deal of time
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with Ruzele since she was very young and that he was mutually responsible for ensuring
that her basic physical and emotional needs were met.
In May 2004 Ms. Strauss was hospitalized after overdosing on prescription drugs. While
in the hospital, Ms. Strauss began questioning Mr. Tuschman's handling of the situation,
feeling that he delayed in seeking medial attention for her by waiting until Ms. Strauss's
mother arrived at the home and encouraged him to call for assistance. She views his
delay as negligent and felt he was attempting to allow her to die. As a result of this, Ms.
Strauss again moved from the marital home and moved back to her mother's. Ms.
Strauss and Mr. Tuschman never reconciled after this.
After permanently separating, Mr. Tuschman began exercising visitation with Ruzele and
voluntarily began paying child support. Mr. Tuschman indicated that visitation became
increasingly inconsistent and in November 2004 he and Ms. Strauss went to mediation. In
mediation they were able to develop an agreed upon visitation schedule. Ms. Strauss
agreed to allow Mr. Tuschman visitation as outlined in Utah Code Annotated section 303-35.
Mr. Tuschman visited with Ruzele as agreed to in the mediation for approximately two
months. In early 2005, Mr. Tuschman again began to experience difficulties in receiving
visitation. He indicated that Ruzele would frequently have other obligations that
conflicted with his visits or simply would not be available when he attempted to visit.
Furthermore, Mr. Tuschman also noticed that Ruzele becoming increasingly dependant
on Ms. Strauss. She began contacting Ms. Strauss numerous times during visitation and
would contact her for permission to engage in activities and for food selection advice
when they were at a restaurant together. Mr. Tuschman found these calls and text
messages to be extremely disruptive as Ruzele would communicate with her mother for a
large portion of the visit and was becoming increasingly detached and less responsive to
him. He also was concerned that Ruzele was becoming less self reliant than she had
previously been and was not developing a relationship with her mother similar to that Ms.
Strauss has with her own mother.
In January 2005, Ms. Strauss elected to facilitate contact between Ruzele and her
biological father, Robert Hayden. Prior to January 2005, Mr. Hayden had been unaware
that he and Ms. Strauss had a child as Ms. Strauss's mother had told him that the
pregnancy had not been successful and that Ms. Strauss had experienced a miscarriage.
Ms. Strauss says that this contact occurred because Ruzele had been told when she was
five years old that Ms. Tuschman was not her biological father and in January 2005 made
the decision to initiate contact with Mr. Hayden. After ensuring that Mr. Hayden was
receptive to having a relationship with Ruzele, Ms. Strauss arranged for contact to begin.
Ruzele indicates that she is very attached to her biological father and her half siblings.
She has accepted Mr. Hayden as her father and is very interested in continuing this
relationship with him and her half siblings. Mr. Hayden and Ruzele continue to have
contact by telephone on a regular basis, but have visited on a very limited basis.
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Over the next few months visitation between Mr. Tuschman and Ruzele occurred less
frequently and eventually stopped occurring at all. In May 2005, while Mr. Tuschman
was away on business, Ms. Strauss took possession of the Jeremy Ranch home, a home
that Ms. Strauss had not lived in since separating from Mr. Tuschman in May 2004. Ms.
Strauss also moved her mother, Carol, and Ruzele into the home with her. Upon
returning from his business trip, Mr. Tuschman found that Ms. Strauss had changed the
locks on the home and he was unable to access the home and his possessions. When
unable to resolve this situation with the assistance of police, Mr. Tuschman sought
assistance from the court. In the motion that he filed he asked the court to allow him
access to the home. He also requested the court enforce the already agreed to visitation
schedule as he had not visited with Ruzele since approximately March 2005. On May 15,
2005 the court ordered Ms. Strauss to vacate the home and awarded Mr. Tuschman
visitation with Ruzele as previously agreed to, which consisted of Tuesday's from 3:30
to7:00 p.m. and every other weekend from Friday at 1:30 until Saturday at 8:00 p.m.
While in the home Ms. Strauss indicated that she accidentally found "hard core"
pornography on Mr. Tuschman's computer. Ms. Strauss indicated that Mr. Tuschman
admitted to having a pornography addiction shortly after moving into the Jeremy Ranch
home, but had promised to never look it pornography again. After finding this material,
Ms. Strauss became extremely worried about Ruzele's safety as the pornography was
found on a computer that Ruzele was allowed to use and could be easily located. Mr.
Tuschman denies these allegations and claims that Ms. Strauss took a great deal of his
personal possessions including legal files, tax documents and the majority of the
memorabilia of their marriage and his time with Ruzele.
Shortly after the May 2005 court ordered that visitation occur, Ms. Strauss enrolled
Ruzele in counseling with Roxi Nelson, L.C.S.W. Ms. Strauss indicated that she sought
treatment for Ruzele as she was concerned that Ruzele did not want a relationship with
Mr. Tuschman and feared that this was abnormal. Ruzele regularly attended counseling
with Ms. Nelson until summer 2006. Ms. Nelson indicated that she had not seen Ruzele
consistently in over one*year stated that appointments were scheduled more on an as
needed basis.
Mr. Tuschman continued to experience difficulties with visitation and again asked the
Court to assist with enforcing the prior order. On June 30, 2005 the Court entered a
finding that a relationship between Ruzele and Mr. Tuschman had been established and
that Mr. Tuschman was entitled to visitation. The Court again ordered visitation to occur
but developed a graduated schedule. The outlined schedule was to begin with short
contacts that occurred at the home of Ms. Strauss than move to supervised visits with the
goal of moving towards resuming the previously agreed upon visitation schedule.
The initial visitation at the Strauss home was extremely difficult. Ruzele was very
resistant to having any contact with Mr. Tuschman and Mr. Tuschman was met with a
great deal of resistance. Mr. Tuschman reported several incidents of Ruzele responding
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to him abruptly or in a hostile fashion. He stated that contact often did not occur because
either Ruzele would refuse to see him and close the door on him or that he would be
informed by Ms. Strauss or one of her family member that Ruzele was refusing to visit.
Mr. Tuschman also reported incidents where Ruzele would covertly act affectionate
towards him or quietly tell him she loved him, acting this way in an attempt not to be
caught by her mother or her maternal family members being affectionate towards him.
In July 2005 after completing the mandatory number of visits at the Strauss's home, Mr.
Tuschman began visiting Ruzele under the supervision of Willwin staff. Ruzele
continued to express resistance to visiting with Mr. Tuschman. Willwin reported
experiencing difficulties at the beginning of visitation and at times found it necessary to
try to persuade Ruzele to participate, frequently giving then eleven year old Ruzele the
opportunity to select activities for them to do during the visit or to structure the visit the
way she wanted, even allowing the maternal grandmother to attend a visit as this was the
only way that Ruzele would agree to go.
During these struggles, Willwin found Ms. Strauss, her mother and her sister to be less
than supportive of the visitation and indicated that at times they made things more
difficult by dismissing suggestions that the supervisor made to encourage Ruzele. They
also noted incidents of Ms. Strauss "circling" the park during visitation time. Although
Ruzele continued to be resistant to visitation and maintained her stance of not wanting to
see Mr. Tuschman, Willwin noticed Ruzele's demeanor improved as the visit progressed
and found that Ruzele appeared to be more relax and interact more with Mr. Tuschman,
at times even appearing to be enjoying herself. They also notice a remarkable change in
Ruzele demeanor towards the end of visits in that Ruzele became more sullen and quieter
than she had been during their interaction.
Once the mandatory number of supervised visits where completed, Mr. Tuschman
attempted to begin exercising unsupervised visitation. After arriving at the Strauss home
on the previously agreed to dates and times that visitation had been ordered to occur, and
being met with resistance and refusal, Mr. Tuschman stopped attempting to visit and
again sought assistance from the court. Mr. Tuschman has not had regular visitation with
Ruzele since approximately March 2005.
Current Perspectives
Petitioner (Ms. Tracy Strauss)
Ms. Strauss does not want the Court to order Mr. Tuschman to receive visitation rights
with Ruzele. She does not believe that visitation is warranted as Mr. Tuschman "is not
her biological father", nor does she believe that visitation is in Ruzele's best interest as
"Ruzele is afraid of David." She questions Mr. Tuschman's motivation for seeking
visitation and believes that he is not genuinely interested in Ruzele or Ruzele's best
interest. She believes Mr. Tuschman is more concerned about "his appearance and what
people think of him" as opposed to caring for Ruzele and wanting a relationship with her.
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She believes Mr. Tuschman is very embarrassed by Ms. Strauss's decision to divorce him
and by the negative appearance that may accompany this decision, and thinks that he is
pursuing visitation with Ruzele as a way to improve his image and to gain retribution
against her.
Ms. Strauss is aware of Mr. Tuschman's accusation that she is alienating Ruzele and
vehemently denies doing this. She believes she has been supportive of Ruzele and has
encouraged Ruzele to maintain a relationship with Mr. Tuschman. She indicates that she
has encouraged Ruzele to call and visit with Mr. Tuschman and has even attempted to
force her to have a relationship. She views her seeking treatment for Ruzele as evidence
to support this claim.
Although she indicates that she is supportive of the relationship, Ms. Strauss admits that
she does not believe that forcing Ruzele to have a relationship with Mr. Tuschman is best
for Ruzele. Ms. Strauss is very concerned that Mr. Tuschman continues to struggle with
managing his anger and fears that Ruzele will be susceptible to witnessing his "rages."
She is also concerned that Ruzele may be exposed to pornographic material as she
believes Mr. Tuschman is addiction to "hard core" pornography and fears that Ruzele
may accidentally find this on his computer.
Ms. Strauss is very confused that the court is even entertaining Ms. Tuschman's request
for visitation and felt that their long periods of separation should not be considered even
though Mr. Tuschman maintained regular contact and continued to financially support
them. She does not view his support and contact as being related to the level of his
attachment to the child and does not believe that contact and financial support alone
should constitute a relationship. She believes that Ruzele's has been consistent in her
desire to not have a relationship with Mr. Tuschman and stated that Ruzele has "never"
been emotionally close to Mr. Tuschman nor did she view him as a father figure. Ms.
Strauss indicated that she believes Ruzele has never had a strong attachment to Mr.
Tuschman and reports that Ruzele has "made if clear her entire life that she does not want
to be with David." She also indicates that Ruzele is afraid of Mr. Tuschman and that she
has been throughout the entire relationship. Ruzele's fear stemmed from her being
exposed to and a victim of Mr. Tuschman's verbal abuse and rages. She says that while it
may have appeared that Ruzele was connected to Mr. Tuschman it was simply Ruzele's
way of keeping the peace and preventing Mr. Tuschman from becoming verbally abusive.
Ms. Strauss indicates that she does not believe that it is in her best interest to be forced to
have contact with Mr. Tuschman and is very concerned about the emotional toll that this
will have on Ruzele. She indicates that Ruzele has struggled immensely since Mr.
Tuschman began fighting for visitation and believes that Ruzele continues to
decompensate as this fight goes on. She has seen a decline in Ruzele's academic
performance and in her ability to manage on a daily basis. She reports that when forced to
have contact Ruzele experiences increased anxiety and stress and has emotional problems
that manifest through bed wetting, excessive crying and self harming behaviors. She also

6

Parent-time Evaluation
Case Number 044500158
Page 7 of 14
endorses that Ruzele experiences an increase in somatic and legitimate physical
complaints when she is forced to have contact with Mr. Tuschman. She reports that
Ruzele is angry at Mr. Tuschman for trying to force her to visit him and upset that he is
not honoring his promise to not force her to visit.
Respondent (Mr. Tuschman)
Mr. Tuschman believes that he should be granted parent-time with Ruzele Strauss
because he has acted as her father since Ruzele was merely 8 months old. He believes he
has treated Ruzele as though she were his biological child and claims that he "was the
only father that she knew" prior to January 2005 when Ms. Strauss initiated contact
between Ruzele and her biological father. Mr. Tuschman perceives Ms. Strauss's choice
to introduce Ruzele to her biological father as manipulative and an attempt to negatively
impact his motion for visitation. Although not against Ruzele having a relationship with
her biological father, Mr. Tuschman is fearful that this relationship will also be
minimized and removed once Ms. Strauss and her family feel the biological father is no
longer beneficial in the court proceeding.
Mr. Tuschman indicated he has always felt as though he was Ruzele's father. He
indicated that he and Ms. Strauss have discussed the possibility of him adopting Ruzele
on several occasions, the first occurring shortly before marrying. Mr. Tuschman
indicated that they did not proceed with the adoption at that time as Ms. Strauss changed
her mind after being informed that it was necessary to notify the biological father and get
his consent. Mr. Tuschman again reiterated his desire to adopt in 2001 at the time that he
and'Ms. Strauss were purchasing the Jeremy Ranch home and again he stated that Ms.
Strauss agreed but asked that they wait a few months. Although he was unable to adopt
Ruzele, he continues to view her as his daughter and reports loving her as though she was
his biological daughter.
Mr. Tuschman believes that he and Ruzele had a close relationship and is saddened by
the distance that exists between them now. He perceives Ruzele's resistance as being
motivated by her mother and maternal family members and fears that Ruzele is acting
this way to ensure acceptance from the maternal family members. He denies Ms.
Strauss's claims that Ruzele was never attached to him and describes them as having a
very good and loving relationship since before he and Ms. Strauss married. He described
times when Ms. Strauss would teasingly call Ruzele "daddy's girl" as they spent so much
time together and Ruzele frequently wanted to be with him. Mr. Tuschman indicated that
he has always been actively involved in raising Ruzele and was involved in Ruzele's
academics and frequently participated in the classroom activities or attended field trips.
While living apart, Mr. Tuschman indicated that he ensured that he had daily contact with
Ruzele and saw her frequently. After moving to Utah, he became more involved with
providing care for Ruzele as Ms. Strauss become increasingly unable to provide care as
her physical and mental health decompensate.
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Mr. Tuschman indicates his motivation for pursuing court ordered visitation with Ruzele
is based solely on the fact that he loves Ruzele and he wants to help her grow into an
independent and strong adult. He believes he has a lot to offer her in accomplishing
independence and is very concerned that Ruzele's long-term well being will be
significantly compromised by the dependence and enmeshment that her current
environment endorses. He believes he could be a wonderful role model for her and that
she would have a better chance to develop emotional independence if he were allowed to
be involved in her life and believes that he could assist her in developing into a strong
and independent person. He wants Ruzele to develop skills that will help her develop
healthy inner personal relationships in her adulthood and that will assist her in gaining
independence. He is fearful that the current environment that she is in and the lack of a
significant positive male role model could result in her experiencing difficulties in
achieving these skills. He is further concerned by what he perceives to be exposure to a
heightened level of hostility directed at males in her current environment as he fears it
may instill a level of hatred towards men, similar to that he believes the maternal family
has. He is worried that Ruzele will struggle with independence and mental health issues
similar to her mother as the environment and the authority figures that she is residing
with encourages and reinforces these characteristics.
Child (Ruzele Strauss)
Ruzele consistently indicates that she is not interested in having a relationship with Mr.
Tuschman. She has not wavered in her stated lack of desire to have a relationship with
Mr. Tuschman. She maintains that she is fearful of him and describes him as being
"abusive" towards her and her mother throughout the marriage. Her memories of Mr.
Tuschman all focus on him yelling, screaming, and him being abusive towards her and
her mother. In an effort to ensure that visitation did not occur, Ruzele told the examiner
that she had previously informed her therapist, Ms. Nelson, that Mr. Tuschman had
sexually abused her. She recanted this statement shortly afterward, saying that she only
said this because she thought it would "get him out of her life."
Ruzele said that she is very confused by Mr. Tuschman's insistence to have visitation
with her and views this as his attempt to "cause pain." She believes if he truly loved her
he would do what she wanted which is to have him leave her alone. Being that he
continues to pursue visitation, Ruzele views his efforts as being negative and maliciously
motivated.
During the evaluation Ruzele said she had never felt attached to Mr. Tuschman and
refused to recall any positive memory that she had with Mr. Tuschman. She was unable
remember times with Mr. Tuschman that was good or enjoyable and at times simply had
no memories that included him. She indicated that Mr. Tuschman had not been actively
involved in raising her nor did he participate in providing care for her when her mother
was. married to him. In a further attempt to minimize Mr. Tuschman's involvement in her
life, Ruzele stating he visited only three times per year after she and her mother moved

8

Parent-time Evaluation
Case Number 044500158
Page 9 of 14
from Texas to Utah, a statement that did not correlate with what Ms. Strauss or Mr.
Tuschman said as they stated visiting occurred approximately every three to six weeks.
Ruzele denies the claim that her mother or maternal family members are discouraging her
from having a relationship with Mr. Tuschman and indicates that her desire is based
solely on her own feelings. She indicated that her mother has pushed her to attend
visitation and to communicate with him and has been very supportive of her having
contact with Mr. Tuschman. She denies that her mother shared information related to the
divorce with her and when asked how she became aware of the courts ordered visitation
stating "my mom, no not my mom but my aunt and grandma would tell me and I would
get really upset." She indicated that the Guardian ad Litem had sent her a document that
contained information related to Mr. Tuschman being addicted to pornography, an issue
that was also very concerning to Ruzele.
Therapeutic perspective (Roxi Nelson, L.C.S.W and Dr. Lynn Maynes:
Ruzele began treatment with Roxi Nelson, L.C.S.W in May 2005. She attended on a
regular basis for approximately one year at which time her attendance became sporadic
and more on an as needed basis. Mr. Nelson met with Ruzele in April 2007 and again
shortly after this evaluator requests to speak with Ms. Nelson. Ms. Nelson focus in
therapy has been to assist Ruzele in processing her relationship with Mr. Tuschman as
well as to focus on Ruzele and assist her in her emotional issues. Ms. Nelson said Ruzele
remained resistant to discussing issues about Mr. Tuschman and when she did she was
superficial. Ruzele has informed Ms. Nelson that she is fearful of Ms. Tuschman, but
does not elaborate and discussed it in a very generic and unspecific manner. Ruzele
maintained her desire to not have a relationship with Mr. Tuschman and her position that
she was "afraid" of him and abusive towards her and her mother. She denies ever feeling
attached to Mr. Tuschman and had told Ms. Nelson that she "detests" Mr. Tuschman.
Ms. Nelson does not believe that it would not be in Ruzele best interest to be forced to
have a relationship with Mr. Tuschman as she has not been given the impression that
Ruzele has ever had a meaningful relationship with him. Furthermore, Ms. Nelson
questions the level of Mr. Tuschman's sincerity as it is her understanding that he has not
consistently maintained contact with Ruzele.
Also given the fact that Ruzele endorses symptoms of trauma as a result of Mr.
Tuschman, Ms. Nelson is concerned that Ruzele will continue to be afraid of Mr.
Tuschman and will be repeatedly re-traumatized if forced to have contact. She is also
concerned that the maternal family dynamics and how strongly emeshed the family unit
is that Ruzele would never allow herself to trust Mr. Tuschman nor did she believe
therapy will improving this relationship as Ruzele is strongly influenced by the opinions
of her maternal family and reliant on them and going against them would be to difficult
and costly for Ruzele. Ms. Nelson also believes that forced contact will only increase
Ruzele's anxiety and her inability to function emotionally.
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Although attending counseling with Roxi Nelson, L.C.S.W., the court ordered Ruzele to
participate in Therapeutic Visitation Counseling with Dr. Lynn Maynes. Ruzele began
attending Therapeutic Visitation Services in June 2006. After attending a few sessions,
Ruzele discontinued her attendance as she had become upset with Dr. Maynes because
she had allowed Mr. Tuschman to begin email communication with Ruzele. Ms. Strauss
indicated that this contact induced a great deal of anxiety in Ruzele and resulted in
Ruzele missing many days of school as she was emotionally distraught.
Dr. Maynes began working with Ruzele again in January 2007, conducting five sessions
between Ruzele and Mr. Tuschman over a two month period of time. Upon arriving to
the first session Ruzele presented as extremely anxious and fearful. She was very distant
and refused to interact with or look at Mr. Tuschman throughout the entire session and
was emotional upon leaving. After the first session, which Ruzele was transported to by
Ms. Strauss, arrangements were made for this evaluator to transport Ruzele and observe
sessions. The decision for alternative transportation was made in an attempt to reduce
any stress or anxiety that Ruzele may have experienced in relation to Ms. Strauss being
present and Ruzele's need to act in a manner that would support the beliefs that she
perceived Ms. Strauss would want. Throughout the following three sessions Ruzele
appeared to be more relaxed and able to communicate directly with Mr. Tuschman as the
sessions progressed. While being transported, Ruzele was relaxed, talkative and did not
present as anxious or emotional. Ruzele also presented similarly at the conclusion of
sessions when she was being taken to meet her mother.
The final session was March 6, 2007. Although similar to the prior three in terms of how
it started, who transported, etc., this visit ended abruptly only minutes after Ruzele
entered the room where Mr. Tuschman was waiting for her. Upon entering Ruzele
angrily stated that did not want to ever see Mr. Tuschman again and exited. In less than
two minutes her mother and grandmother were waiting in their car by the front door. No
further sessions occurred and Ruzele has had no communication with Mr. Tuschman
since.
Dr. Maine's sessions focused on providing Ruzele with a safe and secure environment
that would allow her expression of and validation of her feelings. Ruzele was
encouraged to identify and express her feelings and fears related to Mr. Tuschman
without fear of him becoming angry or defensive towards her. She was asked to explore
her relationship with Mr. Tuschman prior to the divorce and to work on identify feelings,
both positive and negative, associated with these times. Ruzele, again, was very resistant
to this exercise and to any discussion about her relationship with Mr. Tuschman. She
frequently denied experiencing any positive or good times with Mr. Tuschman and only
spoke of past times in a negative and vague manner. She was unwilling to identify
anything positive about Mr. Tuschman or the relationship that they previously had,
simply indicating that she could not remember.
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During sessions Ruzele did not waiver in her lack of desire to have contact or a
relationship with Mr. Tuschman and continued to endorse feeling fearful of Mr.
Tuschman. Ms. Strauss reported that Ruzele was experiencing increased anxiety related
to the therapeutic visitation and that the sessions were extremely disruptive to Ruzele's
daily functioning. Not only did they require Ruzele to be released from school early, Ms.
Strauss indicated that she frequently kept Ruzele home from school as she was to
emotionally distraught to function. Ms. Strauss also reported Ruzele to be experiencing
sleep problems and emotional disturbance. She also indicated that Ruzele appeared to be
more depressed and had episodes of uncontrollable crying for hours.
Clinical Impressions:
Although she indicates otherwise it is clear that Ms. Strauss is not in support of Mr.
Tuschman and Ruzele having a relationship. Her position is clearly demonstrated in her
legal pleading as well as in her interpretation of events. Ms. Strauss' attempt to validate
her cooperativeness in the process is countered with statement regarding the lack of
attachment that existed between Ruzele and Mr. Tuschman and with statements
questioning Mr. Tuschman's motivation.
Ms. Strauss has provided limited and misleading information to Ms. Nelson which has
contributed to Ms. Nelson's negative view of Mr. Tuschman and her perception that he is
"insincere" and "uninterested." She and her family have interfered with visitation and
have prevented it from occurring. They have not been supportive of suggestions offered
that may have reduced Ruzele's level of resistance regarding visitation with Mr.
Tuschman. Additionally, she clearly demonstrated a lack of support for the therapeutic
visitation process as demonstrated by her conveniently being available at the front of Dr.
Maynes office after Ruzele walked out of therapy only minutes after it began. Not only
was her availability suspicious but her willingness to allow Ruzele to leave therapy with
no encouragement to return clearly demonstrated her desire for the process to be
unsuccessful.
Ms. Strauss's decision to introduce Ruzele to her biological father in the middle of such
emotional turmoil in Ruzele's life is questionable as this choice increased Ruzele's
emotional instability and created confiision. This introduction added distress and
uncertainty in Ruzele as she is now confronted with rejecting one father figure and
replacing him with her biological father, a stranger whom she has not been allowed
contact with for the first 11 years of her life. Further, this appears to be another attempt
by Ms. Strauss to minimize the role that Mr. Tuschman had historically played in
Ruzele's life. This evaluator is greatly concern that in future Ruzele's may again be
placed in the position of rejecting her biological father as he may become expendable or
to difficult for Ms. Strauss or her family, just as Mr. Tuschman has.
Ms. Strauss and Ruzele share a similar pattern in that they appear to only endorse one
side of a situation, in that it is either all good or all bad. Although Ms. Strauss used
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yelling as a way of expressing herself when in conflict with Mr. Tuschman, she views
Mr. Tuschman's yelling as "extremely abusive." She indicates that Ruzele has been so
traumatized by Mr. Tuschman's to the extend that she is displays symptoms consistent
with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder yet neither abusive behavior but neither she or
Ruzele can elaborate on any specific incident or series of incidents that may have lead to
her reported feelings of being traumatized. Any references were vague and ambiguous
and frequently were simply terms like "he yelled" or he had "rages" and was "abusive."
This ambiguity is not consistent with the level of anxiety and stress that Ms. Strauss
indicates Ruzele experiences as a result of Mr. Tuschman pursuing a relationship.
It is my impression that the core issue for Ms. Strauss is her struggle to understand and
accept the importance that Mr. Tuschman has played in Ruzele's life. She minimizes the
fact that Mr. Tuschman has acted in the role of Ruzele's father since she was an infant
and is unable to validate any positive experiences either between her and Mr. Tuschman
or Mr. Tuschman and Ruzele. She perceives his involvement as minimal and
unimportant, although he was clearly an attachment figure to Ruzele.
Ruzele demonstrated similar coping mechanisms as her mother in that she has frequent
somatic complaints, struggles to manage her emotion and is extremely dependant and
influenced by the maternal relatives she resides with. She is clearly a sensitive and
loving child who has been forced to reject her feelings for Mr. Tuschman. This behavior
is understandable as her alliance to her mother and maternal relatives, and the fear of
loosing their acceptance and love, outweighs any benefit that maintaining a relationship
with Mr. Tuschman may offer. Ruzele accommodates this struggle by refusing to
remember or believe anything positive about Mr. Tuschman. This dynamic is also
present in the way she views her biological father, who at present is accepted by and
approved of by Ms. Strauss and her family. She only sees him as positive and has, in a
short period of time, become very attached to him and her half siblings.
Ruzele appears to be stuck in her current perception that Mr. Tuschman is all bad. She is
unable to identify anything positive or good about him and when confronted with
information that would contradict her position, she emotionally shuts down and refuses to
talk. Even after being involved in counseling for over two years, Ruzele continues to be
unable to verbalize any form of prior attachment to Mr. Tuschman, although becoming
attached to him would be a natural response to someone who had been involved in her
life for over ten years. She refuses to explore the sudden and drastic shift in her feelings
or to acknowledge she was loving and responsive towards Mr. Tuschman prior to his and
Ms. Strauss's divorce. She continues to be resistant to addressing her perceived fears and
concerns and is only able to classify issues under the label of "abuse" but is unable to
define the meaning that "abuse" holds to her.
Mr. Tuschman's doggedness to maintain his relationship with Ruzele is admirable. He
does not appear to be using his relationship with Ruzele to make trouble for Ms. Strauss
nor does he appear to be pushing visitation with Ruzele as a way to cause her pain or hurt
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her. Mr. Tuschman's appears to be purely motivated by his love and concern for Ruzele.
He continued to pay child support because of his sense of responsibility for the child and
is now ordered to pay alimony to Ms. Strauss, although she is claiming the marriage only
lasted for one year.
Although Ms. Strauss has raised concerns related to Mr. Tuschman's ability to manage
his anger and accused him of being addicted to pornography, Mr. Tuschman has
undergone evaluations that have found no major psychopathology on psychological
issues, he has no legal history and there is nothing to indicate that his presence would be
a danger to the child.
Conclusion and Recommendations
It is evident by his report as well as numerous reports from others who knew Ruzele and
Mr. Tuschman and had the opportunity to observe them together that Ruzele had some
level of attachment to Mr. Tuschman. At present Ruzele is completely polarized against
Mr. Tuschman and has been provided a replacement "father figure", her biological father.
Ruzele has avowed deep affection and attachment for her biological father, which is
unlikely given her limited contact with him.
Ruzele has been given the strong impression that her preference predicts exactly what
will happen in terms of her contact with Mr. Tuschman. She is very aware of her
mother's, the maternal grandmother's and maternal aunt's feelings for Mr. Tuschman.
The level of hostility that they have for Mr. Tuschman is evident and could not fail to
escape Ruzele. Additionally, the cost of pitting herself against her maternal family
members is too great to risk as she is completely dependant and reliant on them. Thus she
has no other option but to adopt the history of her attachment with Mr. Tuschman as it
has been rewritten by her mother and grandmother.
Although continued contact between Ruzele and Mr. Tuschman would ultimately be in
Ruzele's best interest, it is highly unlikely that forced therapy or visitation at this juncture
would have any success. Ms. Strauss does not believe that she should facilitate the
relationship as per the court's order, no matter how many times she is ordered to do so.
Sadly, Ruzele believes visitation with her stepfather, whom she once was very attached
to, should be based strictly on her opinion. Although it is clear to this evaluator that Mr.
Tuschman played an integral role in raising Ruzele and that Ruzele had been very
attached to him, her opinion of him has been so influenced by the beliefs of her mother
and maternal relatives that she cannot allow Mr. Tuschman to have any positive
attributes. She is also unable to accept that his perseverance to have visitation with her is
genuinely motivated.
Additionally, Ruzele may need Mr. Tuschman to limit his efforts because she is
exhausted by the pressure her mother and maternal relatives place on her. She needs to
be allowed the opportunity to either enmesh or individuate from her mother and the
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maternal family without feeling pressured from both sides, and than be provided the
opportunity to assess her feelings at a later time.
For these reasons it is recommended that:
1.

The Guardian ad Litem should remain in contact with Ruzele until she reaches
the age of 18. Ruzele should be informed of all contact information about Mr.
Tuschman (e.g. cell phone, physical location, email address) twice per year in
the Guardian's office. During the visit with the Guardian ad Litem, Ruzele
should be given any letters received from Mr. Tuschman, which should be
read and remain in the possession of the Guardian ad Litem.

2.

Ms. Strauss and her family actively work with a therapist who can assist them
in understanding the effects that broken attachments can have on children and
who can help them to incorporate and deliver to Ruzele a more appropriate
and supportive messages related to Mr. Tuschman.

3.

Mr. Tuschman and Ruzele visit four times per year either with a therapist
approved by Dr. Maynes, Roxi Nelson and the Guardian ad Litem or at the
Guardian ad Litem's office. It is important that neither Ms. Strauss, her
maternal grandmother or her maternal aunt not be involved in this meeting in
any manner and that a neutral third party provides transportation to these
meetings. It is important that the dates and times be scheduled one year in
advance and be unchangeable.

Respectfully Submitted,

AnnaTrupp, L.C.S.W.
Parent-Time Evaluator
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Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
A trial court's determinations of the legal requirements for standing are reviewed for correctness.
[2] Appeal and Error 30 €=^1024.1

Feb. 16,2007.
Background: Former domestic partner sought visitation with child who was born to other partner
during parties' relationship and who was subject of
order designating parties as co-guardians. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
Timothy R. Hanson, J., granted visitation. Other
partner appealed.
Holdings: On certification, the Supreme Court,
Parrish, J., held that:
(1) a legal parent may freely terminate the in loco
parentis status of a surrogate parent by removing
child from relationship, abrogating Gribble v.
Gribble. 583 P.2d 64;
(2) former partner did not have standing to seek
visitation under the doctrine of in loco parentis; and
(3) Court would decline to adopt a de facto parent
or psychological parent doctrine to allow former
partner to seek visitation.
Reversed.
Durham, C.J., dissented and filed opinion.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)6 Questions of Fact on Motions
or Other Interlocutory or Special Proceedings
30kl024.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Supreme Court gives deference to the trial court on
factual determinations that bear upon the question
of standing.
[3] Appeal and Error 30 C^>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Supreme Court gives minimal discretion to the trial
court in its application of the facts to the law on
question of standing.

West Headnotes
[4] Action 13 €^>13
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €==>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k.842 Review Dependent on Whether

13 Action
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13k 13 k. Persons Entitled to Sue. Most Cited
Cases
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must
be satisfied before a court may entertain a controversy between two parties.
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[5] Action 13 € ^ 1 3

[10] Parent and Child 285 €^>15

13 Action
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13k 13 k. Persons Entitled to Sue. Most Cited
Cases
Under the traditional test for standing, the interests
of the parties must be adverse and the parties seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in
the controversy.

285 Parent and Child
285kl5 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Unlike the relationship arising from adoption, the in
loco parentis relationship is temporary in nature.

[6] Action 13 €^>13
13 Action
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13k 13 k. Persons Entitled to Sue. Most Cited
Cases
To obtain standing, a party may assert an interest
that is legally protectible under either statute or the
common law.
[7] Parent and Child 285 €>^15
285 Parent and Child
285k 15 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Doctrine of "in loco parentis" is applied when
someone who is not a legal parent nevertheless assumes the role of a parent in a child's life.

[11] Parent and Child 285 €^>15
285 Parent and Child
285k.15 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Termination of the in loco parentis relationship also
terminates the corresponding parent-like rights and
responsibilities.
[12] Parent and Child 285 €^>20
285 Parent and Child
285k.20 k. Assisted Reproduction; Surrogate
Parenting. Most Cited Cases
A legal parent may freely terminate the in loco parentis status of surrogate parent by removing her
child from the relationship, thereby extinguishing
all parent-like rights and responsibilities vested in
the surrogate parent; abrogating Gribble v. Gribble.
583 P.2d 64..
[13] Parent and Child 285 €^>15

[8] Parent and Child 285 €^>15
285 Parent and Child
285kl5 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Individual attains in loco parentis status by assuming the status and obligations of a parent without
formal adoption.

285 Parent and Child
285kl5 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Status of in loco parentis may be terminated once
the person alleged to be in loco parentis no longer
discharges all duties incident to the parental relationship.

[9] Parent and Child 285 € ^ 1 5

[14] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H €==>20.9

285 Parent and Child
285k 15 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
While an individual stands in loco parentis to a
child, he or she has the same rights, duties, and liabilities as a parent.

76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock
76HII Custody
76Hk20.9 k. Visitation and Joint Custody.
Most Cited Cases
Former domestic partner did not have standing, under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, to
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seek visitation with child born to other partner during parties' relationship; while former partner might
have stood in loco parentis to child during the time
she was actually living with child and providing for
her care, her in loco parentis status terminated
when other partner and child moved out and other
partner refused to allow former partner to interact
with child.

85k 1.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Courts should avoid effecting change in the common law of state when there is no substantial body
of agreement that such change is necessary and
when it is patent that such change can be better effected by legislative action.

[15] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H €==>20.9

760 Child Custody
76DVII Particular Status or Relationship
76DVII(A) In General
76Dk271 k. Relatives in General. Most
Cited Cases
The only persons having any actually vested interest in the custody of a child cognizable by the
law are the parents; other relatives of a child merely
have some dormant or inchoate right or interest in
the custody and welfare of the child that matures
only upon the death or termination of the parents'
rights.

76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock
76HII Custody
76Hk20.9 k. Visitation and Joint Custody.
Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court would decline to adopt a de facto
parent or psychological parent doctrine to allow
former domestic partner to seek visitation with
child who was born to other partner during parties'
relationship; a de facto parent doctrine would not
provide an identifiable jurisdictional test that could
be easily and uniformly applied in all cases, adopting doctrine would not be a natural development of
the common law but rather a legislative act in
derogation of recognized common law principles,
and doctrine conflicted with state statutory law.
West's U.C.A. §§ 30-3-5(5)(a), 30-5-2, 78-45g-201.

[18] Child Custody 76D €==>271

*809 Kathryn D. Kendell, San Francisco, CA, and
Lauren R. Barros, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Frank D. Mylar, Midvale, for defendant.

On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
[16] Constitutional Law 92 C=?2488
PARRISH, Justice:
92 Constitutional Law
92XX Separation of Powers
92XX(C) Judicial Powers and Functions
92XX(C)2 Encroachment on Legislature
92k2485 Inquiry Into Legislative Judgment
92k2488 k. Policy. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k70.3(3))
As a general rule, making social policy is a job for
the legislature, not the courts.
[17] Common Law 85 €^>11
85 Common Law
85k 10 Adoption and Repeal

INTRODUCTION
K 1 Defendant Cheryl Barlow asks this court to
overturn the district court's order granting Barlow's
former domestic partner, Keri Jones, visitation of
Barlow's daughter. Because Jones has no biological
or legal relationship with the child, she has no statutory standing to seek visitation. The district court,
however, granted standing under the common law
doctrine of in loco parentis. We must now decide
whether Utah courts have *810 recognized, or
should adopt, a common law doctrine granting
standing for domestic partners of fit legal parents
FN1
to seek visitation of children for whom they
had acted as parents.
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FN1. Because biological and adoptive parents enjoy identical rights under the law,
our use of the term "legal parent"
throughout this opinion refers equally to
both classes of parents.

the child's surname as "Jones Barlow." For the first
two years of her life, both Barlow and Jones cared
for the child. And in May 2002, the parties obtained
an order from the Third District Court designating
Jones and Barlow as co-guardians of the child.

f 2 We hold that the doctrine of in loco parentis, as
recognized by the courts of this state, does not independently grant standing to seek visitation after the
in loco parentis relationship has ended. Although
this court recognized the right of stepparents to
seek visitation in Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64
(Utah 1978), standing in that case arose out of an
interpretation of statutory law granting such rights,
not from an independent common law source. We
decline to extend the common law doctrine of in
loco parentis to create standing where it does not
arise out of statute. We accordingly overturn the trial court's grant of visitation rights and hold that the
common law doctrine of in loco parentis does not
independently grant standing to seek visitation
against the wishes of a fit legal parent.

K 6 Jones and Barlow ended their relationship
around October 2003, soon after the child's second
birthday. Subsequently, Barlow and the child
moved to a separate residence, and Barlow eventually ended all contact between Jones and the child.
Barlow also petitioned the district court for an order
removing Jones as the child's co-guardian. Jones
objected, but the district court granted the petition.

BACKGROUND
11 3 Cheryl Pike Barlow and Keri Lynne Jones
began a romantic relationship, and in time, they
moved in together. They ultimately traveled to Vermont, where they entered into a civil union.
H 4 In November 2000, around the time they made
their decision to enter into a civil union, Barlow
and Jones decided to have a child together. They
planned that Barlow would be artificially inseminated and bear the child and that Jones would be artificially inseminated and bear a second child at a
later date. Jones and Barlow selected a sperm donor
who shared both of their characteristics and began
the artificial insemination process. Barlow conceived in February 2001. During the pregnancy,
Jones participated in prenatal care with Barlow and
her physician.
H 5 On October 4, 2001, Barlow gave birth to a
baby girl (the "child"). The birth certificate listed

U 7 In December 2003, Jones brought suit in district
court seeking a "[d]ecree of custody and visitation,"
claiming that she had standing under the common
law doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court
found that the doctrine of in loco parentis could
confer standing and ordered that the proceedings be
bifurcated. First, the parties would participate in an
evidentiary hearing to assess whether Jones stood in
loco parentis to the child. If the court found that
Jones established the elements of in loco parentis,
then the court would proceed with a best interests
of the child analysis to determine visitation and
custody.
1) 8 At the conclusion of the first phase of trial, the
district court held that Jones was in loco parentis to
the child and thus had standing to argue that visitation was in the child's best interest. The district
court limited the second phase of the trial to issues
of visitation and child support after finding that
Utah's adoption statutes precluded a consideration
of custody. Following the conclusion of the second
phase of trial, the district court found that continued
contact with Jones would be in the child's best interest and ordered visitation. In addition, the court
ordered Jones to provide financial support to the
child.
U 9 Barlow appeals the district court's
decision.FN2 She presents five arguments: (1) the
*811 trial court lacks jurisdiction in this case be-
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cause the in loco parentis doctrine does not grant
Jones standing to seek visitation; (2) the trial court's
application of the in loco parentis doctrine violates
Barlow's constitutional rights; (3) the visitation order violates Barlow's right to privacy; (4) Jones was
never truly in loco parentis to the child; and (5)
Jones' claims are barred by res judicata. Because
we hold that Jones lacks standing, we reverse the
trial court's order and decline to reach the merits of
the remaining arguments.
FN2. We note that the docket number for
this case, 20040932, was originally assigned to a string of interlocutory appeals
filed with the Utah Court of Appeals before the entry of final judgment by the district court. A second docket number,
20041031, was assigned after Barlow filed
a direct appeal from the final judgment. On
December 17, 2004, the court of appeals
certified this consolidated case number to
the Utah Supreme Court. Although this
case number was originally assigned to the
interlocutory appeals, we decide this case
as an appeal from a final judgment and
deem all unresolved interlocutory appeals
moot under this decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2][3] ^| 10 In reviewing questions of common
law standing, this court recognizes three possible
standards of review. Determinations of the legal requirements for standing are reviewed for correctness. Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Morgan, 2003 UT 58, % 18, 82 P.3d 1125.
However, we give deference to the district court on
factual determinations that bear upon the question
of standing. Id. (citing Kearns-Tribune Corp. v.
Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997)). Finally,
we give minimal discretion to the district court in
its application of the facts to the law. Id.
If 11 Because we confine our review to the district
court's interpretation of the doctrine of in loco par-
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entis and do not address its findings of fact or application of those facts to the law, the appropriate
standard of review is correctness. We therefore
grant no discretion to the district court.

ANALYSIS
[4][5] [6] f 12"[S]tanding is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied" before a court may entertain a controversy between two parties. Wash.
County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003
UT 58, H 6 n. 2, 82 P.3d 1125; accord Harris v.
Springviile City, 712 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986)
("[L]ack of standing is jurisdictional."); Jenkins v.
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) ("[T]he
moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court."). Under the traditional test
for standing, "the interests of the parties must be
adverse" and "the parties seeking relief must have a
legally protectible interest in the controversy."
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148. A party may assert an
interest that is legally protectible under either statute or the common law. See Morgan, 2003 UT 58,
TI 17, 82 P.3d 1125. Recognizing that no Utah statute confers a right to seek visitation of the child,
Jones bases her claim of a legally protectible right
on the common law doctrine of in loco parentis.
[7] [8] [9] K 13 The doctrine of in loco parentis is applied when someone who is not a legal parent nevertheless assumes the role of a parent in a child's
life. Cribble v. Cribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah
1978) ("The term 'in loco parentis' means in the
place of a parent...."); Black's Law Dictionary 803
(8th ed. 2004) ("Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on
all or some of the responsibilities of a parent."). An
individual attains in loco parentis status by assuming the "status and obligations of a parent without
formal adoption." Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66; accord
Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457,
459 (1925). While an individual stands in loco parentis to a child, he or she has the "same rights, duties, and liabilities as a parent." Sparks v.
Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d 570, 571 (1931); ac-
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cord Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66; McDonald v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 267 S.W. 1074, 1076
(Tex.App.1924) ("All such are said to stand in loco
parentis, and, as long as the relation exists, the
rights and duties with reference to the child are the
same as those of the natural parent.").
% 14 The central question now presented to us is
whether the in loco parentis doctrine contemplates
perpetuating these parent-like rights and obligations
after a legal parent has ended the in loco parentis
relationship. *812 Because at common law all
rights and obligations end with the termination of
the in loco parentis relationship, and because the
doctrine in no way abrogates a parent's right to terminate such a relationship, we conclude that Jones
lacks standing to seek visitation. And we decline to
expand the in loco parentis doctrine to permanently
diminish parental rights.

I. THE IN LOCO PARENTIS DOCTRINE DOES
NOT CONFER STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AFTER THE PARENT-LIKE RELATIONSHIP HAS ENDED
[10][11] f 15 Unlike the relationship arising from
adoption, the in loco parentis relationship is temporary in nature. 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child §
9 (2002); Babb v. Matlock, 340 Ark. 263, 9 S.W.3d
508, 510 (2000). In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65
Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925), we endorsed the common law principle that where an individual enters
into an in loco parentis relationship with a child,
"the reciprocal rights, duties, and obligations of
parent and child continue as long as such relation
continues." Id. at 459; accord59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002) ("Once the person alleged
to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all the
duties incident to the parental relationship, the person is no longer in loco parentis."). Thus, the termination of the in loco parentis relationship also
terminates the corresponding parent-like rights and
responsibilities. 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9
(2002); State v. Randall S. (In re Interest of Destiny S.)t 263 Neb.255, 639 N.W.2d 400, 406 (2002).
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K 16 Because it is clear that Barlow effectively
ended the in loco parentis relationship when she
moved to another residence and refused to allow
Jones to interact with the child, the only question
that remains is whether such an act by a legal parent qualifies as a valid termination of an in loco
parentis relationship under the common law. Stated
differently, the question is whether a legal parent
may terminate the in loco parentis status by removing the child from the relationship with the surrogate parent or whether the in loco parentis doctrine
allows the surrogate parent to extend the relationship against the legal parent's will.
H 17 Before addressing the question of how an in
loco parentis relationship may be terminated, we
first correct a misstatement this court has made as
to the status of the common law on this issue. It is
universally recognized that, "[u]nlike natural and
adoptive parenthood, the status of being in loco
parentis is temporary; it may be abrogated at will
either by the surrogate parent or by the child." 59
Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002) (emphasis
added). In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah
1978), we misconstrued this principle when we asserted that "[t]he common law concerning termination of the [in] loco parentis status is that only the
surrogate parent or the child is able to terminate the
status at will." Id. at 67 (emphasis added). This assertion that the common law recognized disavowal
by either the surrogate parent or the child as the exclusive method of dissolving an in loco parentis relationship was incorrect.
f 18 When we review the authorities cited by this
court in Gribble, we find no support for the proposition that only the surrogate parent or the child may
terminate the in loco parentis relationship. In support of that proposition, the Gribble court, 583 P.2d
at 67 n. 13, cited two cases: the Washington Supreme Court decision of Taylor v. Taylor, 58
Wash.2d 510, 364 P.2d 444 (1961), and the South
Carolina decision of Chestnut v. Chestnut, 247 S.C.
332, 147 S.E.2d 269 (1966). Both of these cases involved attempts by men who stood in loco parentis
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to a child to avoid child support upon divorce or
separation from their wives. Taylor, 364 P.2d at
444-46; Chestnut 147 S.E.2d at 270. In declaring
that these men could avoid a support obligation,
both courts directly quoted the following statement
from the Iowa Supreme Court as representing the
accepted common law:
One important qualification is that one merely
standing in the place of a parent may abandon the
burdens attendant upon such status at any time. In
McDonald v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association it is said: "... the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated*813 at
will by either the person thus standing in loco
parentis or by the child." To the same effect is
this language from In re McCardie's Estate (95
Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850 (1934) ]: "It (loco parentis) is not, as argued, to be likened to that of
adoption. The one is temporary in character, the
other permanent and abiding."
State ex rel. Gilman v. Bacon, 249 Iowa 1233, 91
N.W.2d 395, 399 (1958) (citations omitted), quoted
in Taylor, 364 P.2d at 445-46; Chestnut, 147
S.E.2dat270.
H 19 That the surrogate parent is in no way bound
by the obligations of the in loco parentis relationship does not support the somewhat contrary conclusion that the doctrine entitles the surrogate parent to unilaterally extend the rights pertaining to
such a relationship. In fact, there is nothing in the
authorities we cited in Gribble justifying the conclusion that the in loco parentis status may be terminated by only the surrogate parent or the child.
% 20 Our research has failed to uncover a single instance where a court has endorsed the proposition
that the inherent power of the surrogate parent or
the child to terminate the relationship is exclusive
in nature. Quite the opposite, cases recognizing that
the relationship may be abrogated at will by either
party emphasize the transitory nature of the relationship, rather than the Gribble formulation of a
relationship that is essentially permanent at the op-
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tion of the surrogate parent. See Harmon v. Dep't
of Soc. & Health Servs., 134 Wash.2d 523, 951
P.2d 770, 775 (1998) ("At common law the status
of one standing in loco parentis is voluntary and
temporary and may be abrogated at will by either
the person standing in loco parentis or ... the
child."); In re Agnes P., 110 N.M. 768, 800 P.2d
202, 205 (N.M.Ct.App.1990) ( "Furthermore, an in
loco parentis status is temporary and may be abrogated at will by either the child or the surrogate parent."); McDonald v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n,
267 S.W. 1074, 1076 (Tex.App.1924) ("[T]he relation existing between an adopting parent and the
child is permanent, continuing, and cannot be abrogated by the parent; whilst the status of one in
loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at
will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child."). In fact, a New Mexico appellate court that cited this proposition found that
nothing within the in loco parentis doctrine prohibited the state from terminating the relationship
against the objection of the surrogate parents. Agnes P., 800 P.2d at 205. The court held that the surrogate parents were not entitled to termination hearings because they did not have the same due process rights as legal parents. Id.
K 21 In short, the fact that the in loco parentis status
could be terminated by the surrogate parent or by
the child does not suggest any limitation or restriction on the rights of a fit legal parent to terminate a
surrogate parent's relationship with his or her child.
We thus conclude that our statement in Gribble regarding termination of the in loco parentis status,
insofar as it restricted the authority to terminate the
relationship to either the surrogate parent or the
child, was incorrect as a statement of the historical
common law rule.
[12] T| 22 Indeed, there is no principle within the in
loco parentis doctrine that purports to abridge a fit
legal parent's right to govern her children's associations. The in loco parentis status is "temporary by
definition and ceases on withdrawal of consent by
the legal parent." Carvin v. Britain (In re Parent-
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age of LB.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 168
n.7 (2005).FN3 In other words, a legal parent may
freely terminate the in loco parentis status by removing her child from the relationship, thereby extinguishing all parent-like rights and responsibilities vested in the former surrogate parent.

[that] the person deemed to be standing in loco parentis had actual care and custody of a child in a parent's absence." Id. at 636. Thus, the assignment of
permanent rights is repugnant to one of the defining
features of the in loco parentis doctrine-its temporary status.

FN3. The Washington Supreme Court has
recognized that the in loco parentis doctrine is temporary in nature and does not
extend permanent rights akin to those held
by actual parents. L.B., 122 P.3d at 168 n.
7; Luby v. Da Silva (In re Custody oj
Brown), 153 Wash.2d 646, 105 P.3d991,
994 (2005) ("[N]o Washington case recognizes that nonparents are guaranteed the
fundamental rights of parents under the
doctrine of in loco parentis.")- However,
the court has chosen to "adapt [their] common law" to recognize a "de facto parent"
doctrine which does confer rights equal to
that of a legal parent. L.B., 122 P.3d at
176-77.

K 24 This temporary status is reinforced by the fact
that the surrogate parent may arbitrarily cast the relationship aside at any time and thus terminate all
parent-like obligations and rights. 67A CJ.S. Parent and Child § 348 (2002); Taylor v. Taylor. 58
Wash.2d 510, 364 P.2d 444, 445 (1961). It would
be a perverse doctrine of law that left a legal parent
unable to enforce support obligations against a surrogate parent's will because of the temporary status
of the in loco parentis relationship but allowed a
surrogate parent to extend her parent-like rights
against the legal parent's objections for as long as
she saw fit. Under such a distorted legal regime, the
parent-like rights and responsibilities are permanent
and abiding for as long as the surrogate parent
wants them to be, yet transitory and fleeting when
the legal parent seeks to enforce a parental obligation against the surrogate parent.™4 Such an inequitable result, which would prioritize the rights of
the surrogate parent over the needs of the child,
demonstrates that the in loco parentis doctrine does
not contemplate a perpetual grant of rights and is,
in fact, ill-suited to convey such rights.

*814 | 23 Other courts have recognized that the
temporary nature of the in loco parentis status militates against using the doctrine to grant continual
parent-like rights after the legal parent has terminated the in loco parentis relationship. When confronted with a situation where a former partner asserted in loco parentis standing to seek visitation of
a child after the natural parent unilaterally removed
the child from the relationship, the Texas Court of
Appeals found that
[o]nce [the biological parent] and the child
moved out, however, any possible claim [the surrogate parent] may have had for standing in loco
parentis ended. The common law relationship is
temporary and ends when the child is no longer
under the care of the person in loco parentis.
Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630,
635-36 (Tex.App.2003). Indeed, the Texas court
described "the very cornerstone of the doctrine" of
in loco parentis as the "central common feature

FN4. Although hypothetically the surrogate parent would be burdened by parental
responsibilities for as long as he or she
chose to extend parental rights, this does
not change the fact that the power of
choice remains entirely the prerogative of
the surrogate parent. The legal parent
would have no right to exclude the surrogate parent from the child's life, while
neither the legal parent nor the child would
have the right to enforce a support obligation once the surrogate parent has opted to
cast the relationship aside.
1f 25 Despite the common law principle that the in
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loco parentis doctrine is temporary and does not
convey rights that survive the termination of the
parent-like relationship, Jones asserts that Utah
cases have conferred standing to seek visitation
upon those who had stood in loco parentis to a
child. A close examination of these cases, however,
reveals that this court has never granted standing to
seek visitation solely on the basis of this common
law doctrine.
H 26 In Ghhble, 583 P.2d at 66, this court based a
stepparent's standing to seek visitation upon an interpretation of a Utah divorce statute, which states
in part that "[visitation rights of parents, grandparents and other relatives shall take into consideration
the welfare of the child." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1953) (current version at Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5(5)(a) (Supp.2006)). We read this phrase to
"indicate[ ] the legislative intent to protect the relationships which affect the child whose parents are
being divorced" and reasoned that an individual
who "stand[s] in the relationship of parent, grandparent, or other relative" had standing under the
statute to seek visitation. Gribhle, 583 P.2d at 66.
Although we used the in loco parentis doctrine as
an interpretive tool to guide the inquiry as to who
stands in one of these relationships, the ultimate
source of standing was the statute itself-not the
common law doctrine of in loco parentis.FN5
*815M at 68 ("If appellant is in loco parentis, he
should be considered a parent for purposes of Sec.
30-3-5."); State ex rel J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 715
n. 5 (Utah 1990) (finding that the court in
Gribble"vtas interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1953)"). In this case, however, Jones does not rely
upon any interpretation of statutory law. Rather,
she relies solely upon the common law for standing.
We therefore conclude that Gribble is inapplicable.
FN 5. We make no determination whether
the Gribble interpretation of the prior version of Utah Code section 30-3-5 applies
to the slightly modified wording contained
in the current version of the code. SteeUtah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a) (Supp.2006).
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1f 27 Equally unavailing to Jones is our holding in
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710. In that case, a wife left her
husband and subsequently bore a child fathered by
another man. Id. at 712. Soon after, both the natural father and mother abandoned the child, and the
state of Utah eventually terminated their parental
rights. Id. Although the husband was still technically married to the wife, he did not learn of the
child's existence until the child was nine months
old. Id. Upon learning that he had a stepson, the
husband petitioned for custody. Id. In conferring
standing to the stepfather to seek custody, this court
relied upon two rationales. First, we reasoned that
this court had granted to stepparents standing to be
heard on matters of custody. Id. at 716. Second,
because the Utah legislature had imposed a support
obligation upon stepparents for the duration of the
marriage to the legal parent, we reasoned that this
support obligation was sufficient to confer standing. Id. Neither rationale applies to Jones.
U 28 We explicitly did not rely upon the in loco parentis doctrine in J.W.F. because no such relationship existed in that case. Id. at 715 n. 5. In a footnote, however, we opined that perhaps other types
of relationships could give rise to standing: "[I]t is
conceivable that persons who are not related by
blood or marriage, although not presumptively entitled to standing, could show that they had a relationship with the child that would warrant a grant
of standing. We have no such situation before us
today." Id. at 715 n. 4. As confessed dicta, this
musing on the potential outcome of a hypothetical
situation is not binding upon this court. And perhaps this court would have been less inclined to entertain the notion of throwing open the gate to participation in a child's life if a fit legal parent had
been involved, as in the present case.FN6
FN6. We do not have before us, and we do
not decide, whether a person who is or
once stood in loco parentis to a child has
standing to seek visitation or custody in the
absence of a fit legal parent.
[13][14] Tf 29 In summary, traditional common law
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principles counsel that the in loco parentis status is
of temporary duration and may be terminated
"[o]nce the person alleged to be in loco parentis no
longer discharges all duties incident to the parental
relationship." Hamilton v. Foster, 260 Neb. 887,
620 N.W.2d 103, 116 (2000). While Jones may
have stood in loco parentis to the child during the
time she was actually living with her and providing
for her care, her in loco parentis status terminated
when Barlow and the child moved out. According
to common law principles, Jones does not have
standing to extend the in loco parentis relationship
against Barlow's wishes. Finally, Jones is not proceeding under the divorce statutes as did the stepparent in Gribble. We conclude that recognizing a
legally protectible right under the rubric of in loco
parentis would be "an unwarranted expansion of an
otherwise
well-established
common
law
doctrine," Coons-Andersen, 104 S.W.3d at 636, and
therefore decline to do so.
II. WE DECLINE TO JUDICIALLY CREATE
VISITATION RIGHTS BY ADOPTING A "DE
FACTO PARENT" OR "PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT" DOCTRINE
[15] ^ 30 What Jones essentially asks us to do is recognize a new judicial doctrine in Utah that creates
in a third party the right to seek visitation with a
child in contexts outside those recognized by this
state's domestic relation laws. Whatever label is applied to such a doctrine, it is clear that the common
law concept of in loco parentis does not reach so
far. Were we to recognize such a right in this case,
it would have to be under one of several judicially
created doctrines that have been used recently in
other jurisdictions to confer visitation rights upon
*816 someone other than a parent. Most prominent
among these other doctrines are those labeled
"psychological parent," or "de facto parent." }N7
E.g., Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of LB.),
155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 163 (2005); V.C.
v. M.J.B., 163 NJ. 200, 748 A.2d 539 passim
(2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711
N.E.2d 886, 891 (1999). Rather than creating tern-
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porary rights and obligations that last as long as a
surrogate parent stands in the place of an actual
parent, these doctrines create permanent and abiding rights similar to those of an actual parent. See
LB., 122 P.3d at 177 ("We thus hold that henceforth in Washington, a de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent, whether
biological, adoptive, or otherwise."); V.C, 748
A.2d at 552 ("[A] psychological parent-child relationship ... may not be unilaterally terminated after
the relationship between the adults ends.").
FN7. For a more detailed description of
these doctrines, see Chief Justice Durham's
dissent. Infra atffi[63-90.
T[ 31 We decline to craft such a doctrine. First, adopting a de facto parent doctrine fails to provide an
identifiable jurisdictional test that may be easily
and uniformly applied in all cases. A de facto parent rule for standing, which rests upon ambiguous
and fact-intensive inquiries into the surrogate parent's relationship with a child and the natural parent's intent in allowing or fostering such a relationship, does not fulfill the traditional gate-keeping
function of rules of standing. Under such a doctrine, a party could try the merits of her case under
the guise of an inquiry into standing, unduly burdening legal parents with litigation. We agree with
the Supreme Court of Vermont that
jurisdiction should not rest upon a test that in effect would examine the merits of visitation or
custody petitions on a case-by-case basis. In reality, such a fact-based test would not be a
threshold jurisdictional test, but rather would require a full-blown evidentiary hearing in most
cases. Thus, any such test would not prevent parents from having to defend themselves against
the merits of petitions brought by a potentially
wide range of third parties claiming a parent-like
relationship with their child.
Titchenal v. Dexter, 166 Vt. 373, 693 A.2d 682,
687-88(1997).
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% 32 In addition to providing an unsure jurisdictional threshold, adopting a de facto parent doctrine
would exceed the proper bounds of the judiciary.
The essential questions presented to the court in
this case are some of the most intimate and important that our society faces. In the abstract, we are
asked to define perhaps the most influential and
personal relationship ever experienced-that of parent and child. In particular, we are asked to determine the future upbringing of a child and Jones' continued participation in that process.
<| 33 Faced with these questions, and without the
benefit of binding applicable law, Jones asks us to
craft a judicial doctrine with broad social implications that attempts to adjudicate between competing
policy considerations. On the one hand, we recognize that mutual bonds of affection can be formed
between a child and an adult who does not fit within the traditional definition of a parent and that such
a relationship has the potential to enrich the lives of
both the surrogate parent and the child. However, in
carving out a permanent role in the child's life for a
surrogate parent, this court would necessarily subtract from the legal parent's right to direct the upbringing of her child and expose the child to inevitable conflict between the surrogate and the natural
parents. Such a doctrine raises concerns that a legal
parent could be deprived of a portion of her parental rights on the basis of "elusive factual determinations" as to whether she intended to relinquish
those rights to a third party.™8 Van v. Zahorik,
227 Mich.App. 90, 575 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
FN8. Chief Justice Durham's dissent proposes the adoption of a modified version of
the test to determine de facto parent status
in which "a third party claiming de facto
parent status [must] establish by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) the legal parent intended to create a permanent parentchild relationship between the third party
and the child, and (2) an actual parentchild relationship was formed." Infra f 68.
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*817 [16] U 34 Although principled arguments can
be made for the adoption of a de facto parent doctrine, such arguments are ultimately based upon
policy preferences, rather than established common
law. In such situations, we find the Michigan Supreme Court to be persuasive when it stated:
As a general rule, making social policy is a job
for the Legislature, not the courts. This is especially true when the determination or resolution
requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as
ours-of identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternatives-is the Legislature's, not the judiciary's.
Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18
(1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State ex rel. Sheen v. Ogden Rapid
Transit Co., 38 Utah 242, 112 P. 120, 125 (1910)
(holding that exceeding the judiciary's own authority results in an undue usurpation of legislative
powers).
T| 35 Jones asks this court to exercise the wisdom of
Solomon by adopting a de facto parent doctrine
based upon our weighing of the competing policies
at play. Although this court is routinely called upon
to make difficult decisions as to what the law is, or
even to fill the interstices of jurisprudence, in this
case we are asked to create law from whole cloth
where it currently does not exist. While the distinction between applying the law to unique situations
and engaging in legislation is not always clear, by
asking us to recognize a new class of parents, Jones
invites this court to overstep its bounds and invade
the purview of the legislature.
1 36 Courts are ill-suited for such ventures. Courts
are unable to fully investigate the ramifications of
social policies and cannot gauge or build the public
consensus necessary to effectively implement them.
Unlike the legislature, which may craft a comprehensive scheme for resolving future cases and then
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may repeal or amend it at any time should it prove
unworkable, courts are not agile in developing social policy. If we miscalculate in legislating social
policy, the harm may not be corrected until an appropriate case wends its way through the system
and arrives before us once again-a process that may
take years or even decades. Moreover, our attempt
to correct a prior misstep could then damage the
legal system's reliance upon the principle of stare
decisis.
H 37 In addition to our reticence to assume an essentially legislative role, the creation of a de facto
parent rule absent any precedent in Utah law would
be an unwarranted expansion of the common law.
We agree with the dissent that the common law is a
"dynamic and growing thing." 15A Am.Jur.2d
Common Law § 2 (2000); see infra ffl] 60-61.
However, "the common law decisionmaking process is inherently incremental in nature; the very
'genius of the common law is that it proceeds empirically and gradually, testing the ground at every
step'... [and] calls for devising a rule that does not
stray too far from the existing regime." PM Group
Life Ins. Co. v. W. Growers Assurance Trust, 953
F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting R. Aldisert,
Logic for Lawyers 8 (1989)); accord McClure v.
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 84 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th
Cir.1996); Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc,
34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (1961) ("The persistent movement of the common law towards satisfying the needs of the times is soundly marked by
gradualness. Its step by step process affords the
light of continual experience to guide its future
course."). Creating a de facto parent doctrine for
Utah would be a dramatic expansion of the common law thereby defying the principle of incremental development.
[17] K 38 Such a divergence from Utah's established
common law is also inappropriate because there are
no broadly accepted principles to guide us to a de
facto parent doctrine. We agree that "our courts
should avoid effecting change in the common law
of this State when there is no substantial body of
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agreement that such change is necessary and when
it is patent that such change can be better effected
by legislative action." Duhan v. Milanowski, 75
Misc,2d
1078, 348
N.Y.S.2d
696,
701
(Sup.Ct.1973). As we have noted, this case presents
us with conflicting policies upon which there is no
broad consensus. There are simply no bedrock principles upon *818 which to construct a doctrine creating visitation rights for nonparents.
[18] K 39 To the extent that there are guiding principles within the common law, they militate against
a common law right of visitation for nonparents. It
is a fundamental tenet of our common law that "the
only persons having any actually vested interest in
the custody of a child cognizable by the law are the
parents." Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., 554 P.2d
227, 229 (Utah 1976). Other relatives of a child
merely have "some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody and welfare of children" that
matures only upon the death or termination of the
rights of the parents.™9 Id. at 230-31. Finally,
courts may not make a "best interests" inquiry into
nonparent custody of a child absent a determination
that the legal parents are unfit. In re J.P., 648 P.2d
1364, 1368-69 (Utah 1982); see also A.N. v.
M.I.W. (In re Adoption of P.N.), 2006 UT 64, % 15,
148 P.3d 927.FN,° Although our precedent in this
area involves custody rather than visitation, the
common law nevertheless evidences a strong presumption that parental rights shall not be disturbed
absent a determination that the legal parents are unfit.™11 This presumption is in direct contradiction to a de facto parent doctrine, which interferes
with a parent's right to direct the upbringing of her
child. Thus, adopting such a doctrine would not be
a natural development of the common law, but
rather a legislative act in derogation of recognized
common law principles.
FN9. We note that the language quoted by
the dissent from State ex rei J.W.F., 799
P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1990), that nonparents
need not "stand as a total stranger to the
child" makes sense in the context of these
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inchoate rights. See infra K 51. Taken as a
whole the passage reads:
It may be that no one has the same rights
toward a child as his or her parents. See
Wilson v. Family Services Div., Region
Two, 554 P.2d 227, 230 (Utah 1976).
However, the fact that a person is not a
child's natural or legal parent does not
mean that he or she must stand as a total
stranger to the child where custody is
concerned.
J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 714. Thus J.W.F.
does not stand for the proposition that
nonparents may have common law
standing to assert visitation rights
against fit parents. In fact, this decision
affirms that "no one has the same rights
toward a child as his or her parents."
Id. This passage merely confirms the
proposition asserted in Wilson that other
relatives may have standing to seek custody in the absence of a fit parent. This
is born out by the facts of J.W.F.. where
a stepfather was granted standing to seek
custody only when both of the biological
parents had their parental rights terminated. Id. at 712, 716.
FN 10. In the case of P.N., the child's biological mother relinquished her parental
rights and gave custody of the child to a
couple seeking to adopt him. 2006 UT 64,
% 3, 148 P.3d 927. The district court later
found the mother's relinquishment to be ineffective. The mother and biological father
both opposed the adoption and sought custody of the child, who, at the time, was in
the custody of the prospective adoptive
parents. Id. ffl[ 3-4, 5. The trial court
found no basis for terminating the parental
rights of either of the biological parents
and therefore dismissed the petition for adoption. Id. % 8. It then scheduled a "best
interests trial" and awarded custody of the
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child to the prospective adoptive parents.
Id. ^ 9. We reversed, holding that it was
error for the court to award custody of P.N.
to legal strangers in the absence of an order terminating the parental rights of his fit
natural parents. Id. % 15. We therefore remanded the case for a determination of
custody as between the biological parents.
Id. f 18. Although the case involved custody rather than visitation and was based
upon an analysis of the statute governing
adoption, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16
(Supp.2006), it is nevertheless illustrative
of the proposition that a child's fit legal
parent is presumed to act in his best interests. Therefore, absent a statutory basis
for doing so, it is improper for a court to
second-guess the decision of the fit legal
parents by conducting a "best interests"
analysis.
FN11. We note that Utah Code sections
30-3-5(4)(a) and 30-5-2, discussed below,
stand as statutorily created exceptions to
this general rule because they grant standing to seek visitation rights even against
the objections of fit parents.
% 40 Finally, the de facto parent doctrine conflicts
with Utah statutory law. The legislature has defined
the manner in which a parent-child relationship is
established. The mother-child relationship is established by
(a) the woman's having given birth to the child,
except as otherwise provided in Part 8, Gestational Agreement;
(b) an adjudication of the woman's maternity;
(c) adoption of the child by the woman; or
(d) an adjudication confirming the woman as a
parent of a child born to a gestational mother if
the agreement was valid *819 under Part 8, Gestational Agreement, or is enforceable under other
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law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201 (Supp.2006). The legislature has also designated which nonparents
have standing to seek visitation of a child. Statutes
grant standing to an immediate family member to
seek visitation in the context of a divorce, id.§
30-3-5(4)(a), and to grandparents in certain circumstances, id.§ 30-5-2.
Tf 41 Because the legislature has spoken in this area,
we are reluctant to adopt a common law doctrine
that implicitly controverts this statutory scheme.
The addition of a new class of de facto parents
would conflict with the legislature's apparently exhaustive list of who is considered a mother under
the law. Also, granting visitation rights to de facto
parents contradicts the legislature's narrow grant of
standing to certain immediate family members to
petition for visitation. As the dissent notes, the legislature has not explicitly addressed the standing
of a surrogate parent. See infra ^ 46. The grant of
standing to immediate family members under certain well-defined circumstances, however, creates
the negative implication that all other categories of
nonparents are prohibited from seeking visitation
rights. Otherwise, the standing requirement would
not serve its function as a jurisdictional bar to litigation because every unmentioned class of nonparent
could attempt to establish visitation rights under the
common law. We decline to expand the common
law into an area occupied by statute so as to contradict the apparent legislative intent.
K 42 In sum, we decline to adopt a de facto parent
doctrine because it would be an improper usurpation of legislative authority and would contradict
both common law principles and Utah statutory
law. Although we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of Jones' parental feelings for the child, we
are unwilling to craft a doctrine which would abrogate a portion of Barlow's parental rights.

CONCLUSION
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TJ 43 We hold that the district court erred in granting Jones standing to seek visitation. The common
law doctrine of in loco parentis does not convey
perpetual rights that survive the termination of the
parent-like relationship. And we decline to create
such perpetual rights by adopting a doctrine similar
to that of "psychological parent" or "de facto parent." We therefore reverse the district court order
granting visitation and requiring Jones to pay child
support.
K 44 Associate Chief Justice WELKINS, Justice
DURRANT, and Justice NEHRING concur in
Justice PARRISH's opinion.
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting:
K 45 I respectfully dissent. The facts of this case
mirror a typical divorce-two parents separated and
are quarreling over child visitation and custody. In
this case, however, the parents are both women,
only one of whom is the biological parent of the
child they mutually decided to bring into their relationship. Although this situation is becoming more
and more common, it presents this court with a
question of first impression: Does the nonbiological
mother have standing to petition for visitation with
the child despite the objections of the biological
mother? I would hold that she does, provided that
she and the child have, with the consent of the biological parent, created a de facto parent-child relationship.

I. THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT ADDRESSED
A SURROGATE PARENT'S STANDING
K 46 I disagree with the majority's assertion that the
"legislature has spoken in this area." Supra H 41.
The majority specifically references Utah Code section 30-3-5 (Supp.2006), which gives the trial court
discretion to grant visitation to immediate family
members, and section 30-5-2, which governs grandparent visitation. Supra f 40. While these statutes
address visitation rights, they do not speak to the
circumstances in this case. For obvious reasons, the
grandparent visitation statute does not apply to
Jones. The immediate family member provision is

154 P.3d 808
154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2007 U T 20
(Cite as: 154 P.3d 808)

Page 15

inapposite because it is included within the
"Divorce" chapter of the "Husband and Wife" title
of the Utah Code. Furthermore, its specific terms
limit its applicability to divorces. For example, section 30-3-5(1 )*820 states that the section applies
only "[w]hen a decree of divorce is rendered."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp.2006). Because
Jones and Barlow could not legally marry, their
separation cannot constitute a divorce, and thus the
immediate family member visitation provision does
not address the situation at hand. And although the
majority does not mention the provisions regarding
parent-time for divorced or divorcing parents,
id. §§ 30-3-32 to -38 (Supp.2006), I likewise do not
believe that the parent-time provisions govern the
case before us.

(including grandparents, grandchildren, nephews,
and nieces in definition); id. § 36-11-102(5) (2005)
(defining immediate family as a spouse or child
residing in the household). The most expansive
definition of immediate family member is found in
Utah Code section 76-5-106.5, which addresses
stalking. In that section, an immediate family member is defined as "a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or
any other person who regularly resides in the
household or who regularly resided in the household within the prior six months." Id. §
76-5-106.5(l)(b) (2003) (emphasis added). Under
this definition, Jones would be an immediate family
member because she regularly resided in the same
household as the child within six months prior to
the initiation of this suit.

f 47 The policy considerations underlying the visitation statutes would nevertheless be served by permitting Jones to visit the child. A child has a need
and a right to maintain a relationship with both parents. For example, section 30-3-32(2)(b)(i), which
governs visitation between divorced, divorcing, or
adjudicated parents, states that "it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing ... parents to have
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each
parent following separation." Likewise, section
30-3-5(5)(a) recognizes that, in some circumstances, visitation with "immediate family" members may serve a child's best interests.

K 49 I believe Jones satisfies any reasonable definition of immediate family member because she was,
de facto, the child's parent. By caring for the child
from her infancy and for the first two years of her
life, Jones, with the acquiescence and encouragement of Barlow, acted as the child's "other parent."
Although the reality and nature of this relationship
has not been explicitly acknowledged by Utah's
statutory law, Jones and Barlow did everything
within their power to make Jones the legal equivalent of a parent. When Jones and Barlow solemnized
their relationship with a Vermont civil union, the
state of Vermont endowed Jones with the same
rights granted to a spouse. SeeWt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15,
§ 1204 (2002). Under Vermont law, the civil union
makes Jones an immediate family member and
grants her the same rights as a spouse with respect
to a child born to Barlow during the civil union.
Id. § 1204(f). Although the parties have not addressed the effect of their Vermont civil union on
their rights, the undertaking of that status conclusively demonstrates that when the parties entered into it, they intended Jones to be a parent to any children born to them. Likewise, the guardianship petition, which was filed and granted under Utah law,
strongly supports the conclusion that the parties regarded Jones as a full-fledged parent. Indeed, the
guardianship petition stated that "[Jones] is the only

K 48 Jones has been, literally and for all intents and
purposes, a member of the child's immediate family
since her birth. The term "immediate family member" is not defined in conjunction with section
30-3-5 or anywhere else in Title 30. However, the
term is defined in other sections of the Utah Code.
The Utah Code definition of "immediate family
member" generally includes spouses, children, parents, and siblings, id. §§ 7-9-3(7) (2006),
76-8-316(4)(a) (2003), but it also may include
grandparents, grandchildren, and nieces and nephews.
See id
§ 26-2-22(3)(a) (Supp.2006)
(including grandparents and grandchildren in definition); id
§ 34A-2-103(5)(a)(ii) (Supp.2006)
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other parent that [the child] knows or will know,"
and the supporting memorandum stated that
"[s]ince [the child's] birth, [Jones] has served as her
other parent in all regards." Based on the parties'
actions, it is clear that the parties did everything
they could to make their relationship, with regard to
themselves and the child, as much like the
"traditional family"-two married parents and children-as possible. There were virtually no functional
differences*821 from a traditional union insofar as
the care and treatment of their child was concerned.
Nevertheless, the statutes do not address either
Jones' or the child's rights in this situation.
K 50 As the legislature recognized by enacting visitation statutes, children have the right to maintain
relationships with their parents as well as with persons with whom they have formed deep, parent-like
bonds. A child's rights and best interests do not
change depending on whether his or her parental
figures are recognized as parents under the law or
whether they are simply parents in fact. Thus, in
this case, the child's need for, and right to, a continuing relationship with both of her parents is not
diminished by the fact that only one is a biological
parent or that her parents were not legally married.
Therefore, granting standing to Jones would further
the legislative policy of protecting children who
have formed such bonds, even though the statutes
do not specifically apply.

II. BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT
SPOKEN ON THIS ISSUE, THIS COURT
SHOULD LOOK TO THE COMMON LAW
K 51 In the absence of a controlling statutory provision, I look to our common law. This court has recognized that a person who is not a child's natural
or legal parent does not necessarily "stand as a total
stranger to the child." State ex rel J.W.F., 799
P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1990). Traditionally, a third
party's right to visitation has arisen under the doctrine of in loco parentis. For example, in Gribble v.
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), this court relied
on the doctrine of in loco parentis to hold that a
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stepparent was a parent for purposes of the divorce
statute and, accordingly, granted the stepparent
standing to petition for visitation. Id. at 66-68.
Tf 52 While we applied in loco parentis in the context of a statutory divorce proceeding in Gribble, I
reject the notion that in loco parentis applies only in
conjunction with a statute. In loco parentis is a
common law doctrine. That a common law doctrine
may inform our statutory interpretation in some
cases does not strip the common law of its ability to
stand on its own in the absence of an applicable
statute. Nothing in Gribble, or in any subsequent
case, limits the doctrine of in loco parentis to divorce proceedings, and I believe it can apply notwithstanding the absence of a controlling statute in
this case. In fact, as common law, it is arguably
more pertinent in a case such as the one before us,
where there is not a relevant statute, than in
Gribble, where there was a statute applying to the
dissolution of legal marriages.
K 53 Nevertheless, I concede that the doctrine of in
loco parentis has its limitations. As the majority recognizes, in loco parentis is a temporary status that
lasts only as long as the third party assumes the role
of a parent in the child's life. See59 Am.Jur.2d
Parent and Child § 9 (2002); supra Tf 15. It does not
grant rights or impose duties-such as visitation or
support-once either the surrogate parent or the child
has decided to end the relationship.
t 54 I likewise agree with the majority's assertion
that the Gribble court erred in concluding that only
the surrogate parent or the child can terminate the
parental relationship. Supra ^ 17. I disagree,
however, with the majority's analysis as to why that
conclusion was erroneous. Gribble's conclusion
that only the surrogate parent or child can terminate
an in loco parentis relationship is not erroneous because the cases on which it relies or legal encyclopedias state only that an in loco parentis relationship "may" be terminated by either the surrogate
parent or the natural parent. While legal commentary or case law from our sister states, even case law
on which we have relied, may differ from our state-
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ment of the law, such variances do not abrogate our
conclusions. We are not bound to interpret our
common law in the same way as our sister states or
other commentators. Thus, even though the cases
cited in Gribble do not state that "only" the surrogate parent or the child can terminate the relationship, that does not necessarily mean that we
reached a faulty conclusion.
If 55 Rather, I believe Gribble's statement that only
the surrogate parent or the child can terminate an in
loco parentis relationship *822 is erroneous because, as a matter of principle, it gives an unfair advantage to surrogate parents, essentially allowing
them to use in loco parentis as both a shield and a
sword. To use the majority's example, it allows surrogate parents to use in loco parentis as a way to
shield themselves from support obligations by arguing they have terminated the relationship, while
in other instances, it allows the surrogate parent to
continue the in loco parentis relationship despite
the objections of the biological parent. Supra \ 24. I
agree with the majority that this is an absurd result
and, on policy grounds, likewise reject the notion
that a biological parent cannot sever an in loco parentis relationship. Thus, I agree that Jones' in loco
parentis status terminated when Barlow and the
child moved out.
Tf 56 This conclusion does not, however, change my
belief that Jones has standing under our common
law. Perhaps due to the limitations of the doctrine
of in loco parentis, this court's decisions to grant
standing to third parties have not been limited to in
loco parentis cases. For example, in J.W.F., we
granted a petitioner standing to petition for custody
of his estranged wife's child. 799 P.2d at 712. In
that case, the petitioner had never acted as a parent
toward the child because the child was born while
the petitioner and his wife were separated, although
they remained legally married. Id. In fact, the petitioner did not even know about the child until after
his wife had abandoned the child and the state had
filed a neglect and abandonment petition. Id. We
granted the petitioner standing based on his step-

Page 17

parent status and his legal support obligations. Id.
at 716. In so holding, we recognized that "[c]ertain
people, because of their relationship to a child, are
at least entitled to standing to seek a determination
as to whether it would be in the best interests of the
child for them to have custody." Id. at 714; see
also Wilson v. Family Servs. Div.} 554 P.2d 227,
230-31 (Utah 1976) (granting grandmother a hearing on her petition to adopt grandchild after the parents' rights were terminated).
1 57 In J.W.F., we recognized several factors that
may justify granting standing to a third party, such
as financial obligations or the person's status or relationship to a child. 799 P.2d at 715. We noted
that the relationship of a close relative who has the
child's best interests at heart "would seem to warrant a grant of standing." Id. However, we specifically declined to limit standing to a petitioner
related to a child by marriage FNI or to divorce
proceedings, noting that "it is conceivable that persons who are not related by blood or marriage, although not presumptively entitled to standing,
could show that they had a relationship with the
child that would warrant a grant of standing." Id.
at 715n.4.
FNI. The parties have not raised or argued
the effect of their lawful civil union in
Vermont, but its existence does enhance
the analogy of Jones' status to that of a
stepparent in that these parents took the
only step available to them to legalize their
relationship.
f 58 I would therefore conclude that Jones has
standing under our common law. My conclusion is
not based on the doctrine of in loco parentis, nor is
it based on any specific prior case issued by this
court. Indeed, as the majority points out, there is no
binding case law regarding an unmarried partner's
standing rights. Supra ^ ^ 1-2. Rather, I would recognize that Jones has standing because she is a de
facto parent.
f 59 Like a person holding in loco parentis status, a
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de facto parent FN2 is a person "who, on a dayto-day basis, assumes the role of parent, seeking to
fulfill both the child's physical and psychological
needs." LF. v. KM (State ex rel CM.), 2000 UT
App 115, f 3 (citing In re Hirenia C, 18
Cal.App.4th 504, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 443, 448 (1993));
see also Miller v. Cal Dep't of Soc. Servs., 355
F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.2004). There are,
however, some differences between the in loco parentis*823 and de facto parenthood doctrines. There
are certain evidentiary criteria, which I will discuss
in Section III, that are not required in in loco parentis cases but that are required in de facto parent
cases in order for a third party to show that he or
she has, with the legal parent's intent, formed a parent-child relationship with the child. Further, while
in loco parentis imposes only temporary rights and
obligations on a surrogate parent, de facto parenthood is permanent. Functionally, a de facto parent
is just like the child's legal parent. The only difference is that a de facto parent is not biologically related to the child and does not have an adjudicated
parental status such as adoption. Because de facto
parenthood is more akin to actual parenthood, de
facto parents cannot unilaterally sever their obligations to the child. Nor can a legal parent independently sever a de facto parent's rights. Rather, once a
child shares a de facto parent relationship with a
third party, the child has a vested right to support
from the de facto parent as well as to maintain a relationship with that parent, despite the objections of
either the de facto or legal parent.FN3
FN2. Some courts have used the term psychological parent to refer to a third party
who has, with the consent of the legal parent, assumed a parent-like relationship
with a child. See, e.g., V.C v. M.J.B., 163
N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 555 (2000)
(holding that "[t]hird parties who live in
familial circumstances with a child and his
or her legal parent may achieve, with the
consent of the legal parent, a psychological
parent status vis-a-vis a child" (emphasis
added)). While cases using the term psy-
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chological parent are very similar to this
case, I consider the term de facto parent
more descriptive functionally.
FN3. De facto parenthood is a two-way
street. While de facto parent status entitles
a third party to standing for visitation, it
also requires a de facto parent to provide
financial support for the child. See Chambers v. Chambers, 2005 WL 645220, *7
2005 Del.Fam. Ct. LEXIS 1, *22 (holding
that a de facto parent could be equitably
estopped from denying she owed a support
obligation to her former partner's child).
This is entirely consistent with the purpose
of de facto parenthood: to provide children
with the parental support and protection to
which they are entitled. In fact, the district
court in this case ordered Jones to pay
child support, a result that will presumably
be impossible under the majority's analys- is.
If 60 I recognize that de facto parenthood has never
been recognized by this court. The absence of a
binding judicial pronouncement on an unmarried
surrogate parent's right to standing does not mean
that we must conclude that Jones does not have
standing under the common law. In fact, in the
arena of domestic relations, "judges have traditionally decided ... questions using common law methods," Ann Laquer Estin, Family Governance in the
Age of Divorce, 1998 Utah L.Rev. 21.1, 238, and the
"common law is not static, but is rather a dynamic
and growing thing," 15A Am.Jur.2d Common Law §
2 (2000). Our ability to decide cases on common
law grounds is therefore not limited to common law
doctrines that have been explicitly developed in prior case law. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v.
Ferguson, 91 Hawai'i 81, 979 P.2d 1107, 1115
(1999) (noting that the common law is not "limited
to published judicial precedent"). Rather, the common law embodies "broad and comprehensive unwritten principles, inspired by natural reason and an
innate sense of justice." 15A Am.Jur.2d Common

154P.3d808
154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2007 UT 20
(Cite as: 154 P.3d 808)
Law § 1 (2000). It "is constantly expanding and developing in keeping with advancing civilization and
the new conditions and progress of society." Id. § 2.
f 61 The common law is able to adapt and grow because the common law system endows courts with
"judicial inventiveness to meet new situations."
Id. Indeed, by definition, the common law is
"judge-made" law. M. Stuart Madden, The Vital
Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U.
Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555, 558 (1996). As one judge
has recognized, the common law encompasses "
'any body of law created primarily through judges
by their decisions rather than by the framers of statutes or constitutions.' " Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 247 (1990)). Thus, the judicial role in a
common law system is not solely to apply legislative enactments. Where the legislature has not acted,
we frequently exercise the power to articulate rights
and obligations that have not previously been recognized.^4 The history of tort law, contract law,
property law, domestic relations law, employment
law, and even the criminal law reflects this lawdevelopment function of state courts. This case
raises a question that has not heretofore been addressed by either the courts or the legislature in
Utah. We have, however, recognized*824 that in
some cases a third party ought to have standing in
proceedings affecting the custody of children and that
FN4. It is important that this court not abdicate its responsibility to address new and
difficult legal questions that come before
it. By examining new issues in relation to
our common law principles, this court engages in a dialogue with the legislature,
whose members can benefit from our careful consideration and analysis of the law in
relation to the changing world in which we
live.
[tjhere is no reason to narrowly restrict participation in custodial proceedings. Indeed, our case
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law and the legislature's pronouncements indicate
that the interests of the child are best served
when those interested in the child are permitted
to assert that interest. The question of who should
have custody of the child is too important to exclude participants on narrowly drawn technical
grounds.... Those who have legal or personal
connections with the child should not be precluded from being heard on best interests.
J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 716 (emphasis added); see also
Cribble. 583 P.2d at 68. I would therefore recognize de facto parent standing as a common law
principle in order to serve the broader policy regarding a child's right to visitation with an individual with whom she has formed a true parental
bond. To hold otherwise ignores the reality that
children can and do form parent-child relationships
with persons with whom they do not share a biological legal connection.1^5 For example,
FN5. As I discuss later in this opinion, the
fact that such relationships are formed with
the full consent and participation of a biological or legal parent is important. A relationship undertaken without such consent
and participation should not have de facto
parent status because of the risk that it will
undermine the cohesiveness and parental
control presumed to exist in intact families.
Daily contact with, continuous reliance on, and
the development of psychological attachments to
unrelated persons will often stimulate a sense of
"family" among biologically unrelated individuals. It is within this framework of expanding social definitions of the family that adults who are
not the biological parents of the children they
care for come to be seen as parents. The daily interactions that take place between children and
their nonbiological caregivers and the corresponding psychological attachments that form
between them effectively elevate their relationships to that of a parent and a child, rather than
simply that of a child and a caregiver. As a result,
children routinely form parent-child relationships
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with their stepparents, adoptive parents, foster
parents, and even aunts, uncles, and grandparents
who care for them on a daily basis.
Mellisa Holtzman, Definitions of the Family as an
Impetus for Legal Change in Custody Decision
Making: Suggestions from an Empirical Case
Study, 31 Law & Soc. inquiry 1, 9 (2006) (citation
omitted). As the "nontraditional family" becomes
more prevalent in our society, children will increasingly form parent-child relationships with third
parties.
f 62 While this case is, in part, about parental
rights, it is also about whether children in nontraditional families, with nontraditional but nonetheless
real parents, are entitled to have their interests addressed just as if they had been born into traditional
families. The child in this case is the product of a
same-sex relationship, but she just as easily could
have come from a more traditional one. Her opportunity to have the courts determine whether visitation with one of her parents is important to her
present and long-term best interests should not be
foreclosed. Indeed, children of dissolving, nontraditional relationships are just "as likely to become ...
victim[s] of turmoil and adult hostility as [are children] subject to the dissolution of a [traditional]
marriage." Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of
H.S.H-K.), 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419,* 421
(1995), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 975, 116 S.Ct. 475,
133 L.Ed.2d 404 (1995). These children "need[ ]
and deserve [ ] the protection of the courts as much
as [children] of [ ] dissolving traditional relationship^]." Id. To deny the forum of the courts for
the resolution of children's interests in nontraditional contexts would be to deny those children the protections afforded to all other children. This is contrary to "the public welfare and the true interests of
justice." 15A Am.Jur.2d Common Law § 2 (2000).
Accordingly, I would hold that de facto parents
have standing to petition for visitation.'N6
FN6. The majority repeatedly states that
parents are the only persons with rights to
custody of a child. Supra % 39 & n. 9. In
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the case before us, however, we are dealing with the issue of visitation-distinct
from custody. In the context of visitation,
the rights of third parties do not "mature"
only upon the death of a parent or the termination of parental rights. This is evidenced by Utah's grandparent visitation statute. SeeUtdh Code Ann. § 30-5-2; Uzelac
v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S. T. T.), 2006
UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083 (upholding grant of
visitation to grandparents when the father
was not unfit or deceased). Additionally,
the majority states that "parental rights
shall not be disturbed absent a determination that the legal parents are unfit."
Supra f U 39, 28. The United States Supreme Court held otherwise in Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054,
147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion),
and this court agreed in In re Estate of
S.T.T., 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083, both
cases discussed infra Section IV.
By the same token, the majority relies on
the status of "mother" or "parent."
Supra | 40. We note that Jones is seeking only rights to visitation with the
child, not all the rights associated with
being a parent, an arrangement beyond
the scope of this opinion.
*825 TI 63 I am not the first to reach this conclusion; other courts have confronted the visitation
rights of a de facto parent in the absence of an authorizing statute and have granted standing to de
facto parents. For example, in 1995 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided H.S.H-K., where two women who had shared a committed relationship for
ten years decided to have a child through artificial
insemination. 533 N.W.2d at 421. As in this case,
both women actively participated in doctor visits,
childbirth classes, and the actual delivery. Id.
When the child was born, the women gave the baby
a surname that combined both of their last names.
Id. at 421-22. Thereafter, the two women and the
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child lived together, both women actively parented
the child, and they held themselves out as a family.
Id. at 422. Several years later, the relationship
between the two women dissolved, and the biological mother attempted to terminate the relationship
between the child and her former partner. Id. The
partner filed a petition for custody and visitation. Id.
\ 64 The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that
the partner did not have standing under the state's
relevant custody statute, which conditioned thirdparty standing on a showing of parental unfitness.
Id. at 423-24 (discussing Wis. Stat. § 767.24
(1991-92)). The partner had not made such a showing. Id. at 424. In addition, the court determined
that the state's visitation statute did not give the
partner standing because it applied only when there
had been a dissolution of a marriage. Id. at 424,
429-30. Because the parties were a same-sex
couple, there was no marital dissolution and the
statute did not apply. Id. The court determined that
the legislature had not occupied the field and relied
on its equitable powers to hold that a court may
hear a petition for visitation when it determines the
petitioner has a "parent-like" relationship with the
child and a significant triggering event, such as the
severance of the relationship between a child and a
parental figure, justifies state intervention. Id. at
424-25, 435.
^ 65 More recently, the Washington Supreme Court
decided Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of LB.),
155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161 (2005), cert,
denied, — U.S. — , 126 S.Ct. 2021, 164 L,Ed.2d
806 (2006). Like H.S.H-K., LB. involved two women in an intimate relationship who decided to
have a baby by artificial insemination. Id. at 164.
When the child was born, the women and the child
lived together as a family unit with both women
sharing parenting responsibilities. Id. The child
called her biological mother "mama" and the mother's partner "mommy." Id. When the child was
six, the parties separated, and shortly thereafter, the
biological mother unilaterally terminated the rela-
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tionship between the child and her former partner.
Id. The court looked to Washington's statutes and
found that they were "conspicuously silent" regarding the rights of children in nontraditional families.
Id. at 169. However, the court found that the statutes displayed an intent to protect the welfare of
children and did not provide any evidence that the
legislature intended to preempt the court's common
law jurisprudence over circumstances not yet contemplated by the legislature. Id. at 172-73, 176-77.
Thus the court held that a de facto parent would
have standing and remanded to the district court for
a determination of whether the partner qualified as
a de facto parent.FN7 Id. at 179.
FN7. LB. and H.S.H-K. are in accord with
other jurisdictions that have used the common law to grant standing to a third party
who has developed a parent-like relationship with a child. See, e.g., E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886,
890-92 (1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S.
1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 386
(1999) (determining that the court's equitable powers governed the resolution of a
same-sex partner's de facto parent claim
despite a lack of statutory authority); I.E.
v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 917
(2001) (rejecting the argument that a partner lacked standing because the statutory
scheme did not encompass former partners
or paramours and finding standing under
the common law doctrine of in loco parentis).
*826 % 66 Like these jurisdictions, I would recognize common law standing for de facto parents. I
therefore turn to a discussion of what a third party
must prove in order to obtain de facto parent status.
III. THE DE FACTO PARENT TEST AND ITS
APPLICATION TO JONES
f 67 The determination that a de facto parent has
standing to petition for visitation does not end the
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analysis, which must include consideration of what
a petitioner must demonstrate to establish that he or
she is a de facto parent. In Holtzman v. Knott (In re
Custody ofKS.H-K.), 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d
419 (1995), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 975, 116 S.Ct.
475, 133 L.Ed.2d 404 (1995), the Wisconsin Supreme Court established a four-part test to determine whether the petitioner was a de facto parent. Id.
at 435-36. Under that test, the petitioner must prove:

child relationship between the petitioner and the
child. I would therefore require that a third party
claiming de facto parent status establish by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) the legal parent
intended to create a permanent parent-child relationship between the third party and the child, and
(2) an actual parent-child relationship was formed.
To establish the second element, a third party must,
at a minimum, present evidence demonstrating that
the third party lived with and cared for the child
and that, as a result, a parent-child bond developed
between the third party and the child.

(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and
establishment of a parent-like relationship with
the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child
lived together in the same household; (3) that the
petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child's
care, education and development, including contributing towards the child's support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that
the petitioner has been in a parental role for a
length of time sufficient to have established with
the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.
Id; see also V.C. v. MJ.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748
A.2d 539, 551-52 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S.
926, 121 S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000)
(adopting the H.S.H-K. four-part test to determine
de facto parent standing); Carvin v. Britain (In re
Parentage of L.B.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d
161, 177 (2005), cert denied, ~- U.S. — , 126
S.Ct. 2021, 164 L.Ed.2d 806 (2006) (same).
% 68 Although Lfind the Wisconsin test very helpful, I would revise it slightly. The elements requiring that the petitioner live with the child, assume
parental obligations, and assume the role of a parent for a sufficient length of time all relate to the
ultimate question of whether a parent-child relationship actually existed between the petitioner and
the child. Thus, I would simplify the test by combining the second, third, and fourth parts of the
Wisconsin test into one element requiring the petitioner to establish the existence of an actual parent-

T( 69 The facts in this case easily satisfy this test, although I recognize that other cases may not be so
clear. I therefore emphasize that de facto parent
status is "limited to those adults who have fully and
completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal,
committed, and responsible parental role in the
child's life," C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146,
1152 (Me.2004), and that undertaking must generally be with the full consent, encouragement, and
cooperation of a fit custodial parent. I would therefore require that a petitioner claiming de facto parent status prove the two elements of our test by
clear and convincing evidence. This burden of
proof sets a high threshold, not easily cleared or
automatically met by every person who lives with
or cares for a child.
*827 f 70 The majority suggests that the
"fact-intensive inquir[y]" necessary to determine de
facto parent status falls outside the bounds of the
traditional role of standing as a gate-keeping tool in
litigation. Supra 1J 31. This court, however, has recognized that "some cases require more extensive
fact-finding in order to assess whether the plaintiffs
interest in the dispute is sufficient to give rise to"
standing. Sierra Club v. Sevier Power Co., 2006
UT 74, U 28 & n. 3, 148 P.3d 960 (noting that the
determination of whether plaintiffs interests are
sufficient or too attenuated "must be made on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant
facts and the policies underlying our standing requirement"); see also Washington County Water
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Conservancy v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125
(requiring extensive fact-finding, including a trial
and expert testimony, to determine if plaintiff had
standing). While we noted in Sierra Club that instances of intensive factual development at the
standing phase are rare, they do exist, 2006 UT 74,
% 28 n. 3, 148 P.3d 960, and de facto parenthood
cases may present one such situation. While the inquiry into whether de facto parent status exists may
require a fact intensive inquiry at the standing
phase, it in no way supplants the ultimate issue in a
visitation dispute-the best interests of the child.
Thus, a determination of de facto parenthood would
not replace a trial on the merits. While the determination of de facto parenthood may burden the legal
parent with litigation, in instances where the inquiry will be factually intensive, a legal parent has
already allowed a significant relationship to develop between his or her child and a third party, and
thus, the legal parent's rights must yield in favor of
the best interests of the child. The issue of de facto
parent status simply presents an example of the rare
situation when the determination of standing may
involve complex factual inquiries that a court must
consider before it examines the merits of the case. I
now proceed to discuss each part of the de facto
parent test and its application to Jones.

A. Intent of the Legal Parent
T| 71 A party claiming de facto parent status must
first show that the legal parent intended the third
party and the child to form a permanent parentchild relationship. For this step to be satisfied, the
court must find that the legal parent's "own actions
led to the creation of [a] parental bond" between
the third party and the child, J.C v. C.T., 184
Misc.2d
935,
711
N.Y.S.2d
295,
299
(Fam.Ct.2000), and that at the time the bond
formed, the legal parent intended it to be permanent, as opposed to temporary, however long.FNS In
other words, the legal parent must have consented
to and fostered the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parental relationship with the
child.™9 See V.C, 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539,

Page 23

552 (2000), cert, denied, *828531 U.S. 926, 121
S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000). A third party
can prove this by showing that the legal parent
"ceded over to the third party a measure of parental
authority and autonomy and granted to that third
party rights and duties vis-a-vis the child that the
third party's status would not otherwise warrant." Id.
FN8. A parent may delegate to a third
party a degree of parental authority that the
parent intends, from the outset, to be temporary. Examples of such temporary delegation include a parent's appointment of a
third party to care for a child while the parent completes military service, serves a
prison sentence, or is hospitalized for an
extensive period. Third parties that are
meant to stand in the place of a parent for
only a temporary period of time are not eligible for de facto parent standing.
FN9. The majority cites In re Adoption of
P.N. for the proposition that custody may
not be awarded to a third party absent the
termination of parental rights of the natural
parents. Supra f 39 & n. 10. The majority
again relies on a case where the parties
were seeking not only permanent custody,
but adoption. Furthermore, the language
from P.N. states that the rights of the biological parents could not be "permanently
cut off when the parents "have not been
found unfit" and when they "have not consented to such placement." A.N v. M.LW.
(In re Adoption of P.N.), 2006 UT 64, % %
4, 15, 148 P.3d 927. The facts in P.N.
were vastly different from those in the case
before us. Whereas Barlow fostered the relationship between Jones and the child,
P.N. was placed with the prospective adoptive family without the biological father's consent, and he adamantly objected to
the custody arrangement with legal
strangers from its initiation. Id. % 4. The
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lack of consent by the biological parent in
P.N. sets that case apart from the predicament that Jones finds herself in today,
where the biological parent encouraged the
relationship and is now objecting to its
continuation in any manner. Additionally,
in P.N., the complete deprivation of the
biological parents' rights was at issue;
Jones does not seek to eliminate the child's
relationship with Barlow, but merely asks
to continue her relationship with the child
because she has acted as a de facto parent
to the child since birth.
f 72 The focus of this part of the test is on the legal
parent's intent at the formation and during the pendency of the parent-child relationship, not at the
termination of the relationship between the legal
parent and a third party. Id.; see also T.B. v.
L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 919 (2001)
(noting that what is relevant "to an in loco parentis
determination is the method by which a third party
gained authority to assume parental status, and
holding that where the biological parent encouraged
the partner to assume the status of parent and acquiesced as the partner carried out day-to-day care of
the child, she could not erase the relationship created with the child after the parties separated).
Once the legal parent intentionally creates a de
facto parent for his or her child, the legal parent
cannot later change his or her mind and unilaterally
sever or alter the nature of that relationship.
However, this does not mandate that a legal parent
form this intent at the conception or birth of the
child. The de facto parent's participation in the actual decision to have a child and the process of conception, while highly probative of intent where
present, is not required. See V.C., 748 A.2d at
552-53 (recognizing that the situation in which the
partner does not participate in the decision to conceive "parallels] the situation in which a woman,
already pregnant or a mother, becomes involved
with or marries a man who is not the biological or
adoptive father of the child, but thereafter fully
functions in every respect as a father"). A parent
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can intend to create a de facto parent-child relationship with a third party anytime during the child's life.
K 73 The intent requirement is critical because it ensures that the legal parent "has the absolute ability
to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her child." Id. at 552. If the legal parent
wishes to maintain that zone of privacy, he or she
need only choose not to delegate parental authority
or encourage the formation of a permanent, parentlike relationship between his or her child and another party, and avoid any overt acts in furtherance of
such a relationship. Moreover, the intent requirement limits the people who can qualify as de facto
parents. For example, under this standard, a nanny
or other caretaker will not qualify as a de facto parent because a parent does not intend these relationships to be parental or permanent. Additionally, this
part of the test prevents roommates, live-in boyfriends or girlfriends, or significant others from
automatically qualifying as de facto parents. While
a party that lives with a legal parent and his or her
children will likely participate in parental responsibilities to some degree, that participation, by itself,
is not enough. A claimant in this position would
have to show by clear and convincing evidence that
the legal parent intended to create a parent-child relationship and intentionally ceded over a sufficiently significant amount of parental responsibility
to create a permanent parental relationship between
the claimant and the child. I believe the intent requirement gives due consideration to a parent's
right to maintain an autonomous zone of privacy.
However, if the legal parent wishes to keep intact
this zone of privacy, he or she cannot give a third
party "parental authority the exercise of which may
create a profound bond with the child." Id.
1 74 A party claiming de facto parent status must
do more than merely allege intent; the party must
also point to specific behavior of the legal parent
that clearly manifests that intent. This is a casespecific requirement that can be satisfied by a variety of behavioral evidence. There is not, therefore,
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any specific factor that is required or that will, on
its own, be conclusive. Rather, a court must carefully examine all of the evidence to determine
whether proof of the requisite intent is clear and
convincing.

guardian. In fact, the "Verified Petition for Appointment of Co-Guardians for a Minor" stated that
"[Jones] is the only other parent that [the child]
knows or will know" and the Supporting Memorandum stated that "[s]ince [the child's] birth,
[Jones] has served as her other parent in all regards." Jones and Barlow took further steps to ensure that Jones could protect the child as she would
if she were a legal parent, including preparing estate planning documents and naming each other as
beneficiaries on life insurance policies to ensure
that the child would be cared for in an emergency.

^ 75 In the case before us, Barlow's behavior amply
demonstrates that, even before the child's birth,
Barlow intended Jones to be an equal, permanent
parent. Shortly after becoming engaged, Barlow
and Jones mutually decided to have children together and formulated a plan whereby Barlow would
bear the *829 first child and Jones would bear the
second. Pursuant to this plan, Barlow allowed Jones
to participate in the selection of a sperm donor, and
together the parties selected a donor that shared
both of their traits. Jones attended all prenatal matters relating to the artificial insemination and, following conception, participated in prenatal care
with Barlow and the physician. During the pregnancy, Jones and Barlow entered into a civil union
which, at least in Vermont, conferred rights on each
of them respecting children born during the union.
Barlow allowed Jones to be present at the delivery
and participate to the extent possible. After the
child was born, Barlow and Jones chose a name that
would reflect both of their surnames and listed that
name on the birth certificate.
1 76 Barlow continued to openly exhibit her intent
that Jones function in a parental role after the
child's birth. Barlow, Jones, and the child lived together and held themselves out as the
"Jones-Barlow" family. Barlow and Jones both held
themselves out as the child's parents. The child and
Barlow both called Jones "Mommy," while Barlow
was called "Momma." Jones provided financial
support for the child, attended pediatric appointments with her, and participated in her daily care
through such activities as dressing her, feeding her,
and taking her to child care. Jones would not have
been able to participate in these activities, at least
to the extent she did, without Barlow's consent.
f 77 Perhaps the most convincing fact is that Barlow designated Jones as the child's legal co-

TI 78 I do not mean to suggest that designating another party as a co-guardian, standing alone, is determinative. To the contrary, I do not believe that a
co-guardianship, on its own, would be enough to
satisfy this part of the test given that coguardianships are established for a number of reasons, many of which do not involve the intent to create a permanent parent-child relationship. However,
combined with Jones' participation in bringing the
child into the world and her daily support thereafter, I find the language and content of the coguardianship petition in this case particularly persuasive.
^1 79 Other jurisdictions have relied on actions similar to Barlow's in determining whether a third party
is a de facto parent. For example, in V.C., the mother and her partner jointly decided to have children,
chose a sperm donor, and participated in prenatal
care together. 748 A.2d at 542-43. The children
called the partner "Meema," and the biological
mother referred to her partner as the mother of her
children. Id. at 543. The parties and the children
lived together as a family, and the partner assumed
many day-to-day obligations of parenthood and
provided financial support. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the record supported the conclusion that the mother had "fostered and cultivated, in every way, the development of a parentchild bond between [her partner] and [her children]." Id. at 555.
TI 80 Likewise, in E.N.O. v. L.M.M., the court held
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that the mother's partner was a de facto parent. 429
Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (1999), cert,
denied, 528 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d
386 (1999). There, the parties jointly decided to
have a child, the partner cared for the mother during pregnancy, the child was given both parties'
surnames, the parties sent out birth announcements
listing them both as parents, and the partner assumed most of the financial responsibility for the
family and assisted in caring for the child. Id. at
888-89; see also Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of LB.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161,
163-65 (2005), cert, denied, — U.S. — , 126 S.Ct.
2021, 164 L.Ed.2d 806 (2006) (looking to factors
such as the parties' mutual decision to *830 have a
child and selection of a sperm donor, the partner's
participation in prenatal care and delivery, the
parties' choice to give the child a name that reflected both surnames, the parties' decision to live together as a family unit and hold themselves out as a
family, the fact that the child called her mother
"Mommy" and the partner "Momma," and the
parties' decision to share parenting responsibilities);
T.B., 786 A.2d at 914-15 (holding that the partner
was a de facto parent where the parties jointly decided to have a child and thereafter lived together,
the mother named her partner as a guardian over the
child in her will, they engaged in financial planning
to provide for the child, and the partner participated
in day-to-day child rearing responsibilities, such as
taking the child to child care); H.S.H-K., 533
N.W.2d at 421-22 (holding that the partner was a de
facto parent where the parties jointly decided to
have a child, the partner was present during prenatal appointments and delivery, the parties gave the
child a name that reflected both surnames, the partner provided primary financial support, and both
women shared child care responsibilities).
\ 81 Like the above courts, I find a significant
amount of evidence manifesting Barlow's intent to
give parental rights to Jones. Barlow's actions
clearly and convincingly establish that, up until she
and Jones separated, she intended Jones to be her
child's other parent. I therefore would hold that in

this case the intent requirement has been satisfied.
B. Creation of an Actual Parent-Child Relationship
U 82 I now turn to the second part of the de facto
parent test. To satisfy this part, the petitioner must
prove that he or she and the child formed an actual
parent-child relationship. Cf You mans v. Ramos,
429 Mass. 774, 711 N.E.2d 165 (1999) (holding
that an aunt was a de facto parent where she and the
child had developed a substantial mother-daughter
relationship). A petitioner satisfies this requirement
by establishing that (1) the petitioner lived with and
cared for the child on a daily basis, and as a result
(2) the petitioner and the child formed a parentchild bond.
1. Living With and Caring for the Child
% 83 In order for a third party and a child to develop
an actual parent-child relationship, the third party
must have lived with and cared for the child on a
daily basis. See V.C, 748 A.2d at 551 (requiring
that a petitioner lived in the same household as the
child and assumed obligations of parenthood);
H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421 (same). There is no
minimum period of time during which a third party
must have lived with and cared for the child. It is,
however, appropriate for a court to consider the
amount of time during which the third party has
functioned as a parent when determining whether
an actual parent-child relationship has been created.
See V.C, 748 A.2d at 553. In other words, the petitioner must have functioned in a parental role for
a long enough period of time to allow a bonded parent-child relationship to develop. Id. "How much
time is necessary will turn on the facts of each
case," including the child's age,FKM0 developmental stage, and the nature of the relationship. Id.
FN 10. Research indicates that children can
begin to form strong bonds at a very early
age. See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly & Michael E.
Lamb, Using Child Development Research
to Make Appropriate Custody and Access
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Decisions for Young Children, 38 Fam. &
Conciliation Cts. Rev. 297, 299 (2000)
("In the attachment phase, which occurs
between 7 and 24 months of age, the child
... gives increasingly clear evidence that attachments have been formed."). Thus,
while the child's age may be relevant in determining the nature of the relationship, I
do not in any way suggest that a very
young child is incapable of forming a bonded parent-child relationship with a third
party.
^ 84 The care the third party provides to the child
during this time must be equivalent to the care a
biological or legal parent would provide. This does
not require that the third party have the exact same
relationship with the child or assume the same responsibilities toward the child as the legal parent.
Rather, it demands that the third party assume the
normal "obligations of parenthood" and do so
without the expectation of financial compensation.
Id. at 551. These obligations include "taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education
and development,"*831 H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at
436, and may or may not include financial contributions to the child and the household. V.C., 748
A.2d at 553. As with the other parts of the de facto
parent test, this inquiry is fact sensitive and will
vary with each individual case.
% 85 Turning to the facts of this case, I believe that
Jones has clearly and convincingly shown that she
lived with and cared for the child on a daily basis.
Jones lived with Barlow and the child from the
child's birth until the child was two years old. During that time, Jones participated in the child's daily
care as if she were a parent. She took her to doctor
appointments, dropped her off at child care, and attended "to the child's daily personal needs, such as
eating and bathing. Jones also provided the child
with financial security, not only by providing for
the child in her will and securing a life insurance
policy, but also by contributing to the household
expenses.
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If 86 As is the case in most two-parent households,
Jones' parental obligations and responsibilities were
not the same as Barlow's. For example, when the
child was an infant, Barlow, as the nursing mother,
nearly always fed the child. Likewise, during the
first fifteen months of the child's life, Barlow
stayed at home while Jones worked. As the child
grew, the parties' roles evolved accordingly, with
Barlow returning to work and Jones assuming more
care-giving responsibilities. These differences,
however, do not mean that Jones was not fulfilling
a parental role. Indeed, this division of roles is
nearly identical to that frequently found between
married men and women with children. Like the
district court, I am convinced that Jones "assumed
the obligations of parenthood by taking sufficient
and significant responsibility for the child's care,
upbringing, future education and well-being ...
without expectation of financial compensation."
K 87 I recognize that Jones' role had changed by the
time she filed her petition for visitation. Barlow and
the child had moved out, and therefore Jones was
no longer living with the child and caring for her on
a daily basis. This is not problematic, however. Unlike the doctrine of in loco parentis, a de facto parent need not still be living in the same household as
the child at the time the petition is filed; in fact, it is
highly unlikely that he or she will be. The third
party need only petition the court for visitation
within a reasonable time after the legal parent interferes with the third party's relationship with the
child. As a practical matter, this interference often
will not occur until the third party and the child no
longer live together and the legal parent denies visitation.™11 In this case, Jones filed her petition
within a reasonable time of Barlow's interference.
The parties separated on November 7, 2003, Barlow denied Jones visitation with the child later that
same month, and Jones filed her complaint on
December 19, 2003. Thus, Jones satisfies our requirement that she lived with and cared for the
child on a day-to-day basis.
FN11. I do not believe it is necessary to es-
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tablish a definite period of time after the
petitioner moves from the child's household in which a petition for visitation must
be filed. I recognize, and indeed hope, that
parties will often resolve matters of visitation on their own, without involving the
courts. I also recognize, however, that
parties may not be able to resolve their differences regarding visitation, or that the
legal parent may suddenly terminate visitation with the third party after that party has
enjoyed visitation with the child for
months or even years. Setting a limitations
period that begins at the date the petitioner
moves from the child's household would
foreclose a remedy to de facto parents and
their children when a legal parent has
agreed to allow visitation but later changes
his or her mind and denies it. I therefore
would require only that a petition be filed
within a reasonable time after the legal
parent interferes with the relationship
between the third party and the child.

2. Actual Parent-Child Bonding
f 88 In addition to,the requirement that a petitioner
live with and care for the child, to prove the existence of an actual parent-child relationship, the petitioner must show that the petitioner and the child
share "a relationship with deep emotional bonds
such that the child recognizes the person, independent of the legal form of the relationship, as a parent
from whom they receive daily guidance and nurturance." In re RL.M.C,
100 P.3d 546, 559
(Colo.Ct.App.2004), cert, denied, 2004 WL
2377164, 2004 Colo. LEXIS S51 ,cert. *832
denied, 545 U.S. 1111, 125 S.Ct. 2551, 162
L.Ed.2d 287 (2005). A child can form this type of
relationship regardless of whether the potential de
facto parent is biologically related to the child. See,
e.g., J. Hammond Muench & Martin R. Levy, Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 Fam.
L.Q. 129, 152 (1979) ("[T]he child's development
depends upon the continuity and character of [the]
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relationship with the adult he perceives as his parent, and ... this perception rather than the fact of
biological parenthood is the basis of their relationship."(citation omitted)); Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
843, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977)
("[Etiological relationships are not [the] exclusive
determination of the existence of a family.").
Rather, bonded parent-child relationships form
when children "receive sensitive and responsive
care from familiar adults," who may or may not be
biologically related, in the course of everyday caresuch as being fed, held, spoken to, played with,
soothed, and stimulated. Joan B. Kelley & Michael
E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to
Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions
for Young Children, 38 Fam. & Conciliation Cts.
Rev. 297, 298 (2000); see also Smith, 431 U.S. at
844, 97 S.Ct. 2094 ("[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot [ing] a
way of life' through the instruction of children."(citation omitted) (alteration in original)). In
addition, parent-child bonds develop and grow
stronger when the child spends time in the third
party's general proximity. Kelley & Lamb, supra ^
88, at 298.
K 89 There is ample evidence of an actual parentchild bond in this case. As noted previously, Jones
lived with and cared for the child for the first two
years of the child's life. Jones testified that she felt
bonded to the child during this time, particularly in
the mornings when she and the child were alone.
Moreover, as is evident by this lawsuit, Jones seriously wishes to maintain this relationship. I find it
persuasive that family and friends testified that the
relationship between Jones and the child mirrored a
traditional parent-child relationship. The district
judge found the testimony of these witnesses particularly persuasive because they witnessed this relationship "in the home at times that were not merely
social occasions, but rather in evenings and early
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mornings." The child's pediatrician echoed these
witnesses, testifying that "[i]n the office, both
[Jones and Barlow] seemed to take a very active
role in [the child's] well-being and be very genuinely interested in how she was doing." Like the
district judge, I find this testimony "extremely important."
K 90 It is undisputed that Barlow also shared a close
mother-daughter relationship with the child. Like
the district judge, I believe that Barlow may have
had a closer relationship with the child given that
she was the biological and nursing mother. I do not
believe, however, that Barlow's closer relationship
with the child prohibits the child and Jones from
also developing an actual parent-child relationship.
That the third party is not the child's primary caregiver does not imply that the third party and the
child do not share a real parent-child bond. Research has shown that children generally form attachments to both parents at the same age, usually
around six to seven months. Kelly & Lamb, supra ^
88, at 300. This is true even where one parent
spends more time with the child than the other, as is
the case in the "traditional home." Id. Evidence
that Barlow was the child's primary caregiver does
not defeat a claim of an actual parent-child bond
between Jones and the child. Thus, Jones meets the
requirement that she formed an actual parental bond
with the child.

IV. THE DE FACTO PARENT DOCTRINE IS
CONSTITUTIONAL
T| 91 Finally, my belief that Jones is a de facto parent and thus entitled to standing is constitutional.
The Constitution of the United States, specifically
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects "the fundamental right of parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)
(plurality opinion). To *833 protect this fundamental right, parents are entitled to a presumption that a
fit parent acts in the best interests of his or her
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child. See id at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (" 'The law's
concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions. More important,
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.' " (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979))).
This presumption cannot be rebutted "simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision
could have been made." Troxel 530 U.S. at 73,
120 S.Ct. 2054.
T( 92 Troxel is the preeminent case addressing a parent's fundamental rights in the context of thirdparty visitation. Troxel addressed the application of
a Washington statute that allowed " 'any person' "
to petition for visitation rights " 'at any time' " and
gave a court the authority to grant visitation if it "
'serve[d] the best interest of the child.' " Id. at 67,
120 S.Ct. 2054 (quoting Wash. Rev.Code §
26.10.160(3) (1994)). The plurality held that, as applied, the statute violated "the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Id. at 66-67,
120 S.Ct. 2054. According to the plurality, the statute exceeded the bounds of due process because its
breadth allowed any third party to bring a visitation
petition, and it did not afford a parent's decision
any deference despite the parental presumption. Id.
at 67-68, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Rather, the visitation
statute allowed a court to overturn any parent's decision regarding visitation based solely on its determination of the child's best interest, id. at 67, 120
S.Ct. 2054, which was precisely what the district
judge in the case had done, id. at 68-70, 120 S.Ct.
2054.
H 93 However, the de facto parent doctrine does not
violate a parent's due process rights under Troxel
The de facto parent doctrine is not nearly as broad
as the statute at issue in Troxel It does not grant
"any" third party standing, but only those persons
who have satisfied the stringent requirements of de
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facto parenthood Moreover, a finding of de facto
parent status does not amount to a judge's determination that a better decision could have been made
with regard to visitation, but rather, to a finding that
the parental presumption does not apply when a
legal parent creates and fosters a parent-child relationship between his or her child and a third
party FN,P Also, when a judge makes a determination that a party is a de facto parent, the judge is
only determining that the party has standing and is
thus entitled to a hearing on the best interests of the
child Thus, the judge's decision that a party is a de
facto parent is not a determination of what visitation arrangement is best See TB v LRM
567
Pa 222, 786 A 2d 913 919-20 (2001) ("A determination of standing simply implies that the party has
a substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation and
does not speak to [a third party's]
chance of success on the merits ")
FN 12 This case addresses only visitation,
and I accordingly limit my analysis regarding a natural parent's waiver of the parental
presumption to this context However,
some courts have gone further and recognized parity between de facto and legal
parents, thus enabling de facto parents to
take advantage of the protections offered
by the parental presumption See eg
Caivin v Britain fin te Pclientage oj
LB) 155 Wash 2d 679, 122 P 3d 161, 178
(2005) (noting that "the status of de facto
parents
places them in parity with biological and adoptive parents" and gives them
a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and management of the child),
cert denied — U S —- 126 S Ct 2021
164LTd2d806(2006)
1f 94 Moreover, nothing m Tioxel suggests that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits third-party visitation in all contexts or always requires a rebuttal of
the parental presumption In fact, the 77 oxel plurality specifically limited its holding to the "sweeping
breadth" of the Washington statute, noting that it
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had not considered whether the Due Process Clause
always requires a showing of harm as a prerequisite
to third-party visitation 530 U S at 73, 120 S Ct
2054 The Court also stated that it was not defining
"the precise scope of the parental due process right
in the visitation context" hNI Id
FN 13 Several of the dissenting justices in
Troxel indicated that they would not be opposed to granting visitation to those that
had a substantial relationship with a child
530 US at 85, 120 S Ct 2054 (Stevens,
J, dissenting) (noting that in many circumstances it would be "constitutionally permissible for a court to award some visitation of a child to a
previous caregiver"),
id al 98, 100-01, 120 S Ct 2054
(Kennedy, J , dissenting) (noting that there
may be cases where a third party "has developed a relationship with a child which
is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto" and that "a fit parent's right visa-vis a complete stranger is one thing, her
right vis-a-vis another parent or a de facto
parent may be another")
*834 H 95 Therefore, I do not believe that the Due
Process Clause is violated under Troxel when a
judge grants a de facto parent standing in a visitation matter I recognize that a parent has a right to
make decisions regarding the upbringing of his or
her child However, a parent exercises this right
when he or she invites a third party to form a parental relationship with his or her child and thereafter actively fosters the relationship By incorporating the legal parent's intent into our de facto parent test, I am giving deference to the legal parent's
decisions However, once a legal parent exercises
this right and creates a de facto parent relationship
between the child and another, the legal parent has
a reduced expectation of privacy and autonomy A
parent who encourages the formation of such a relationship cannot later unilaterally sever the connection or complain that a court has violated his or her
rights by protecting the relationship As the New
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Jersey Supreme Court explained in V.C. v. K4.J.B.:
[A] parent has the absolute ability to maintain a
zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her
child. However, if she wishes to maintain that
zone of privacy she cannot invite a third party to
function as a parent to her child and cannot cede
over to that third party parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond with
the child.
163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 552 (2000), cert,
denied, 531 U.S. 926, 121 S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d
243 (2000).
^ 96 This approach is consistent with post- Troxel
decisions that have granted third parties standing
where the third party has a substantial relationship
with the child.rNI4 For instance, this court determined that Utah's grandparent visitation statute
was constitutional and upheld a grant of visitation,
against the father's objection, where the maternal
grandparents had lived with the child and interacted
with her on a daily basis prior to the death of the
child's mother. LJzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of
S.T.T.J, 2006 UT 46, ^ 1-4, 144 P.3d 1083. As recognized in S.T.T., when a family is divided by
events such as divorce, "a situation may arise where
the child's interests differ from those of the parent." Id. *l 30. The de facto parent test would
"provide[ ] guidance to courts in determining
whether the petitioning [third party] ha[s] established circumstances under which the courts can,
nevertheless, supersede the parent's decision," just
as courts may do when the third party seeking visitation is a grandparent. Id. ^ 35. As this court has
previously recognized, situations exist in which visitation with a third party may be in the best interests of a child despite the legal parent's objections, and like Utah's grandparent visitation statute,
the de facto parent test would, I believe, survive
constitutional scrutiny.
FN14. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C, 100 P.3d
546,
557,
562
(Colo.Ct.App.2004)
(rejecting the assertion that a parent must
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be found unfit under Troxel and upholding
trial court's order granting a partner equal
parenting responsibilities based on a psychological parent theory because it was
more than a judge's "better decision" as to
best interests), cert, denied, 2004 WL
2377164, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 851,cert,
denied, 545 U.S. 1111, 125 S.Ct. 2551,
162 L.Ed.2d 287 (2005); Rideout v. Riencleaiu 761 A.2d 291, 303 (Me.2000)
("[WJhere the grandparents have acted as
the children's parents for significant periods of time, [Maine's] Grandparent Visitation Act serves a compelling state interest
in addressing the children's relationship
with the people who have cared for them
as parents ... [and the Act] may be applied
... without violating the constitutional
rights of the parents."); VC, 748 A.2d at
554 (noting that where a parent has invited
another to be a de facto parent and thereby
"altered her child's life by essentially giving him or her another parent, the legal
parent's options are constrained"); Rubano
v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I.2000)
(finding that lower court's enforcement of
a visitation agreement between the natural
parent and the de facto parent did not violate the Due Process Clause because there
are circumstances where "even the existence of a developed biological, parentchild relationship ... will not prevent others
from acquiring parental rights vis-a-vis the
child").
*835 K 97 In conclusion, the recognition of de facto
parenthood would not infringe upon the general
right of parents to raise their children in the manner
they deem appropriate. Rather, de facto parenthood
addresses only the specific circumstances that arise
when a parent consents to and fosters a de facto
parent relationship between the parent's child and
another party. It merely recognizes that when a parent encourages another to form a de facto parent relationship with a child, the parent and the third
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party are not the only parties affected by the decision. There is another interested party: the child.
In these situations, in order to properly address the
best interests of the child, it is appropriate to grant
the de facto parent standing.
| 98 I therefore conclude that under Utah common
law, de facto parents should have standing to seek
visitation, despite the objections of a biological or
legal parent. De facto parenthood recognizes that
when a natural parent fosters such a relationship,
the child is also affected and ought to be protected
from losing a relationship with someone who is, as
far as the child is concerned, a parent.
Utah,2007.
Jones v. Barlow
154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2007 UT 20
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Emmarae GRIBBLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Michael GRIBBLE, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 15453.
July 21, 1978.
Wife brought divorce action against husband, and
husband counterclaimed that he was entitled to
reasonable visitation rights with his wife's child by
a previous marriage, i. e., his stepchild. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, David K. Winder,
J., held that stepfather was not entitled to hearing
on issue of visitation, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J., held that stepfather was
entitled to hearing to determine whether he stood in
loco parentis to his stepchild and if so whether it
was in child's best interest to grant him right of visitation, and further, whether that right was to be
conditioned by his agreement to pay proper share
for child support.
Reversed and remanded.

76Dk283 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 134k299)
Statute providing guidelines regarding visitation in
divorce actions, as amended in 1975, codified traditional common-law rules permitting an equitable
investigation into whether it was in welfare of child
that parents, grandparents or other relatives be accorded visitation rights and indicated legislative intent to protect relationships which affect child
whose parents are being divorced and to be sensitive to fact that relationships beyond those of parentchild may be important enough to protect vis-a-vis
visitation. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
[2] Child Custody 76D €=^76
76D Child Custody
76DII Grounds and Factors in General
76DII(C) Factors Relating to Child
76Dk76 k. Welfare and Best Interest of
Child. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 134k298(l))
Child Custody 76D €^>178

76D Child Custody
76DVTI Particular Status or Relationship
76DV1I(A) In General
76Dk271 k. Relatives in General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 134k299)

76D Child Custody
76DV Visitation
76I)kl78 k. Welfare and Best Interest of
Child. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 134k299)
In proceedings to determine custody and/or visitation, welfare of a minor child is of paramount importance, and divorce courts have broad equitable
powers in safeguarding this interest. U.C.A.1953,
30-3-5.

Child Custody 76D €^>283

[3] Child Custody 76D €=^>272

76D Child Custody
76DVII Particular Status or Relationship
76DVU(B) Grandparents
76Dk282 Grandparent Visitation and Access to Child

76D Child Custody
76DVII Particular Status or Relationship
76DVII(A) In General
76Dk272 k. Stepparents. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 134k299)
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For stepfather to assert visitation rights with respect
to his ex-wife's child, he had to stand in relationship of parent, grandparent or other relative to
child, keeping in mind paramount concern of child's
welfare. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
[41 Parent and Child 285 €^>14
285 Parent and Child
285k 14 k. Stepchildren. Most Cited Cases
At common law, stepparent and stepchild relationship conferred no rights and imposed no obligations.
[5] Parent and Child 285 €=^>15
285 Parent and Child
285kl5 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Term "in loco parentis" means in place of a parent,
and a "person in loco parentis" is one who has assumed status and obligations of a parent without
formal adoption.
[6] Parent and Child 285 €^>15
285 Parent and Child
285kl5 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Whether or not one assumes status of "person in
loco parentis" depends on whether person intends
to assume that obligation.

92XXVII(B)
Protections
Provided
and
Deprivations Prohibited in General
92k3878 Notice and Hearing
92k3879 k. In General. Most Cited
(Formerly 92k251.6)
Implicit in due process clause of State Constitution
is that persons be afforded a hearing to determine
their rights under the law. Const, art. L § 7.
[9] Parent and Child 285 €^>15
285 Parent and Child
285k 15 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Common law concerning termination of loco parentis status is that only surrogate parent or child is
able to terminate status at will, and rights, duties
and obligations continue as long as they choose to
continue relationship.
[10] Child Custody 76D €^>510
76D Child Custody
76DVIII Proceedings
76DVIII(C) Hearing
76Dk510 k. Findings and Verdict by Jury.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 285k2(8))
There is a presumption that best interest of child is
for him to be reared by his natural parent, although
this presumption is one of fact and not of law and
may be overcome by sufficient evidence, and welfare of child is controlling.

[7] Parent and Child 285 €^>15
[11] Child Custody 76D €^>289
285 Parent and Child
285kl5 k. Persons in Loco Parentis. Most Cited
Cases
Where one stands in loco parentis to another, rights
and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as
words imply, exactly the same as between parent
and child.
[8] Constitutional Law 92 €=>3879
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process

76D Child Custody
76DV.II Particular Status or Relationship
76DVII(B) Grandparents
76Dk282 Grandparent Visitation and Access to Child
76Dk289 k. Death of Parent. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 134k299)
Statute providing guidelines regarding visitation in
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divorce actions conceivably allows visitation where
custodial rights would not exist; for example, where
two natural parents divorce, with custody of their
child granted to mother and visitation rights granted
to father, and mother then dies, custody would go to
father absent evidence of his unfitness, incapacity,
etc., as against child's maternal grandparents, but
maternal grandparents would have visitation rights
which they previously did not have, assuming that
court found it was in child's best interest.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.

that he should be entitled to reasonable visitation
rights with respondent's son. He claimed that he has
treated the child as his own son, feels very close to
him, and is concerned about his future welfare. Appellant further offered to pay fifty dollars a month
into a trust account for the child's benefit until he
reaches eighteen years of age. Appellant lived with
the child from the time he was two months old until
the respondent and the appellant separated, roughly
four years later, and it is uncontested that the child
has had no contact with his biological father.

[12] Child Custody 76D C^>272

Respondent objected to visitation rights being
awarded to the appellant. The trial court held as a
matter of law that the appellant (stepparent) was not
entitled to a hearing on the issue of visitation. The
sole issue raised on appeal, therefore, is whether the
appellant stepfather is entitled to a hearing on the
issue of visitation rights.

760 Child Custody
76DVII Particular Status or Relationship
76DVII(A) In General
76Dk272 k. Stepparents. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 134k299)
Stepfather was entitled in divorce proceeding to
hearing to determine whether he stood in loco parentis to his wife's child and if so whether it was in
child's best interest to grant him right of visitation,
and further, whether that right should be conditioned upon his agreement to pay a proper share for
child support. Const, art. 1, § 7; U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
*65 Jonathan H. King, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
J. Douglas Kinateder, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and respondent.
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
This case arises out of a divorce action filed by the
respondent against the appellant. Respondent has a
minor child, her offspring by a previous marriage,
born about two months before his mother's marriage to the appellant. Although four children were
born to the respondent and the appellant during the
time they were together, all four died either at birth
or in their infancy. Because of this and because the
appellant, the child's stepfather, had never formally
adopted him, respondent did not seek child support
in her divorce complaint. Appellant counter-claims

[l][2][3]Utah Code Ann., Sec. 30-3-5 (1953), as
amended, provides guidelines regarding*66 custody
and visitation in divorce actions:
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may
make such orders in relation to the children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the parties
and children, as may be equitable. The court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody
of the children and their support and maintenance,
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents,
grandparents and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child. (Emphasis added.)
The 1975 Legislature amended Sec. 30-3-5 to include the last sentence, thereby codifying traditional common law rules permitting an equitable investigation into whether it is in the welfare of the child
that parents, grandparents, or other relatives be accorded visitation rights. In proceedings to determine custody and/or visitation, the welfare of a minor
child is of paramount importance,[FNl] and di-
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vorce courts have broad equitable powers in safeguarding this interest.[FN2]The last sentence of
Sec. 30-3-5 indicates the legislative intent to protect the relationships which affect the child whose
parents are being divorced, and to be sensitive to
the fact that relationships beyond those of parentchild may be important enough to protect vis-a-vis
visitation. For the appellant to assert visitation
rights, he must, therefore, stand in the relationship
of parent, grandparent, or other relative to this
child, keeping in mind the paramount concern of
the child's welfare.
FN1. Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328,
517 P.2d 1019 (1974); Robinson v. Robinson, 15 Utah 2d 293, 391 P.2d 434 (1964).
FN2. Dehm v. Dehra, Utah, 545 P.2d 525
(1976); Mecham v. Mecham, Utah, 544
P.2d 479 (1975).
[4] At common law, the stepparent and stepchild relationship conferred no rights and imposed no obligations. [FN3] In some states this rule has been
statutorily amended to require stepparents to
provide for their stepchildren so long as the relationship continues. [FN4] The Colorado Supreme
Court in In re Estate of latino, [FN5] went so far as
to conclude that the word "stepchild" in an inheritance tax statute included the Former stepchildren of
a marriage that ended in divorce prior to the stepparent's death.

have standing to assert his claims. However, it appears that the appellant may have assumed the
status of one in loco parentis to the child which
would put him in a different position. The term "in
loco parentis" means in the place of a parent, and a
"person in loco parentis" is one who has assumed
the status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption. [FN6] Whether or not one assumes this
status depends on whether that person Intends to assume that obligation.[FN7]
FN6. Workman v. Workman, 498 P.2d
1384 (Okl.1972); Sturrup v. Mahan, 261
Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974).
FN7. Fevig v. Fevig, 90 N.M. 51, 559 P.2d
839 (1977). See also 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent
& Child, s 88.
"[7] Where one stands in loco parentis to another,
the rights and liabilities arising out of that relation
are, as the words imply, exactly the same as
between parent and child."[FN8]The Washington
Supreme Court in In re Hudson, [FN9] discussed the
rights of parental custody and control and classified
*67 parental rights and those of persons in loco parentis together as having apparent equivalent status:
FN8. Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5
P.2d 570 (1931); see also In re Tanner,
Utah, 549 P.2d 703 (1976).
FN9. 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).

FN3. Estate of Smith v. Nicholson, 49
Wash.2d 229, 299 P.2d 550 (1956).
FN4. Estate of Griffen v. Haugland, 86
Wash.2d 223, 543 P.2d 245 (1975); State
v. Gillaspie, 8 Wash.App. 560, 507 P.2d
1223 (1973).
FN5. 542 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1975).
[5][6] Utah has no statutory provision obligating
stepparent support, however; and if nothing more
existed in the relationship between the appellant
and respondent's child, the appellant would not

. . . Parents or those standing in loco parentis to
minor children primarily have the constitutional
right to the custody and control of such minor children and may give to those children such attention
and training as in the judgment of such parents or
guardians may seem best for the welfare of the
child or children and for the good of society. [FN 10]
(Emphasis added.)
FN 10. Id., 126P.2dat775.
[8] In the instant case, the appellant claims to have
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lived with his stepson since the child was two
months old, treated him "as his own son," and feels
concerned about his future. If these claims are true
and if they indicate his desire to stand in the place
of a parent, then appellant's relationship may entitle
him to the same rights accorded to natural parents.
Implicit in the due process clause of our state Constitution [FN 11] is that persons be afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law. If we
are to find that the status of loco parentis confers
the same rights upon a stepparent as those enjoyed
by a natural parent, then A fortiori, the rights of the
stepparent cannot be terminated without an opportunity to be heard on the matter.
FN 11.Utah Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 7.
[9] The loco parentis status has been terminated,
however, by divorce, [FN 12] although termination
by divorce has been determined only in the context
of the person in loco parentis making the choice to
terminate the status; and not, as here, in the context
of the one in loco parentis wishing to continue the
status against the wishes of the natural parent. The
common law concerning termination of the loco
parentis status is that only the surrogate parent or
the child is able to terminate the status [FN13] at
will, and the rights, duties, and obligations continue
as long as they choose to continue the
relationship. [FN 14]
FN 12. Franklin v. Franklin, 75 Ariz. 151.
253 P.2d 337 (1953).
FN 13. Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wash.2d 510,
364 P.2d 444 (1961); Chestnut v. Chestnut,
247 S.C. 332, 147 SJB.2d 269 (1966).
FN 14. See the discussion re stepparents as
standing in loco parentis in 59 Am.Jur.2d,
Parent and Child, Sec. 91.
[10][11] This is an unusual case. Respondent even
admits that the appellant loves the child. There is a
presumption that the best interest of a child is for it
to be reared by its natural parent, although this pre-
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sumption is one of fact and not of law and may be
overcome by sufficient evidence; [FN 15] and, as
stated previously, the welfare of the child is controlling. Important also is that the appellant does
not seek custody; he wishes only to exercise visitation privileges. Because Sec. 30-3-5 conceivably allows visitation where custodial rights would not exist,[FN16] this Court feels that there is greater flexibility in determining visitation than there is in determining custody.
FN 15. Walton v. Cofrman, 110 Utah 1,
169 P.2d 97 (1946); Baldwin v. Niclson.
110 Utah 172, 170P.2d 179(1946).
FN 16. For example, two natural parents divorce, with custody of their child granted
to the mother and visitation rights granted
to the father. The mother then dies. Custody would go to the father absent evidence of his unfitness, incapacity, etc. as
against the child's maternal grandparents.
Even though the maternal grandparents
would not have a custodial right as against
the father, they would have visitation
rights which they previously did not have,
assuming the court found it in the child's
best interest to give visitation rights to the
grandparents.
A case in point is that of Spells v. Spells, [FN 17] a
Pennsylvania decision concerning the right of a
stepfather to seek visitation rights with his ex-wife's
children. The court there said:
FN 17. 250 Pa.Supcr. 168, 378 A.2d 879
(1977).
. . . It is our belief that a stepfather may not be
denied the right to visit *68 his stepchildren merely
because of his lack of a blood relationship to them.
Clearly, a stepfather and his young stepchildren
who live in a family environment may develop deep
and lasting mutual bonds of affection. Courts must
acknowledge the fact that a stepfather (or stepmother) may be the only parent that the child has truly
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(Cite as: 583 P.2d 64)
known and loved during its minority. A stepparent
may be as devoted and concerned about the welfare
of a stepchild as a natural parent would be. Rejection of visitation privileges cannot be grounded in
the mere status as a stepparent. (Emphasis added.)
Case law is clear that 'the guiding star for the court
in coming to a conclusion (in a child custody case)
is the welfare of the child. To this the rights of parents and all other considerations are subordinate.' .
. . Thus, it is clear that visitation rights of a parent
not in custody must be carefully guarded. . . . Accordingly, when a stepparent is 'in loco parentis'
with his stepchildren, courts must jealously guard
his rights to visitation....
The Pennsylvania court remanded the case to the
trial court in order to determine whether or not the
stepfather actually stood in loco parentis to his
stepchildren; and if so, to permit the stepfather to
demonstrate that his interest in visitation should be
protected.
We believe this is a sound view and one which we
should adopt.
[12] In view of the foregoing, it appears that the appellant may be in loco parentis to respondent's child
and that only he or the child, and not the respondent, can terminate that relationship. If appellant is
in loco parentis, he should be considered a parent
for purposes of Sec. 30-3-5. It is consistent with
both the statutory intent and with the requirements
of due process that he, like a natural parent, grandparent, or any other relative, have a hearing to determine his rights to visitation.
The appellant made no offer to pay child support,
and certainly he has no legal duty to do so. He did
offer to set up a trust fund on behalf of the child
and to make monthly contributions to that fund. It
may be that if a stepfather standing in the status of
loco parentis is given the opportunity to seek visitation rights as a right afforded a natural parent, that
he should not be permitted to escape the duties and
obligations of the loco parentis status as long as

that relationship remains intact. A hearing could determine not only the right to visitation, but could
determine whether that right should be conditioned
on a requirement that the stepfather accept an obligation to assist in the support of the child. This is not
only consistent with the concept of loco parentis
but may well be necessary to the child's welfare.
Loco parentis does not envision that a stepparent be
permitted to enjoy the rights of a natural parent
without also accepting the responsibilities that are
incurred.
The case is reversed and remanded to the trial court
for a hearing to determine whether the appellant
stands in loco parentis to his stepchild and if so,
whether it is in the child's best interest to grant the
appellant a right of visitation; and, further, whether
that right should be conditioned by appellant's
agreement to pay a proper share for child support.
No costs are awarded.
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL,
JJ., concur.
Utah, 1978.
Gribble v. Gribble
583P.2d64, 1 A.L.R.4th 1263
END OF DOCUMENT

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2008)
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children ~
Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time Determination of alimony ~ Nonmeritorious petition for modification

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include
the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for
the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If
the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for

distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable
attorneys1 fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation
order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the
prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor

spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time
of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the
court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of
short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs
of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds

extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or
death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void
ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.

§30-5a-101. Title
This chapter is known as the "Custody and Visitation for Persons Other than Parents Act."
§30-5a-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Parent" means a biological or adoptive parent.
(2) "Person other than a parent" means a person related to the child by marriage or blood, including:
(a) siblings;
(b) aunts;
(c) uncles;
(d) grandparents; or
(e) current or former step-parents, or any of the persons in Subsections (2)(a) through (d)
in a step relationship to the child.
§ 30-5a-103. Custody and visitation for persons other than a parent
(1) In accordance with
1. Section 62A-4a-20L it is the public policy of this state that parents retain the
fundamental right and duty to exercise primary control over the care, supervision,
upbringing, and education of their children. There is a rebuttable presumption that a
parent's decisions are in the child's best interests.
(2) A court may find the presumption in Subsection (1) rebutted and grant custodial or
visitation rights to a person other than a parent who, by clear and convincing evidence,
has established all of the following:
(a) the person has intentionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent;
(b) the person and the child have formed an emotional bond and created a parent-child
type relationship;
(c) the person contributed emotionally or financially to the child's well being;

(d) assumption of the parental role is not the result of a financially compensated surrogate
care arrangement;
(e) continuation of the relationship between the person and the child would be in the
child's best interests;
(f) loss or cessation of the relationship between the person and the child would be
detrimental to the child; and
(g) the parent:
(i) is absent; or
(ii) is found by a court to have abused or neglected the child.
(3) A proceeding under this chapter may be commenced by filing a verified petition, or
petition supported by an affidavit, in the juvenile court if a matter is pending, or in the
district court in the county in which the child:
(a) currently resides; or
(b) lived with a parent or a person other than a parent who acted as a parent within six
months before the commencement of the action.
(4) A proceeding under this chapter may be filed in a pending divorce, parentage action,
or other proceeding, including a proceeding in the juvenile court, involving custody of or
visitation with a child.
(5) The petition shall include detailed facts supporting the petitioner's right to file the
petition including the criteria set forth in Subsection (2) and residency information as set
forth in Section 78B-13-209.
(6) A proceeding under this chapter may not be filed against a parent who is actively
serving outside the state in any branch of the military.
(7) Notice of a petition filed pursuant to this chapter shall be served in accordance with
the rules of civil procedure on all of the following:
(a) the child's biological, adopted, presumed, declarant, and adjudicated parents;
(b) any person who has court-ordered custody or visitation rights;
(c) the child's guardian;

(d) the guardian ad litem, if one has been appointed;
(e) a person or agency that has physical custody of the child or that claims to have
custody or visitation rights; and
(f) any other person or agency that has previously appeared in any action regarding
custody of or visitation with the child.
(8) The court may order a custody evaluation to be conducted in any action brought under
this chapter.
(9) The court may enter temporary orders in an action brought under this chapter pending
the entry offinalorders.
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»e it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
[*1] Section 1. Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 257, Laws of Utah 1991, as amended to
ead:
0-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children -- Division of debts -- Court to have continuing
jrisdiction - Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for
lodification.
1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or
bligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent
hildren;
b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and

ental care insurance for the dependent children; and
:) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
icurred during marriage;
i) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or
abilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
ii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders.
I) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child
are expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If
le court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may
iclude an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the
mployment or training of the custodial parent.
3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties,
le custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and obligations
>r debts as is reasonable and necessary.
\) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other [ D > relatives < D ] [ A > MEMBERS OF THE IMMEDIATE
<\MILY < A ] , the court shall consider the [ D > welfare < D ] [ A > BEST INTEREST < A ] of the child.
5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
utomatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
itio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are
stermined.
>) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony
»at the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further established by the person receiving
imony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
7

) [ D > When < D ] [ A > IF < A ] a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made and
snied, the court [ D > may < D ] [ A > SHALL < A ] order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the
availing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted [ A > OR DEFENDED
GAINST < A ] in good faith.
\> (8) IF A PETITION ALLEGES SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH A VISITATION ORDER BY A PARENT, A GRANDPARENT, OR
THER MEMBER OF THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY PURSUANT TO SECTION 78-32-12.2 WHERE A VISITATION RIGHT HAS BEEN
DEVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE COURT, THE COURT MAY AWARD TO THE PREVAILING PARTY COSTS, INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY
EES AND COURT COSTS INCURRED BY THE PREVAILING PARTY BECAUSE OF THE OTHER PARTY'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE OR
KERCISE COURT-ORDERED VISITATION. < A ]
* 2 ] Section 2. Section 30-5-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 123, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read:
)-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents and other immediate family members.
\> (1) < A ] The district court may grant grandparents [ A > AND OTHER IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS < A ] reasonable rights of
sitation [ D > to grandchildren, < D ] if it is in the best interest of the [ D > grandchildren < D ] [ A > CHILDREN < A ] .
V> (2) GRANDPARENTS AND OTHER IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS MAY PETITION THE COURT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-321.2 TO REMEDY A PARENT'S WRONGFUL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH A VISITATION ORDER. < A ]
* 3 ] Section 3. Section 63-63a-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 253, Laws of Utah 1992, is amended to read:
3-63a-8. Children's Legal Defense Account.
) There is created a restricted account within the General Fund known as the Children's Legal Defense Account.
) The purpose of the Children's Legal Defense Account is to provide for programs that protect and defend the rights, safety, and
jality of life of children.
) The Legislature shall appropriate money from the account for the administrative and related costs of the following programs:
) relating to the effects of divorce on children as provided in Sections 30-3-4, 30-3-7, 30-3-10.3, 30-3-11.3, 30-3-15.3, and 30-3J, Mandatory Educational Course on Children's Needs for Divorcing Parents - Pilot Program, and Sections 30-3-15.3, 30-3-18, and
)-3-19 through 30-3-31, Mediation Pilot Program - Child Custody or Visitation;
) implementing the use of guardians ad litem as provided in Sections 30-3-5.2, 78-3a-44.5, 78-3a-63, 78-3a-65, 78-11-6, and 789, and termination of parental rights as provided in Sections 78-3a-39, 78-3a-42, 78-3a-47, and 78-3a-101 through 78-3a-115.

his account may not be used to supplant funding for the guardian ad litem program in the juvenile court as provided in Section 78a-63; [ D > and < D ]
:) requiring community service for violation of visitation orders or failure to pay child support as provided in Section 78-32-12.1
A> ; AND < A ]
JV> (D) ENFORCING AND ADMINISTERING THE PILOT PROGRAM AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-12.3 ESTABLISHING THE
ANCTIONS FOR SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH VISITATION ORDERS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-12.2 < A ] .
I) The following withheld fees shall be allocated to the Children's Legal Defense Account:
0 an additional fee of $ 10 shall be withheld on every marriage license issued in the state of Utah as provided in Section 21-2-2;
nd
)) a fee of $ 2 shall be withheld from the existing civil filing fee collected on any complaint, affidavit, or petition in a civil, probate, or
joption matter in every court of record.
>) The Division of Finance shall allocate the monies described in Section (4) from the General Fund to the Children's Legal Defense
:count.
* 4 ] Section 4. Section 78-32-12.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 253, Laws of Utah 1992, is amended
• read:
3-32-12.1. Community service for violation of visitation order or failure to pay child support.
) If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent has refused to comply with the minimum amount of visitation
dered in a decree of divorce, the court [ D > may < D ] [ A > SHALL < A ] order the parent to:
) perform [ A > A MINIMUM OF 10 HOURS OF < A ] community service; and
) participate in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to educate the parent about the importance of complying with the court
der and providing a child a continuing relationship with both parents.
) If a custodial parent is ordered to perform community service or undergo court-ordered education, there is a rebuttable
esumption that the noncustodial parent be granted visitation by the court to provide child care during the time the custodial parent
complying with community service or education in order to recompense him for visitation time wrongfully denied by the custodial
irent under the divorce decree.
) If a noncustodial parent is ordered to perform community service or undergo court-ordered education, the court shall attempt to
hedule the community service or education at times that will not interfere with the noncustodial parent's visitation with the child.
) The person ordered to participate in court-ordered education is responsible for expenses of workshops, classes, and individual
unseling.
) If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an obligor, as defined in Section 78-45-2, has refused to pay child
pport as ordered by a court in accordance with Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, the court [ D > may < D ]
> SHALL < A ] order the obligor to:
) perform [ A > A MINIMUM OF 10 HOURS OF < A ] community service; and
) participate in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to educate the obligor about the importance of complying with the court
jer and providing the children with a regular and stable source of support.
) The obligor is responsible for the expenses of workshops, classes, and individual counseling ordered by the court.
> If a court orders an obligor to perform community service or undergo court-ordered education, the court shall attempt to schedule
i community service or education at times that will not interfere with the obligor's visitation with the child.
I The [ D > penalties < D ] [ A > SANCTIONS < A ] that the court [ D > may < D ] [ A > SHALL < A ] impose under this section do not
>vent the court from imposing other [ D > penalties < D ] [ A > SANCTIONS AS < A ] provided [ D > by < D ] [ A > IN SECTION 78-32.2 OR OTHER PROVISIONS IN < A ] this chapter, or prevent any person from bringing a cause of action allowed under state or
leral law.
The Legislature shall allocate the money from the Children's Legal Defense Account to the judiciary to defray the cost of enforcing
j administering this section.
5 ] Section 5. Section 78-32-12.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
> 78-32-12.2. < A ] Definitions - Sanctions.
> (1) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION: < A ]

A> (A) "MAKE UP VISITATION" MEANS VISITATION WHICH IS: < A ]
A> (I) OF THE SAME TYPE AND DURATION OF VISITATION AS THAT WHICH WAS DENIED, INCLUDING VISITATION DURING
VEEKDAYS, WEEKENDS, HOLIDAYS, AND DURING EXTENDED VISITATION PERIODS; < A ]
:A> (II) TO BE MADE UP WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER THE COURT HAS ENTERED ITS ORDER OF MAKE UP VISITATIONS; AND < A ]
;A> (III) IN THE MANNER CHOSEN BY THE AGGRIEVED PARENT IF IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD. < A ]
> > (B) "PETITION" MEANS A PETITION BROUGHT BY A PARENT, A GRANDPARENT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 30-5-2, BY OTHER
MMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS, OR UPON THE COURTS OWN MOTION ALLEGING THAT A PARENT IS NOT COMPLYING WITH A
/ISITATION ORDER IN A DECREE OF DIVORCE OR A SUBSEQUENT VISITATION ENFORCEMENT ORDER WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT AT
DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE ALLEGED PATTERN OF NONCOMPLIANCE: < A ]
[A> (I) A FIRST PETITION IS A PETITION TO ENFORCE AN ORIGINAL ORDER OF VISITATION OR A PETITION FILED AFTER THREE
fEARS FROM THE LAST VISITATION ENFORCEMENT ORDER; < A ]
[A> (II) A SECOND PETITION IS A PETITION FILED WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING ENTRY OF THE FIRST VISITATION
ENFORCEMENT ORDER; AND < A ]
[ A > (III) A THIRD PERSON IS A PETITION FILED WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING ENTRY OF THE SECOND VISITATION
ENFORCEMENT ORDER. < A ]
[ A > (C) "SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE" MEANS CONDUCT WHICH: < A ]
[ A > (I) SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERES WITH A COURT ORDERED VISITATION SCHEDULE; OR < A ]
[ A > (II) INTERFERES WITH PARENTS RIGHT TO FREQUENT, MEANINGFUL, AND CONTINUING ACCESS WITH HIS CHILD AND WHICH
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRS THAT PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP. < A ]
[ A > (D) "VISITATION ENFORCEMENT ORDER" MEANS AN ORDER TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH AN ORIGINAL VISITATION ORDER
THROUGH THE USE OF SANCTIONS. < A ]
[ A > (2) UPON A FIRST PETITION, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: < A ]
[ A > (A) IF THE FIRST PETITION IS UNCONTESTED, BY DEFAULT: < A ]
[ A > (I) A PERMANENT INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE COURTS VISITATION ORDER; < A ]
[ A > (II) MAKE UP VISITATION FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARENT AND CHILD; AND < A ]
[ A > (III) PARTICIPATION IN WORKSHOPS, CLASSES, OR INDIVIDUAL COUNSELING TO EDUCATE THE PARENT ABOUT THE
IMPORTANCE OF COMPLYING WITH THE COURT ORDER AND PROVIDING THE CHILD WITH A CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH
BOTH PARENTS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1 (1)(B); OR < A ]
[ A > (B) IF THE FIRST PETITION IS CONTESTED, THE COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE VISITATION ORDER. < A ]
[ A > (3) UPON A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: < A ]
[ A > (A) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS TO THE PREVAILING PARTY; < A ]
[ A > (B) MAKE UP VISITATION FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARENT AND CHILD; < A ]
[ A > (C) A MINIMUM OF 10 HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1 (1)(A); AND < A ]
[ A > (D) A PERMANENT INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE COURTS VISITATION ORDER. < A ]
[ A > (4) UPON A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE, THE COURT MAY ORDER: < A ]
[ A > (A) MEDIATION WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO REPORT BACK TO THE COURT ON THE RESULTS OF MEDIATION WITHIN 30 DAYS;
<A]
[ A > (B) PARTICIPATION IN WORKSHOPS, CLASSES, OR INDIVIDUAL COUNSELING TO EDUCATE THE PARENT ABOUT THE
IMPORTANCE OF COMPLYING WITH THE COURT ORDER AND PROVIDING THE CHILD WITH A CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH
BOTH PARENTS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1 (1)(B); OR < A ]
[ A > (C) A FINE OR JAIL SENTENCE OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER CONTEMPT OF COURT IN SECTION
78-32-10. < A ]
[ A > (5) UPON A SECOND PETITION, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: < A ]

;A> (A) IF THE SECOND PETITION IS UNCONTESTED, BY DEFAULT: < A ]
;A> (I) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS; < A ]
A > (II) MAKE UP VISITATION TO BE PROVIDED FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARENT AND CHILD; < A ]
A > (III) A MINIMUM OF 10 HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1(1)(A); AND < A ]
A > (IV) IMPOSE A FINE OR JAIL SENTENCE OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER CONTEMPT OF COURT IN
iECTION 78-32-10; OR < A ]
A > (B) IF THE SECOND PETITION IS CONTESTED, THE COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
HE EVIDENCE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE VISITATION ORDERS. < A ]
A > (6) UPON A FINDING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: < A ]
A > (A) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS TO THE PREVAILING PARTY; < A ]
A > (B) MAKE UP VISITATION TO BE PROVIDED FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARTY AND CHILD AT TWICE THE AMOUNT OF TIME
REVIOUSLY WRONGFULLY DENIED AND UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTIONS 78-32-12.2(3)(A)
HROUGH (C); < A ]
A> (C) A MINIMUM OF 20 HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1(1)(A); < A ]
A> (D) A CONTEMPT ORDER WHICH IMPOSES A FINE OR JAIL SENTENCE AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-10; AND < A ]
A> (E) THE VIOLATOR TO POST BOND OR SECURITY IN THE AMOUNT DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO INSURE FUTURE
OMPLIANCE. < A ]
«V> (7) THE COURT MAY IMPOSE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WHICH MAY INCLUDE ANY ADDITIONAL REMEDIES, TERMS, OR
ONDITIONS WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S PREVIOUS ORDER. < A ]
* > (8) UPON A THIRD PETITION, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: < A ]
\ > (A) IF THE THIRD PETITION IS UNCONTESTED, BY DEFAULT: < A ]
\ > (I) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS; < A ]
\> (II) MAKE UP VISITATION TO BE PROVIDED FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARTY AND CHILD AT TWICE THE AMOUNT OF TIME
DEVIOUSLY DENIED AND UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTIONS 78-32-12.2(3)(A) THROUGH (C); < A ]
V> (III) A MINIMUM OF TEN HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1(1)(A); AND < A ]
V> (IV) IMPOSE A FINE OR JAIL SENTENCE OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER CONTEMPT OF COURT IN
ECTION 78-32-10; OR < A ]
V> (B) IF THE THIRD PETITION IS CONTESTED, THE COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
iE EVIDENCE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE VISITATION ORDERS. < A ]
i> (9) UPON A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: < A ]
i> (A) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS TO THE PREVAILING PARTY; < A ]
i> (B) A FINDING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IS
GAINST THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD FOR PURPOSES OF MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY AND ORDER A TEMPORARY CHANGE
:
CUSTODY FOR A DURATION TO BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT; AND < A ]
> (C) A FINDING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A PROBABLE CAUSE SHOWING OF CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE AS PROVIDED IN
CTION 76-5-303 AND ORDER THE CASE TO BE REFERRED TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY FOR PROSECUTION. < A ]
> (10) THE COURT MAY DECLINE TO ISSUE AN ORDER WITH THE ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTIONS 78-12.2(2) THROUGH (9) ALTHOUGH THE PETITIONER HAS MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IF THE COURT PROVIDES FINDINGS ON
IE RECORD EXPLAINING WHY A SANCTION OR SANCTIONS WERE NOT IMPOSED. < A ]
> (11) THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT SHALL GIVE THE COURT AND THE CUSTODIAL PARENT WRITTEN NOTICE OF HIS INTENTION
EXERCISE THE MAKE UP VISITATION AT LEAST SEVEN DAYS BEFORE THE PROPOSED VISIT IF IT IS TO BE ON A WEEKDAY OR
EEKEND, AND AT LEAST 30 DAYS BEFORE THE PROPOSED VISIT IF IT IS TO BE ON A HOLIDAY OR AN EXTENDED VISITATION
RIOD. < A ]
> (12) THE COURT SHALL SUSPEND ANY PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 78-32-12.2 IF SUBSTANTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD
USE OR CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION OR A CASE IS PENDING IN THE COURTS ON THE ALLEGATIONS. < A ]

\> (13) THE FILING OF ANY PETITION UNDER THIS SECTION WHICH IS FOUND TO BE WITHOUT MERIT AND NOT ASSERTED OR
EFENDED AGAINST IN GOOD FAITH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS AS DETERMINED BY THE COURT. < A ]
(V> (14) THIS SECTION SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY AS A PILOT PROGRAM IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT AS PROVIDED IN
ECTION 78-32-12.3. < A ]
;*6] Section 6. Section 78-32-12.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
A> 78-32-12.3. < A ] Pilot program — Purpose ~ Evaluation of pilot program — Exceptions.
A> (1) THERE IS ESTABLISHED A MANDATORY SANCTIONS FOR SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH VISITATION ORDERS PILOT
ROGRAM IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT TO BE ADMINISTERED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS BEGINNING
ULY 1, 1993, TO JULY 1, 1994. THE MANDATORY SANCTIONS PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A PETITIONER WITH A SPEEDY
JMD EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE TO VISITATION ORDERS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-12.2. < A ]
A > (2) THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL SHALL ADOPT RULES TO IMPLEMENT AND ADMINISTER THIS PILOT PROGRAM. < A ]
A > (3) AS USED IN THIS SECTION, A PETITIONER WHO FILES A PETITION UNDER SECTION 78-32-12.2 IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL
)ISTRICT AS DEFINED IN SECTION 78-1-2.1, WHERE THE PILOT PROGRAM IS ADMINISTERED, IS GOVERNED BY THIS SECTION.
CA]
; A > ( 4 ) T H E A D M I N I S T R A T I V E O F F I C E O F T H E C O U R T S S H A L L A D O P T A PROGRAM T O EVALUATE T H E EFFECTIVENESS O F T H I S
>ILOT P R O G R A M . PROGRESS REPORTS S H A L L BE P R O V I D E D T O T H E J U D I C I A R Y I N T E R I M C O M M I T T E E O N T H E D A T E O F
M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F T H I S S E C T I O N A N D O N T H E RESULTS B E G I N N I N G O C T O B E R 1 9 9 3 A N D A P R I L 1 9 9 4 . T H E C R I T E R I A U S E D T O
DETERMINE T H E RESULTS S H A L L I N C L U D E A SURVEY O F T H E : < A ]
."A> ( A ) P E T I T I O N E R S A N D R E S P O N D E N T S I N T H E F I R S T J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T W H O P A R T I C I P A T E D I N T H E P I L O T PROGRAM A N D T H E
REMEDIES T H E Y RECOVERED FOR S U B S T A N T I A L N O N C O M P L I A N C E W I T H A V I S I T A T I O N O R D E R OR O R D E R S ; < A ]
[ A > (B) PARTICIPANTS I N THE PILOT PROGRAM, I N C L U D I N G PETITIONERS, RESPONDENTS, PRACTITIONERS, COURT
ZOMMISSIONERS, A N D JUDGES O N T H E ISSUES OF NONCOMPLIANCE W I T H V I S I T A T I O N ORDERS; < A ]
[ A > ( C ) P E T I T I O N E R S A N D R E S P O N D E N T S I N T H E S E C O N D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T W H O D I D N O T PARTICIPATE I N T H E P I L O T
PROGRAM A N D T H E R E M E D I E S T H E Y R E C O V E R E D FOR S U B S T A N T I A L N O N C O M P L I A N C E W I T H A V I S I T A T I O N O R D E R O R O R D E R S ;

MMD < A ]
[ A > (D) PRACTITIONERS, COURT COMMISSIONERS, AND JUDGES IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ON THE ISSUES OF
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH VISITATION ORDERS. < A ]
[ A > (5) THE COURT SHALL SUSPEND ANY PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 78-32-12.2 IF SUBSTANTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD
ABUSE OR CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION OR A CASE IS PENDING IN THE COURTS ON THE ALLEGATIONS. <A]
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